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Executive Summary  
 
Forecasting, when power law distributions apply 
 
Thesis focus: 
 
The focus of my thesis, as outlined in my thesis proposal, is: 
 
Whilst a lot of our strategic focus in the public sector is on linear policy approaches, many 
systems/ phenomena of importance are defined as non-linear or far from equilibrium. 
Traditional approaches to linear forecasting have not proved effective for non-linear systems, 
since non-linear systems follow a different set of rules. Historically, non-linear systems were 
too hard to forecast, but over recent decades some rules and approaches are starting to 
emerge.  
 
One important and clearly defined category of non-linear systems are those that follow a 
‘power-law’ distribution rather than the ‘normal’ distribution, which is often associated with 
linear systems or systems in equilibrium. My research collects, analyses, and does a 
comparative analysis of the different power law populations, as well as the main strategic 
forecasting techniques that can be applied to those populations/ systems.  
 
Overall Conclusions and observations 
Just as in science and mathematics, there is now a clearly defined separation and 
understanding of linear and non-linear systems and the rules that apply to each. My thesis 
has as its central theme, the idea that strategy as a subject also fits this same philosophical 
separation of approaches, which I have called the strategic planning versus the strategic 
thinking divide. Strategic planning is essentially the linear approach – being rational and 
assuming relatively stable conditions. Strategic thinking assumes the world is effectively non-
linear and ‘far from equilibrium’. Non-linear approaches mean acknowledging concepts like; 
punctuated equilibrium, power law ‘log-log’ graphs, ‘scale-free’ characteristics, ‘self organising 
criticality’, accepting only pattern prediction (including 1/f formulas) and not precise prediction 
etc. Understanding non-linearity is essential to understand such things as ‘Black Swans’. 
Luck, serendipity and ‘bounded rationality’ are always involved in non-linear complex adaptive 
systems, whereas linear systems tend to comply with the so called ‘rational’ traditions in 
science and economics.  
 
Power law statistical distributions can be seen in a wide variety of non-linear natural and man-
made phenomena, from earthquakes and solar flares to populations of cities and sales of 
books. This sheer diversity of effects that have power law distributions is actually an amazing 
fact that has only become evident over the last decade or so. Since the world contains 
aspects that are clearly linear and other aspects that are clearly non-linear, it is essential for 
someone interested in strategy to be able to understand both systems and be able to apply 
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the correct techniques to each approach. The two parts of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ effectively 
link the two strategic approaches together as there is only one world and not two separate 
realities.  
 
It therefore follows that a strategist needs a good understanding of both strategic planning 
and strategic thinking, since both are needed for different phases or periods, and perhaps 
both are needed for any period when you can't tell what phase you are in, which can also 
happen. I suggest that under a linear phase, the strategic planning approach should be 
dominant, but supported by strategic thinking (since you never know when events will turn 
abruptly); whereas in a turbulent non-linear period the strategic thinking approach should be 
dominant, but supported by strategic planning (since you know that great turbulence will not 
last). This is a sort of a swapping dominant/ recessive situation, which has a loose parallel in 
the theory of the left/ right brain split, where it is not wise to use only one style of thinking, 
since there are two styles which suit different situations. The key is to pick the right thinking 
style for the right situation. Just as we have one brain, but two thinking styles, so in the 
strategy toolbox we also have two valid, useful and complimentary general strategic 
approaches.   
 
However for this thesis, I have focused on the non-linear power law aspects of life which have 
strong implications for strategic thinking, since that is the new area for me as well as one of 
the new knowledge frontiers for strategy as a subject (and for leadership, politics and many 
other areas).   
 
Specific observations 
 
 The ‘sandpile’ metaphor is the key non-linear metaphor 
The answer to my research question, ‘Forecasting, when power law distributions apply’, is 
to understand the ‘sandpile’ metaphor of Per Bak, where the next event could be very 
small or occasionally very large, and that the overall pattern of the events will follow an 
emergent power law ‘log-log’ chart. From this follow mathematical 1/f type ratios. Inherent 
in the sandpile metaphor is the associated concept of self-organising criticality, in which a 
scale-factor of a system diverges, because the system automatically drives itself to a 
critical point by some dynamic process, no matter what state they start off in. The 
divergence can leave the system with no appropriate scale factor to set the size of some 
measured quantity and therefore the quantity follows a power law. The power-law 
distribution is the only distribution that is scale-free. 
 
 Power laws distributions are inherently unfair (the ‘rich-get-richer’) 
The Pareto process is a rich-get-richer mechanism in which the most populous cities or 
best-selling books get more inhabitants or sales in proportion to the numbers they already 
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have. These distributions have a power law in their tail. These ‘rich-get-richer’ processes 
are also known as the Matthew effect, cumulative advantage or preferential attachment. 
The ‘Matthew’ effect comes from the biblical edict, ‘For unto every one that hath shall be 
given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even 
that which he hath.’ (Matthew 25:29 – King James Bible). To me this edict seems harsh, 
but is very apt for reality. Newman believes that this principle is now the most widely 
accepted theory for explaining such things as citations, city populations and personal 
income. 
 
 Increased networks/ interdependence, means increased turbulence  
As the world becomes more connected through social, political and economic networks, 
the importance of understanding non-linear systems increases as turbulence in all these 
systems dramatically increases due to power law effects within network flows. Extremes 
will get more extreme due to the ‘Matthew’ effect, where the winners take all.  
 
 Accepting that power laws only give pattern prediction not point prediction  
 For example, you will never be able to predict the size of the next earthquake or war, but 
the power law graph for that subject gives a clear forecasting framework at the highest 
level looking at all the available data, which we can learn from and help us get over the 
idea of needing to predict the next event. For example, Karl Popper believed that under a 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ scenario, forecasting inherently is not possible, but you should at 
least understand why that is so.  
 
 No difference between natural and human power law activities  
For this thesis (which is a preliminary study of the subject) I have found no effective 
difference between natural effects (e.g. earthquakes or animal extinction rates) that follow 
power law distributions and human activities (e.g. wealth, war, citations etc) that follow 
power law distributions. I have therefore not separated the two different types in this 
thesis. In fact the later section on networks is in purely alphabetical order of the subject. 
This lack of difference is not a comforting finding. The implications of this lack of clear 
difference between natural and human effects is considered in the Conclusions chapter. It 
is a profound question, as to whether we can actually change the various underlying 
power law patterns or are we predestined to fit these patterns.  
 
 Complexity is still an emerging subject, against a background of linear thinking  
Like all emerging areas, the study of complexity (non-linearity) naturally comes up against 
resistance from the established paradigms of thinking which are essentially linear and 
equilibrium in focus. For the subjects that I covered, this reaction is most apparent in 
traditional (meaning much of current) economics. For most items covered I put forward 
both views - the traditional and the complexity explanations. Studying so many different 
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power law examples was important to reinforce how widespread and conceptually similar 
all these different power law examples all are, even if they are describing completely 
different things.  
 
 Sample sizes for power law graphs are impressive 
For example, many of the populations tested are the complete population at a given point 
or for a period of time. Sometimes the sample sizes are measured in millions of data 
points. For example, Stanley collected 35 million observations on the Paris Stock 
Exchange.  Since these are impressive sample sizes or are the complete populations for 
a given time period, it is clear that any thoughts of my sampling any population is by 
comparison slightly futile. 
 
Importance of modelling 
One very important tool, which I have hardly mentioned in this thesis, is ‘modelling’. Probably 
every power-law example in this thesis comes from sources that not only record the power-
law log-log chart but also record attempts at modelling that subject using that chart’s power-
law co-efficient. I acknowledge the extreme importance of power-law charts to modellers 
since this has provided new methods and a greatly enlarged range of subjects (i.e. everything 
non-linear) to model.  As stated in the introduction, my interest is only in the high level 
principles of non-linearity as it affects strategy. I am not a modeller, so I have not emphasized 
that aspect but that should not be taken as a lack of appreciation of how important power-
laws are to modelling over a whole range of subjects. Whilst ‘modelling’ is an important 
technique it is not the one word answer to my thesis question. It is not my interest or my 
journey for this thesis. However, I believe this thesis would be a good background explanation 
of the subject of power-law non-linearity for modellers and non-modellers (like me).   It doesn’t 
help you ‘predict’ the next event, but it should provide a good description of what is happening 
or could happen.  
 
Power law applications and key non-linear concepts 
In this thesis, I have collected and analysed as many power law distributions (log-log charts) 
as I can find. Whilst the reader may find this repetitive, I found this repetition extremely 
important because it reinforced how widespread power-law effects are and because I applied 
the ‘emergent’ concept to the subject of non-linearity itself. For example, I knew quite early on 
that each example was often incomplete in itself, but collectively the reader could see that the 
same themes and the same linear versus non-linear debates were occurring again and again. 
Hence the whole (different examples of power-law effects) is in my view greater than the sum 
of the incomplete individual parts. I note that there are other non-linear distributions (which I 
have not studied) that are not power-law distributions and that Newman and others have 
indicated that not all distributions that are said to be power-law distributions are power-law.   
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Throughout the thesis the main ideas and concepts that strategic forecasting needs to apply 
to non-linear power-law distributions are:  
 
 Understanding the importance of complex adaptive systems, 
 ‘Scale-free’ or ‘scale invariant’ features,  
 Punctuated equilibrium (periods of stability and periods of rapid change),  
 Self-organised criticality (poised at a tipping point), 
 The ‘Butterfly’ effect (small changes can have big effects), 
 Emergent properties or patterns,  
 The ‘Matthew’ effect (winner takes all),  
 Change is caused by both Internal/ external triggers, 
 Pattern prediction rather than point prediction, 
 Straight line log-log graphs are the signature of power law-distributions,  
 With emergent power-law patterns, details don’t matter, 
 Increased networks/ interdependence, means increased turbulence, and  
 Strategy is about surviving the ‘Red Queen’ Race. 
 
These concepts are covered throughout the thesis as they apply to each power law 
application and they are summarised in the Conclusions chapter. 
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Forecasting, when power law distributions apply  
 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
Background to my thesis  
My research topic builds on aspects of my Master of Strategic Studies (MSS) course work, 
especially STRA 519 (Research Essay), STRA 511 (Strategic Thinking) and STRA 502 
(Strategic Analysis).   
  
In my 2009/10 research essay for STRA 519, ‘Picking the best strategic forecasting tool for 
the job at hand’, I mostly focussed my efforts on what I would now describe as ‘linear’ 
approaches that suggested one could forecast into the future (such as forecasting one or 
more scenarios).  These approaches included: force field analysis, induction, deduction, 
extrapolation, theoretical and judgemental approaches. I also considered dimensions of 
change such as incremental, substantial and transformational change. I covered these areas 
further than I had before and in my mind was comfortable that I understood the different 
techniques that I had considered. I also touched on the effect of power laws, but since that 
was a new area of knowledge for me, I did not have time or space to explore that area further 
or in any depth. Understanding power laws and complexity was therefore an area of 
unfinished business as far as my learning was involved. 
 
It is therefore natural that just as I finished my STRA 519 research essay, I realised that I had 
only finished half of it and I had what for me, was the unexplored area of non-linear 
forecasting to do and that was in my mind like a part two of my first essay. The STRA 519 
research essay summarised approaches that believed the future can to some extent be 
forecast, whereas this essay will be the opposite, that forecasting the future is not possible on 
all important matters, especially when dealing with complex adaptive systems. This is 
because of concepts such as tipping points, punctuated equilibrium, emergent properties, 
butterfly effects and scale free effects. Whilst I had some familiarity with many of these terms; 
I was aware that these and other non-linear concepts (also called ‘complexity’), use a 
completely separate set of jargon from the books that I had previously been studying. I have 
used this thesis to gain an understanding of this complexity language.  
 
Throughout my Master of Strategic Studies degree I started to notice that many of the articles 
in our reading packs talked about the difference between thinking about linear things versus 
thinking about non-linear things.  For example, in STRA 511 – Strategic Thinking, I looked 
long and hard at the readings provided, by thinkers like F.A. Hayek (complex systems) and 
John Sterman (All models are wrong – Systems thinking) and at that time did not really know 
how to fit them into my mental structure for strategic thinking. Only now that I have studied 
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linearity/ non-linearity, do I have a better understanding of their place and importance in 
defining non-linear thinking and the implications for strategy.  
 
In this study I wanted to find out what is meant by non-linearity and how you recognise a non-
linear effect when you see it. The complexity books that I read, kept referring to power law 
distributions as the signature feature of non-linear complex adaptive systems. This study is 
therefore a study of power laws and through studying power laws I want to understand non-
linearity.   
 
At first I thought it might be too much of a jump to do a review of power law examples coming 
from completely different subjects. However, when I was invited by my supervisor Dr Lance 
Beath to present my research essay (STRA 519) findings to his STRA 502 – Strategic 
Analysis class in April 2010, I used cross subject examples such as earthquakes, spread of 
disease and war etc. From the class questions, I soon discovered that strategy/ policy 
students come from employers such as the Earthquake and War Damage Commission, the 
Ministry of Health and Defence and what to me may be slightly academic, was to many 
students part of their day jobs. It is often governmental organisations that have a very high 
interest and need to understand non-linear systems and where possible, make forecasts and 
know on what they should be forecasting on.  
 
My inherent focus is on ‘strategy’, not mathematics/ statistics or modelling 
This thesis is inherently about strategy/ policy as it involves forecasting. My interest is not in 
the statistical or mathematical aspects of power laws. Whilst my thesis is not intended to be a 
mathematical/ statistics exercise, I was very keen to include the forty or more ‘log-log’ power 
law charts into this study. To me these charts are of high importance in showing the actual 
empirical data that all the subsequent assumptions are based on and also to show how 
different (as well as the same) each chart is from each other. The reader should note that 
there are at least two different approaches to drawing these charts (e.g. one is the Zipf’s 
approach of ranking and the second is simply numeric). Seeing the various charts also 
highlights how the ‘real’ data is never completely ‘perfect’, but it is still always amazing to see 
these straight power law lines considering they are ‘emergent’ properties.   
 
Whilst I have no inherent interest in producing ‘models’, I note that ‘complexity’ and probably 
every topic covered in my thesis can be and already is being modelled. Power laws have 
given modellers a wonderful tool to start their work.  We need their work, so good luck to 
them, but that is not me. I have no inherent interest or skill in the mathematical aspects, only 
in how a policy/ strategy person can use the results for increased forecasting understanding 
and the understanding that predicting the next event is effectively impossible when dealing 
with a non-linear effect. 
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High level starting point 
From the conclusions of the research essay (STRA 519) and subsequent readings, I compiled 
the following linear versus non-linear table which set out my initial subject understanding. In 
the next three chapters, I will define the various terms I have used below.   
 
Table 1 Comparing non-linear to linear 
 Non-linear Linear 
Definition Complex adaptive systems Simple systems 
Change phase ‘Punctuated’ ‘Equilibrium’ 
Statistical distribution system 
applying 
Power laws Normal bell curve 
Key strategic features The whole is greater/less than the 
sum of the parts and the need to 
leverage 
The whole is equal to the 
sum of the parts 
 
This thesis sets out to explore the validity of this initial categorisation. To do this and to keep 
tight study focus, I selected as the prime focus for this thesis, the study of power law effects. 
To do this I have to take examples from where-ever I can across subjects. This includes the 
study of wealth distribution (Pareto’s law), the frequency of words and city sizes (Zipf’s law), 
share market fluctuations, company size fluctuations – including growth/ decline rates, 
company failures, earthquakes (Gutenberg-Richter law), scientific citations (Lotka’s law) and 
scientific progress (Thomas Kuhn), species extinction, war (Richardson’s law), river networks, 
sexual partners, traffic jams and computer networks. Whilst many of these different power 
effects had their own name (e.g. Pareto’s law of wealth distribution), behind each power law is 
the same defining log-log graph and the same distinctive set of rules.  
 
Of course life is never simple, as my early readings (i.e. Mark Newman) had highlighted that 
the study of power laws is a relatively new subject and that the defining ‘log-log’ graphs are 
not only caused by power law distributions but also log-normal and exponential distribution. I 
am not sure what the significance is of these other distributions but I have kept my focus on 
purely power law distributions since the power law distribution system is the basis of 
complexity and the distinctive scale free predictions. These issues are considered further in 
Chapter 17.  
 
Thesis outline 
Chapters Two to Four define key concepts. Chapter Two starts with understanding non-
linearity (complexity); by considering the following distinctions – reductionism versus holism, 
simple versus complex adaptive systems, linear versus non-linear examples; as well as 
providing examples of how non-linear systems produce ‘emergent’ properties or effects. At 
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the end of this chapter, I make the link between strategic planning/ linearity, and strategic 
thinking/ non-linearity.  
 
Chapter Three introduces the concept of power laws. This is done by highlighting the 
difference between the normal distribution and power law distribution systems. This chapter 
introduces the ‘log-log’ graph which is the signature of a power law, and describes how power 
law distributions are ‘scale-free’. In this chapter I assert that understanding power laws are 
fundamental for strategic forecasting.  
 
Chapter Four introduces the concepts of punctuated equilibrium, the 1987 landmark physics 
‘sandpile’ experiment and metaphor and related to this, self organised criticality. The 
‘sandpile’ metaphor is considered in some detail because this is perhaps the key metaphor in 
all power law examples throughout my thesis. Whilst the term ‘punctuated equilibrium’ was 
first used to explain fossils, the term has subsequently been applied to other subjects 
including strategy (especially by Miller, Friesen, and Mintzberg). 
 
Chapter Five is a review of Pareto’s law of wealth distribution. This is the first of the different 
power law distributions covered. This chapter highlights how classical economics (linear/ 
equilibrium/ rational) cannot account for the non-linear Pareto’s law, and it explores the 80/20 
Rule and its conceptual opposite approach of the ‘Long Tail’.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven consider different power law applications that are called Zipf’s law. 
These include the frequency of words used, size of cities, and size of companies. All these 
examples have log-log graphs that provide high empirical evidence of non-linearity and have 
little traditional linear theory to explain them. The non-linear/ complexity explanations are 
relatively new and still developing.  
 
Chapters Eight to Eleven consider different economic power law applications. These include 
the distinction between traditional ‘equilibrium’ economics and complexity ‘non-equilibrium’ 
economics, as well as considering non-linear concepts such as Joseph Schumpeter’s ‘Gales 
of creative destruction’ and strategy is ‘about surviving the Red Queen Race’; as well as 
considering power law charts for stock price fluctuations, share volumes traded, company 
growth/ decline rates, and company failure rates.  
 
Chapters Twelve to Sixteen cover a number of different networks, both natural and human 
that have power law distributions. These include earthquakes, scientific citations, Thomas 
Kuhn’s paradigm shifts, species extinctions, war, movie-actor networks, the Internet, the 
World Wide Web, traffic jams, river networks, and the number of sexual partners.  
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Chapters Seventeen to Nineteen consider what this all means. Chapter Seventeen considers 
the problem, that not all apparent power law distributions are completely power law 
distributions. Chapter Eighteen considers the strategic implications of non-linearity and 
Chapter Nineteen offers my conclusions to the question I originally posed. This was, how do 
you know when a situation is non-linear and what tools and techniques do you use to handle 
that situation? 
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Chapter 2 - Understanding non linearity (Complexity) 
This chapter considers four important background and interrelated sets of definitions that are 
important for understanding forecasting when power laws apply. These are: 
 
 Defining reductionist and holistic approaches,  
 Defining simple and complex adaptive systems, 
 Defining linear and non-linearity, including examples, and 
 Defining what is meant by non-linear systems producing ‘emergent’ properties or 
patterns.  
 
Defining reductionist and holistic approaches 
Historically scientific thinking has always placed a lot of value in ‘reductionism’, which seeks 
to break things (e.g. atoms or DNA etc) into smaller and smaller parts. Reductionism asserts 
that the whole can be decomposed and analyzed in terms of its constituents that are 
considered as fundamental to the whole.
1
 This has generally served science very well and 
has lead to great advances in most subjects over the last three hundred years.  
 
In recent decades, many scientists (especially those studying complexity) themselves have 
questioned the value of relying entirely on reductionism and have suggested as a 
complementary style, the use of ‘holistic’ thinking. Holism professes that the whole is 
fundamental and cannot be reduced to its components, as the whole is sometimes greater 
than the sum of its components.
1
 This distinction (reductionism versus holism) has become 
clearer over time, as we now know that linear systems are more or less equal to the sum of 
their parts; and nonlinear systems may be either much more, or much less, than the sum of 
their parts.
2
   
 
Reductionism is great for quantitative aspects of internal details. In contrast, our current 
understanding of external large-scale effects is mostly descriptive and qualitative, geometric 
rather than numerical. We can recognise a hurricane from satellite photos, but we can’t tell 
exactly what it’s going to do.
3
  For many subjects such as in ecology, epidemiology, or 
economics, we also need to study the whole or at least part of the system. Without the holistic 
thinking provided by ‘complexity’ it is difficult to make predictions on the spread of AIDS or to 
predict stock-market crashes. Cohen goes further and suggests that there are no big areas of 
reductionist causality in social science or management studies.
4
 
 
                                               
1
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2
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3
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4
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Defining simple and complex systems 
 
Simple systems generally involve a small number of individual elements with relatively weak 
interactions between them. Reductionism works well for simple systems.
5
 Using this 
definition, simple systems would include many aspects of classical physics but would be very 
problematic for much of modern physics and biology.  
 
Complex adaptive systems, on the other hand, involve a medium-sized number of agents 
(drivers, traders, molecules etc). These agents are generally both intelligent and adaptive, in 
the sense that they make decisions in accordance with various rules, and are ready to modify 
their rules of action on the basis of new information that comes their way. There are no 
dictators or centralised controllers in these systems. There is generally no single driver, 
trader, or molecule that has access to what other actors in the system are doing, so the 
agents in a complex adaptive system make their decisions and update their rules for action on 
the basis of local rather than global, information. For studying complex adaptive systems, new 
and different approaches to reductionism are needed. Fortunately one new method to study 
complex systems is by computer simulation and ‘what-if’ games. No longer do we 
automatically have to break the system into simpler subsystems.
5
   
 
Defining linear and non-linear 
 
Linear systems are systems in which changes in the initial conditions lead to proportional 
changes in the final state.
1
 Linear systems have been the mainstay of science for more than 
three hundred years: because one plus one equals two, and we can predict that the total 
volume of water flowing down a drain is double when a tap drips for twice as long.
6
 Linear 
systems are relatively simple to understand, especially compared to non-linear systems, so it 
is probably natural that our education system seems to have a bias towards training us to 
think in a linear fashion.   
 
Nonlinear systems are systems in which changes in initial conditions do not produce 
proportional changes in the final state.
1
 Nonlinear systems do not obey the simple rules. 
Compare the simple flow of water down a drain (double the time means double the flow at a 
constant rate) with the complex nonlinear phenomena that regulate the quantity of water in 
the human body, or the movement of water vapour in the clouds overhead.  
 
                                               
5
 Casti, John L (1997). Would-Be Worlds. How Simulation is Changing the frontiers of Science. John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York. U.S.A. Pp. Ix-x. 
6
 Coveney, Peter and Highfield, Roger (1995). Frontiers of Complexity. The search for Order in a 
Chaotic World. Fawcett Columbine. New York. U.S.A. Pp. 7-10. 
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Most physical systems are inherently non-linear in nature.
7
 Nonlinearity with its irreversibility, 
characterizes phenomena in every field of science, whether apparently random weather 
patterns, the outbreak of flu epidemics, or the spread of information and ideas.
6
 They show up 
in phenomena ranging from turbulence over an aircraft wing, to weather, lasers, and the firing 
of synapses in the brain. Nonlinear systems are so common, and truly linear systems so 
relatively rare, that the mathematician Ian Stewart thinks it is just as silly for physicists to have 
a field called ‘nonlinear systems’, as it would be for zoologists to have a field called 
‘nonpachydermology’ – the study of all nonelephants.
8
 These thoughts are effectively 
rephrasing the earlier comments of the legendary Hungarian-American mathematician John 
von Neumann who referred to the theory of nonequilibrium systems (effectively the same 
thing as non-linear systems) as the ‘theory of non-elephants’, i.e. it covers most things.
9
  
 
Nonlinearity causes small changes on one level of organisation to produce large effects at the 
same or different level. This is called positive feedback, which turns amplified music into a 
deafening howl.
6
 The phenomenon where a small change in the initial state of a dynamic 
system can dramatically alter its subsequent evolution is called the ‘Butterfly effect’.
1
 
Characterised as the so-called butterfly effect: a butterfly flaps its wings over the Amazon rain 
forest and sets in motion events that lead to a storm over Chicago. The next time the butterfly 
flaps its wings, however, nothing of meteorological consequence happens.
10
 In non-linear 
systems small inputs can (but not always) lead to dramatically large consequences. This 
effect has even been applied to our lives, where it has been suggested that when we look 
back in detail on the major events of our lives, it is not uncommon to be able to identify such 
seemingly inconsequential random events that led to big changes.
11
   
 
Nonlinear equations are difficult to solve.
7
 The study of nonlinear systems languished until the 
1960s and 1970s, when a combination of new mathematical tools and computers reopened 
their study.
8
 Only with computer graphics are we really able to explore the complexity that 
non-linear equations possess, by literally doing a million possible combinations.
6
 Cheap 
computers and plentiful computing power has enabled researchers to explore complexity in 
new and often unforeseen ways.
12
  
 
Over recent decades, research has increasingly documented that nonlinear behaviour is 
typical of the real world and this means in a qualitative sense ‘getting more than you 
                                               
7
 Wikipedia - Nonlinear system. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonlinear_system  19/12/2009 
8
 Beinhocker, Eric D. (2007). The Origin of Wealth. Evolution, Complexity, and The Radical Remaking of 
Economics. Random House Business Books. London, Great Britain. Pp. 107.  
9
 Bak, Per (1997). How Nature Works – The Science of Self-Organized Criticality. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford, U.K. Pp. 26-32. 
10
 Lewin, Roger (1992). Life at the Edge of Chaos. Pp. 11. 
11
 Mlodinow, Leonard. (2009).The Drunkard’s Walk. How Randomness rules our Lives. Penguin Books. 
London. UK. Pp. 194. 
12
 Beinhocker, Eric D. (2007), op. cit., Pp. Xii. 
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bargained for’ or ‘getting far less than you bargained for’, unlike linear systems which produce 
no surprises, i.e. ‘you get what you bargained for’.
13
   
 
Nonlinear systems are very sensitive to their starting conditions, so that a tiny difference in 
the initial ‘push’ they first receive causes a big difference in where they end up, and there is 
feedback, so that is how a system effects its own behaviour. Complexity is based on two 
simple ideas – the sensitivity of a system to its starting conditions and feedback.
2
  
 
In general, nonlinearity produces complex and frequently unexpected results.
6
 Most of nature 
is non-linear and not easily predicted. For example, weather forecasting is the classic 
example of being unpredictable. Other non-linear systems such as ecosystems, economic 
entities, developing embryos or the brain, each are examples of complex dynamics that defy 
mathematical analysis or simulation using linear approaches.
 
A very slight difference in the 
initial conditions produces very different outcomes, which is the reason for the 
unpredictability.
10
   
 
Examples explaining different aspects of non-linearity 
In his book, the ‘Tipping Point’, Gladwell describes his childhood struggles to understand 
things that are not linear and he gives the example of pouring ketchup on his dinner. Like 
many children encountering this problem for the first time, he assumed that the solution was 
linear. He thought that with steadily increasing hits on the base of the bottle it would yield 
steadily increasing amounts of ketchup out the other end. Not so, Gladwell’s father said, and 
he recited a ditty that effectively sums up non-linearity for Gladwell, being: ‘tomato ketchup in 
a bottle – none will come and then the lot’ll’.
14  
 
 
Linear thinking assumes that large events need large causes, for example, the large mass 
extinction that killed the dinosaurs was caused by a very large meteorite. However, non-linear 
thinking points out that large catastrophic events occur as a consequence of the same 
dynamics that produces small ordinary events. This observation runs counter to the usual way 
of thinking about large events, in which we look for equally large causes.
9
  
 
Thuan (a physicist) explains what linear behaviour means by using the example of a dry 
sponge placed under a tap. At first, the weight of the dry sponge increases proportionally to 
the number of water drops it soaks up. The sponge doubles its weight when it has absorbed 
twice the number of drops, and triples it with three times as many drops. The relationship 
between the weight and the number of drops is said to be linear. However, the behaviour of 
the sponge changes by the time it has soaked up a lot of water. There comes a point when its 
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ability to absorb extra water diminishes, until it becomes zero. When that happens, the weight 
of the sponge no longer increases in proportion to the number of drops falling on it. The 
behaviour switches from linear to non-linear. Finally, the weight of the sponge reaches a 
steady level, as it cannot absorb any more water. It has reached saturation.
15
  
 
Thuan uses the same saturation metaphor of phase changes when we visit a museum full of 
works of art. At first, our aesthetical pleasure increases in proportion to the number of 
paintings we get to admire. We are in the linear phase. After a while, though, the pleasure 
wears thin; we gradually grow numbed by too many masterpieces, and we enter a non-linear 
regime. Eventually, we reach a point where we can not stand it any more. We have become 
saturated with paintings.
15
  
 
Biology and economics have traditionally been thought of as in a balanced equilibrium stable 
state. In the equilibrium state, small shocks will cause only small disturbances, modifying the 
equilibrium state only slightly. The system’s response is proportional to the size of the impact; 
equilibrium systems are said to be ‘linear’. Small freak events can never have dramatic 
consequences.
9
  
 
Non-linear systems have ‘emergent’ properties or patterns 
From the 1970s, scientists started to refer to systems that were far from equilibrium, that were 
dynamic and complex, and that never settled into a state of rest as ‘complex systems’. These 
systems have dynamically interacting parts or particles. In such systems the micro-level 
interactions of the parts or particles lead to the emergence of coherent macro-level patterns of 
behaviour.
16
 These complex systems are not at rest, as they are continuously evolving.
6 
  
 
Emergent properties show that the whole can be more than the sum of the parts
17
 and the so-
called emergent properties can only be described at higher levels than those of the individual 
units.
6
 The central idea of emergence is the idea that meaningful order can emerge 
spontaneously, all on its own in complex systems made of numerous interacting parts.
18  
An 
emergent property cannot be deduced or explained in terms of the properties of its 
constituents. In other words, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
1
  
 
Examples of emergent properties include: 
 The pattern of the whirlpool is the result of the dynamic interactions between the 
individual water molecules. One cannot have a whirlpool with a single water molecule; 
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rather, the whirlpool is a collective or ‘emergent’ property of the system itself.  It is not 
an expected result, if you just study the properties of a single water molecule sitting in 
isolation. You need to have a few billion water molecules together, add some energy in 
the right way, and then you get the complex macro pattern of a whirlpool.
16 
 
 
 The interactions of millions of people, making decisions, acting out their cultural norms, 
cooperating, competing, and going about their daily lives, creates an emergent 
phenomena that we call ‘society’ which has different features than those of the studies 
of individuals that make it up.
19
  
    
 In the economic world, Adam Smith’s invisible hand of ‘market forces’ and Pareto’s law 
of wealth distribution represent two principle emergent properties.
18
  
 
 Life is an emergent property, as are human beings.
20
  
    
 Zipf’s law of cities or words is an emergent property in the sense that it is not an 
obvious consequence of the underlying dynamical rules.
9
 
 
 Based on these examples, it is probably safe to say every power law effect mentioned 
in this Thesis is an emergent feature. 
 
Networks are important for complex systems 
Networks are an essential ingredient in any complex adaptive system. Without interactions 
between agents, there can be no complexity. For example, the biological world comprises a 
massive hierarchy of networks: molecules interact in cells, cells interact in organisms, and 
organisms interact in ecosystems etc.
21
  
 
The economic world likewise depends on networks. The earth is girdled by many networks, 
including roads, sewers, water systems, electrical grids, railway tracks, gas lines, radio 
waves, television signals, and fibre-optic cables. These provide the highways and byways of 
the matter, energy, and information flowing through the open system of the economy. The 
economy also contains massively complex virtual networks: people interact in companies, 
companies interact in markets, and markets interact in the global economy. Just as in biology, 
the networks of the economic world are arranged in hierarchies of networks within networks.
21
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Pattern prediction, not precise prediction, for complex systems 
The study of complexity has its roots in the classical political economy of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, and then later developed by the Austrian school of economics, which believed 
that order in market systems is spontaneous (or emergent) in that it is the result of human 
action, but not the execution of any human design. Key Austrian economists of this school of 
thinking were Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek.
22
  
 
Hayek dedicated much of his work to the study of complex phenomena. One of Hayek’s main 
contributions to early complexity theory is his distinction between the human capacity to 
predict the behaviour of simple systems and its capacity to predict the behaviour of complex 
systems through modelling. He believed that economics and the sciences of complex 
phenomena in general, which in his view included biology, psychology, and so on, could not 
be modelled after the sciences that deal with essentially simple phenomena like classical 
physics. Hayek believed you could only explain complex phenomena through modelling, and 
this will only give you pattern prediction, compared with the precise predictions that can be 
made out of simple systems.
22
   
 
Key heroes of non-linearity 
It is an interesting observation that most of the people I have named throughout this thesis, 
such as Schumpeter, Hayek, Mandelbrot, Pareto, Zipf, Taleb and perhaps even Mintzberg 
were all initially dissenters or heretics to the conventional wisdom of their day. Not only were 
they dissenters, they were unpopular. Fortunately times change and Schumpeter is now 
considered equal (or even greater) to John Maynard Keynes, as being one of the greatest 
economists of the twentieth century. Hayek received a Nobel Prize and most people have a 
vague understanding of Pareto’s 80/20 law. 
 
The following is my summary of key words used to compare linear with non linear effects.  
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Table 2 
Summary of key words used to compare linear to non linear effects. 
 
The strategic planning/ strategic thinking distinction could also be categorised as a linear 
versus non-linear systems debate, or in the wider science/ mathematics debate, strategic 
thinking fits into non-linear thinking which is called ‘complexity’. This is a subject that focuses 
on those ‘abrupt’ changes in different physical/ social systems including those in finance and 
in economics. This means that ‘strategy’ fits into a bigger intellectual framework that cuts 
across science, mathematics, economics and finance; since most real world systems are non-
linear. Non-linear systems are noted for ‘tipping points’, power laws and abrupt 
transformational changes.  
 
Since both linear/ non-linear systems are purely natural, it therefore follows that a strategist 
needs a good understanding of linearity and non-linearity as well as strategic planning and 
strategic thinking. I suggest that under a linear system/ phase, the strategic planning 
approach should be dominant, but supported by strategic thinking (since you never know 
when events will turn abruptly); whereas in a turbulent non-linear period the strategic thinking 
approach should be dominant, but supported by strategic planning (since you know that great 
turbulence will not last). This has a loose parallel in the theory of the left/ right brain split, 
Linear attributes Non-linear attributes 
In equilibrium Far from equilibrium 
Top down Bottom up 
Simple systems Complex systems 
Certainty Uncertainty 
Additive  
(sum of the parts) 
Emergent  
(whole greater or less than the sum of the parts) 
Reductionist Holistic 
Stable Unstable 
Time and nature fixed One period effects the next 
Static Dynamic 
Trajectory Abrupt 
Continuity or evolutionary change Discontinuous  or revolutionary changes 
Detail Big picture 
Tidy Messy 
Analysis Synthetic 
Deterministic  Iterative calculations 
Solvable - repeatable Simulation 
‘Rational’ ‘Bounded rationality’ 
Precise predictions Pattern predictions only 
Linear effects  Small causes with tipping points 
 
Basis for Strategic Planning 
 
Basis for Strategic Thinking 
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where it is not wise to use only one style of thinking, since there are two styles which suit 
different situations. The key is to pick the right thinking style for the right situation. Just as we 
have one brain, but two thinking styles, so in the strategy toolbox we also have two valid, 
useful and complimentary general strategic approaches.   
 26 
Chapter 3 - Introduction to power laws 
 
The normal versus power law distributions 
One type of empirical relation that seems to turn up regularly in complex-systems (non-linear) 
studies is a power law.
1
 Power laws are in my opinion of profound importance in 
understanding forecasting in non-linear systems. Defining power laws is therefore the subject 
of this chapter. To understand power laws you first have to understand the ‘normal’ 
distribution.  
 
For most of the last two hundred years the ‘normal’ (also called ‘Gaussian’ or ‘Bell’ curve) 
distribution has been the dominant statistical distribution to work with. Many quantities in 
nature follow the bell curve. For example, the peaked distribution characterizing random 
networks, height of adult males, IQ distributions, velocity of molecules in a gas, etc.
2
  
Normal distributions cluster around a typical value. Examples of this are, the speed of cars on 
a motorway, the weight of apples in a store, air pressure, sea level, or the temperature in 
Wellington at noon on Christmas Day. All these things vary, but their distributions strongly 
cluster around an average point. Few observations are far from the typical value, making the 
typical value representative of most observations. For instance, it is a useful statement to say 
that an adult male American is about 180cm tall because no adult male American deviates 
very far from this size. Even the largest deviations, which are exceptionally rare, are still only 
about a factor of two from the mean in either direction and hence the distribution can be well-
characterized by quoting just its mean and standard deviation.
3
 
 
By contrast, Barabasi believes that power laws are at the heart of some of the most stunning 
conceptual advances in the second half of the twentieth century, emerging in fields like chaos, 
fractals, and phase transitions. The fact that the networks behind the Web, Hollywood, 
scientists, the cell, and many other complex systems all obey a power law allows us to 
understand Pareto and all other situations when the 80/20 rule applies. This means we can 
for the first time in history start to understand complex systems.
2
  
 
Power laws are very different from the bell curves describing our height. First, a power law 
distribution does not have a peak. Rather, a histogram following a power law is a continuously 
decreasing curve, implying that many small events coexist with a few large events. The 
distinguishing feature of a power law is not only that there are many small events but that the 
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numerous tiny events coexist with a few very large ones. These extraordinarily large events 
are simply outside of the rules of a bell curve.
2
  
 
There is an important qualitative difference between a power law and a bell curve when it 
comes to the tail of the distribution (Refer Figure 1). Bell curves have an exponentially 
decaying tail, which is a much faster decrease than that displayed by a power law. Power 
laws decay far more slowly than the Bell curve, allowing for large ‘rare events’ that can never 
happen in a Bell curve. These large ‘rare’ events are an important characteristic of power 
laws.  Power laws formulate in mathematical terms the notion that a few large events carry 
most of the action.
2
  
 
Figure 1 
  
Power law curve compared to a normal distribution curve. (Buchanan – 2007). 
 
Barabasi gives an example of the difference between the normal distribution and a power law 
distribution. He compares a U.S. roadmap with an airline routing map. On the roadmap cities 
are the nodes and the highways connecting them the links. This is a fairly uniform grid 
pattern. Each major city has at least one link to the highway system, and there are no cities 
served by hundreds of highways. Thus most nodes are fairly similar, with roughly the same 
number of links. Such uniformity is an inherent property of random networks with a peaked 
degree (normal) distribution.
2
  
 
The airline routing map differs drastically from the roadmap. The nodes of this network are 
airports connected by direct flights between them. Inspecting the flight map quickly shows that 
there are a few important hubs, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, Denver, Atlanta, and 
New York from which flights depart to a large number of other U.S. airports. The vast majority 
of airports are tiny, appearing as nodes with at most a few links connecting them to one or 
several hubs. Thus, in contrast to the highway map, where most nodes are equivalent, on an 
airline map, a few hubs connect hundreds of small airports.
2
 Whilst the number of highway 
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links to each city produces a Bell curve indicating a normal distribution, the number of flight 
links to each U.S. city produces a power law graph. (Refer Figure 2). This difference is 
profound and each of the two statistical systems follow different sets of rules. Generally 
people have good familiarity with the normal distribution but have only superficial knowledge 
of power laws. For example, most people have heard of the Pareto’s 80/20 Rule. 
 
Figure 2  
 
The Random (Normal or Bell Curve) versus the Scale-free Networks (Power law Distribution). 
(Barabasi - 2002). 
 
The straight line ‘log-log’ graph is the signature of a power law 
All power laws tend to look alike when plotted on a graph with a logarithmic scale. (Where 
each division is a factor of 10 larger than the one that came before it, for example, 10, 100, 
1,000 and so on.) Common examples of logarithmic scales are the Richter scale of 
earthquakes and the decibel scale of sound volume.  When a power law is plotted on a log 
scale on both axes (called a ‘log-log graph’), a straight line sloping down should result. The 
exact angle of that slope varies, but whether it’s the size and frequency of earthquakes or the 
distribution of publicly listed companies by stock-market capitalization, the slope is always a 
straight line.
4
 (Refer Figure 3). 
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The straight line log-log graph is often called the signature of a power law. However, whilst 
this is a necessity, there are non-power data sets (such as ‘log-normal’ or exponential) that 
mimic this signature behaviour, so care needs to be taken.
5
 Throughout my thesis I have 
therefore included as many of the straight line log-log graphs as I can find to explain the 
examples I am describing. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Power law curve for avalanches in a mathematical model of a sand pile. (Ball – 2004). 
 
Only straight line log-log graphs considered in this thesis 
For this study I have only used power laws that produce a straight line log-log chart. 
Therefore Moore’s law which show a logarithmic increase in transistor counts over time and 
Kleiber’s law about a power law for metabolic rates compared to animal mass, both produce 
results that are straight line, but effectively a 45 degree slope from the bottom left hand side 
and rising on the right hand side. This is a different graph from the graphs in this and other 
studies of complexity. The slopes in these graphs slope the opposite way – a 45 degree slope 
from being high on the left hand side and low on the right hand side. Since my desire is to 
study complexity (non-linear effects), this means that for this study I have looked exclusively 
at only those activities that produce a straight line log-log chart.   
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Power law exponents (slope of a straight line log-log graph) 
Each power law is characterized by a unique exponent. The power law describes the degree 
distribution and the exponent is often called the degree exponent. The distribution of incoming 
links on webpages followed a power law with a degree exponent close to two. The collective 
action of millions of webpage creators work together in a way that produces this emergent 
result that is not a ‘random’ (i.e. not a normal distribution) network.
2
  
 
Taleb gives an example of Pareto’s power law of wealth distribution, where if wealth doubles 
from $1 million to $2 million, the incidence of people with at least that much money is cut in 
four, which is an exponent of two. If the exponent were one, then the incidence of that wealth 
or more would be cut in two. The exponent is called the ‘power’ which is why we use the term 
power law.
6
 
 
Taleb illustrates how exponents work, when he says that only 96 books in 2004 year sold 
more than 250,000 copies and that he ‘thinks’ that the exponent is around 1.5. You can 
extrapolate to estimate that around 34 books will sell more than 500,000 copies – simply 96 
times (500,000/250,000)
-1.5
. Around 12 books should sell more than one million copies, being 
96 times (1,000,000/250,000)
-1.5
. The exponent is therefore an important and powerful 
forecasting tool.
6
  
 
Power law distributions are ‘Scale-free’ 
In a normal distribution, there is an average/ mean and practically all the values are tightly 
clustered (within three standard deviations) around that figure. In a power law distribution 
there is no valid average figure that represents the majority of values. The power law average 
combines the numerous low figures with a few extreme figures and the answer is much 
greater than the median because of the high outliers. This forces us to abandon the idea of a 
characteristic node. In a continuous hierarchy there is no single node which we could pick out 
and claim to be characteristic of all the nodes. There is no intrinsic scale in these networks. 
This is the reason networks with power-law distributions are called ‘scale-free’. Most complex 
networks in nature have a power-law degree distribution, so are called ‘scale-free networks’.
2
 
This property of ‘scale invariance’ is one of the most important aspects of power laws and 
therefore attracts a lot of interest.
5
   
 
Forecasting needs to understand the rare big events or 1/f noise 
Power laws are often expressed as the frequency of an event, being equal to 1 divided by 
some power of its size. Turning this around, the size of an event is proportional to 1 over 
some power of its frequency. This is called ‘1 over f noise’, and written as 1/f noise. 1/f noise 
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turns up in all naturally varying systems and is synonymous to power laws behaviour. For 
example, music also has 1/f noise, as does the variations in the light from a quasar, as does 
the weather system, as does earthquakes, which all obey a power law.
7
 
 
1/f noise means that events of any size can happen at any time, but that big events (in this 
case, big departures from the average) are rare. Traditionally insurance companies and civic 
planners have worked out the odds against extreme events on a historical basis. They look at 
how often a particular type and size of event (say, a severe drought) has occurred in the past, 
and guess that it will happen with the same frequency in the future. They even talk about 
things like a ‘once in a hundred year’ drought. But this is only half the story. The 1/f signal tells 
us that such events actually obey a power law. And that means that if you get a ‘once in a 
hundred year’ drought one summer, the odds of getting a second drought of the same 
severity the following year are exactly the same as if there had not been a drought the 
previous year. It is not safe to assume that after one ‘once in a hundred years’ drought it will 
be a hundred years before the next one happens. That is linear thinking when dealing with a 
non-linear system.
7
  
 
Equally, though, 1/f noise implies that a record-breaking drought could be followed by a 
record-breaking freeze. Next year might be the coldest ever recorded, without this in any way 
invalidating the greenhouse effect hypothesis, thanks to a random fluctuation of the natural 
weather system. That is why it is important to look at long-term trends, not just one-off 
events.
7
  
 
Beinhocker believes that the combination of punctuated equilibrium and power laws in 
complex adaptive systems is almost fiendishly designed to lull people into a sense of self-
confidence, and then pull a nasty surprise. Humans are superb pattern-recognizers. We tend 
to make predictions by looking for patterns in the past and then extrapolating those patterns 
out into the future. More often than not, this works quite well. Most of the time, the world is 
fairly stable. Quite often, conventional strategy analysis can tell us very useful things, and we 
are able to make accurate-enough short term predictions. But the frequent occurrence of 
‘stable’ periods between punctuations points only gives us a false sense of predictability – 
there is nothing more dangerous than a ‘stable’ industry. Likewise, the existence of power 
laws means that big changes are far more likely to occur than the expectations our mental 
models give us on the basis of past experience.
8
   
 
As Anderson points out, power-law distributions in social phenomena destroy the idea that 
what matters is the ‘average’ behaviour, or the ‘average’ man/ person. In effect, a power law 
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raises the odds of extreme events, which a Gaussian probability distribution relegates to the 
status of negligible aberrations.
9
  
 
Understanding power laws are fundamental for strategic forecasting 
In my view, understanding ‘power laws’ is fundamental for strategic forecasting. First it is 
important to understand that there are two different and completely valid statistical distribution 
systems operating in the world. The first is the Gaussian or normal distribution system and the 
second is the more recently defined power laws with all the different names and effects as 
described later in my Thesis. As Mandelbrot points out, power laws may in the future come to 
be seen as the ‘norm’ for most forecasting applications, but the name ‘normal’ distribution was 
given to the Gaussian distribution since that was developed first and that distribution type was 
considered at that time to be the ‘norm’.   
 
Not only does the person doing strategic forecasting need to understand at a high level the 
difference between the two distribution systems, but you also need to be crystal clear as to 
which distribution system is operating in the environment that you are working in. If risks and 
likely outcomes of the strategic forecasting are affected by power law distributions then this 
has profound implications, as all potential events are not equal when power laws are involved. 
A few events have a massive influence, whilst most will be minor. Most of the standard 
strategic tools I have used such as SWOT, TOWS or brainstorming assume that all strategies 
are equal. Under a power laws environment, the risks/ rewards distribution is extremely unfair. 
The results will be logarithmic, i.e. 1, 10, 100, with most being small, a few being large and 
fewer still being very large. It is the few very large events that are important in power law 
distributions and they are the defining feature that is different to the normal distribution.  
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Chapter 4 - Punctuated equilibrium, ‘sandpiles’ and 
self organised criticality 
 
Punctuated Equilibrium – evolution and fossils 
Since Darwin, most biologists assumed that evolution proceeded in a stately and relatively 
linear fashion, leading to a smooth pattern of speciation and extinction. Then in 1972, the 
palaeontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould overturned this conventional wisdom 
and argued that the fossil record shows that biological evolution has not followed a smooth 
path. Rather, they argued that it has gone through long periods of relatively little change, 
which they called ‘stasis’, interspersed with periods of explosive innovation and periods of 
massive extinction.
1
 Gould and Eldredge pointed out that the apparent equilibrium is a period 
of tranquillity, or stasis, between intermittent bursts of activity and volatility in which many 
species become extinct and new ones emerge.
2
 In summary, the great majority of species 
originate and become extinct in geological moments (punctuations) and persist in stasis.
3
  
 
For example, during the Cambrian period about 550 million years ago, a burst of evolutionary 
innovation saw the takeover of the earth by multicellular life and the creation of the 
forerunners of the species on earth today. Then, about 245 million years ago, during the late 
Permian period, there was what Gould called ‘the grand-daddy of all extinctions’, when 96 
percent of all marine species on earth disappeared.
1
 Gould found that many ancient species 
and ecosystems often remain stable in the fossil record for millions of years and then either 
die out or transform themselves into something new in a geological instant.
4
  
 
Gould coined the term ‘punctuated equilibrium’ to describe this pattern of alternating calm and 
storm, or periods of quiescence or stasis interspersed with periods of change.
1
 He noted that 
one species does not gradually transform into another, rather it happens fast. Punctuated 
equilibrium is contrasted with gradualism, which states that evolution generally occurs by 
smooth steady and continuous progress.
5
 
 
Punctuated equilibrium – a ‘signature’ of complex systems 
Patterns of punctuated equilibrium show up not just in biological evolution, but in other 
complex systems ranging from physical avalanches, the crashes of stock markets
1
, to 
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changes of political regimes, such as in Egypt with the abrupt and unexpected fall from power 
of President Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of rule. The current wave of revolution and unrest 
sweeping the Middle East shows clear signs of ‘punctuated equilibrium’.  Per Bak (a Danish 
Physicist) wrote that, ‘Punctuated equilibrium takes place and is at the heart of the dynamics 
of complex systems. Large intermittent bursts have no place in equilibrium systems, but are 
ubiquitous in history, biology and economics’.
2 
 
 
Gould believed that the two most overarching theories of punctuated change are Kuhn’s for 
human thought and Prigogine’s for the natural world. During equilibrium periods, systems are 
stable, make adjustments that preserve the deep structure against internal and external 
pressures, and move incrementally. Revolutions are relatively brief periods and vary in 
magnitude.
6
 
 
Kuhn’s notion of the history of change in scientific concept advanced a punctuated theory for 
the history of ideas – going from stable ‘paradigms’ of ‘normal science’ in the ‘puzzle solving’ 
mode, through accumulating anomalies that build anxiety but do not yet force the basic 
structure to change, through rapid transitions to new paradigms so different from the old that 
even ‘conserved’ technical terms change their meaning to a sufficient extent that the two 
successive theories become ‘incommensurable’. Kuhn’s work on punctuated thinking had a 
big effect on other disciplines, not least because Kuhn himself said that historians of literature, 
of music, of the arts, of political development, and many other human activities have long 
described their subjects in the same way.
6
  
 
Gould pointed out that punctuated equilibrium has been applied to personal growth and that 
many people go through the greatest changes in their lives in the shortest chunks of time. For 
example, someone who is described as having living through years of stagnation, raced 
through a decade of personal growth in the first year of a new career.
6
  
 
In economics, punctuated equilibrium describes the episodic change and long plateaus in the 
history of markets and prices.
6
  
 
The ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theory of strategy 
Miller and Friesen  proposed the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theory of strategy, where there 
are long periods of evolution and incremental adaptation in traditional directions (more of the 
same); that are interrupted or punctuated occasionally by short bursts of ‘quantum’ 
revolutionary realignment, that are sudden, dramatic, and pervasive shifts in direction.
7
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Mintzberg notes that once this sudden and turbulent environment happens, even the very 
best planning techniques are of no use because of the impossibility of predicting the kind of 
stability that will eventually emerge. In response to this kind of inconsistency in the 
environment, patterns of strategic change are never steady, but rather irregular and ad hoc, 
with a complex intermingling of periods of continuity, change, flux, limbo, and so on. 
Strategies do not commonly change in continuous incremental fashion; rather, change, even 
incremental change – takes place in spurts, each followed by a period of continuity. This hints 
that strategies come in all sizes, as does change.
8
 
 
Strategies that may have been bold and innovative at the outset (as a means to find and 
develop a niche) tend to become incremental and conservative in the mature years (to protect 
the niche).
9
 Strategic reorientations really are cultural revolutions.
10 
 
 
‘Sandpiles’ and self organised criticality 
Self-organised criticality (SOC) has been described as one of a number of important 
discoveries made in statistical physics and related fields over the latter half of the 20
th
 
century, discoveries which relate particularly to the study of complexity in nature.
11 
 
 
The 1987 landmark ‘sand pile’ experiment and metaphor 
Physics has long had different metaphors to explain reality. During most of the twentieth 
century the image of ‘billiard balls’ was often used to describe atoms etc.  This changed in 
1987 when three theoretical physicists Per Bak, Chao Tang and Kurt Weisenfeld carried out 
what today is a landmark experiment. They carried out a ‘sandpile’ experiment, where they 
were trying to imagine what would happen if someone were to sprinkle grains of sand one at 
a time onto a table top. As grains pile up, it seems clear that a broad mountain of sand should 
edge slowly skywards. As the pile grows, its sides become steeper, and it becomes more 
likely that the next falling grain will trigger an avalanche. Sand would then slide downhill to 
some flatter region below, making the mountain smaller, not bigger. As a result, the mountain 
should alternately grow and shrink, its jagged silhouette forever fluctuating.
12 
 
 
Bak and his colleagues used a computer to drop these imaginary ‘grains’ onto an imaginary 
‘table’, with a few simple rules dictating how grains would topple downhill as the pile grew 
steeper. It was not quite the same as a real sand pile, and yet the computer had one 
spectacular advantage – a pile would grow in seconds rather than in days. They were able to 
plot the results after they ran a huge number of tests, counting the grains in millions of 
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avalanches in thousands of sand piles. They found a surprising result; that there was no 
typical size of an avalanche. Some involved a single grain; others ten, a hundred, or a 
thousand. Still others were pile-wide cataclysms involving millions that brought nearly the 
whole mountain tumbling down. At any time, literally anything, it seemed, might be just about 
to happen.
12
  
 
The next experiment Bak and his colleagues did was to change the colour of the grains from 
green to red once the sand pile had started to get steep. With more grains, the scattering of 
red danger spots grew until a dense skeleton of instability ran through the pile. When the red 
spots come to blanket the pile, the consequences of the next grain became fiendishly 
unpredictable. It might trigger only a few tumblings, or it might instead set off a cataclysmic 
chain reaction involving millions. This hypersensitive state to which the computer sand pile 
organises itself is known as the critical state.
12
  
 
Each avalanche releases ‘tension’ in the pile, lowering the angle of the slope and restoring 
stability. But only just. The avalanche merely returns the pile to the brink of sliding, so that the 
very next grain that it adds could trigger another landslide. So the sand pile hovers around 
this state of precarious stability, never deviating far from it. Rather than the pile being liable to 
collapse irretrievably, the critical state is constantly resurrected after each avalanche. This is 
why the critical state is said to be self-organised. The sand-pile model describes a non-
equilibrium situation.  It is not unchanging, new grains are constantly being added. This is the 
driving force that prevents equilibrium from being attained. Self-organized criticality is a 
property of most non-equilibrium systems, especially where power laws apply.
13
  
 
Bak and his colleagues measured the size and frequency of avalanches and found that they 
followed a power law probability resulting in the slope of the log v log graph being a straight 
line. The slope is the exponent of the power law and was found to be close to -1, which is 
characteristic of self-organising criticality.
13
 (Refer Figure 3). There was a power-law 
distribution of event sizes where there is no characteristic size for events, since the number of 
events of a certain size is inversely proportional to some power of that size; and 1/f noise 
applies, where events are distributed over all time scales, but the power or size of events is 
inversely proportional to some power of their frequency.
14
  
 
The basic notion of criticality has been familiar to physicists for more than a century, yet has 
always been seen as a kind of theoretical freak, an extremely unstable and unusual condition 
that arises only under the most exceptional circumstances. In the sand pile, however, it 
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seemed to arise naturally and inevitably through the sprinkling of grains. This led Bak and his 
colleagues to ponder the provocative possibility: if the critical state arises so easily and 
inevitably in a sand pile, might something like it also arise elsewhere? Could lines of instability 
of a logically equivalent sort, run through the earth’s crust, for example, through forests and 
ecosystems, and even economies? Subsequent research has shown that the peculiar and 
exceptionally unstable organisation of the critical state does indeed seem to be ubiquitous in 
our world.
12
   
 
Key implications of the ‘sandpile’ experiment include: 
 The simple Bak model provides a very good description of the real world and is a very 
valuable model and metaphor.
15
    
 The model provides a mechanism by which the emergence of complexity arises 
spontaneously from simple local interactions.
11
  
 Interesting things happen at the edge of chaos (critical state) and feedback is an 
essential ingredient in what makes them interesting.
15
  
 The model shows that the complexity observed emerged in a robust manner that did 
not depend on fine-tuned details of the system.
11 
 
 The model correctly predicted that the number of grains in each avalanche follows a 
power law and therefore at self-organised critical state, avalanches have a scale-free 
or scale invariant behaviour (any size, any time).
15
  
 The model show that when a system is near its critical state, it becomes extremely 
responsive to disturbances (Butterfly effect).
13
 
 When the sandpile is in a self-organized critical state, it experiences sudden landslides, 
interspersed by longer intervals of relative calm, while the sand grains are building up 
(Punctuated equilibrium effect).
15
  
 Self organised-criticality has been suggested as the dynamic mechanism behind the 
theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’.
11
  
 
There are critical points for non-linear systems everywhere. For example they have been 
found for earthquakes, forest fires, volcanic activity, solar flares, the pattern of species 
extinctions in the fossil records, fluctuations in economic systems such as financial markets, 
landscape formation, landslides, epidemics, even in hospital waiting lists and world wars. The 
characteristics of non-equilibrium self-organized critical-point phenomena, such as extremely 
sensitivity to fluctuations, ‘scale-free’ events and, in particular, power law probability 
distributions are found widely both in nature and in the world of human affairs. Power-laws are 
the fingerprint of self-organized criticality.
13
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The critical thing is that there’s no telling, when we add a new grain to a pile poised on the 
brink of an avalanche, whether it will set just a few other grains in motion, or trigger the 
collapse of the whole slope, or something in between. Big avalanches are less frequent than 
little ones, but avalanches of all sizes are possible. The fluctuations of the pile, in other words, 
are scale free.
13
  
 
Self-organizing criticality only tells you about the overall statistics of avalanches; it tells you 
nothing about any particular avalanche. This is another case where understanding is not the 
same thing as prediction.
16
 For example, knowing the history of events in non-linear systems 
often provides little or no prediction value as to the next event, despite the fact that each step 
follows logically from the previous step (historical explanations looking backwards).
17
  
 
Bak believes that self-organized criticality is a new way of viewing nature (non-linear aspects). 
The basic picture is one where nature is perpetually out of balance, but organized in a poised 
state - the critical state – where anything can happen within well-defined statistical laws.
18
 
Self-organised criticality is the way nature is able to make enormous transformations over 
short time scales.
 17
  
 
The principle of Universality 
Power laws are not sensitive to particular details. This is the principle of universality, which 
Per Bak regards as the theorist’s dream come true.
19
 Universality becomes the guiding 
principle for understanding many disparate phenomena. It tells us that the laws governing 
complex systems are simple, reproducible, and ubiquitous.
20
 There are many situations 
around critical points that are independent of the details of the underlying dynamical system. 
The exponent at the critical point may be the same for many systems in the same group, even 
though many aspects of the system are different. This makes universality very interesting to 
physicists.
21
 
 
The Complexity physicists invade other subjects 
Buchanan believes that the Per Bak ‘critical state’ sandpile model has provided some of the 
most provocative and powerful ideas in all of modern physics. Whilst little known outside 
physics, these ideas have enabled physicists to establish permanent encampments within 
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other subjects such as earthquake science, human physiology, evolutionary biology and 
economics.
22
   
 
In my thesis, many of the books and articles I have used as my source material come from 
physicists such as Per Bak, Murray Gell-Mann, Eugene (Gene) Stanley and Mark Newman. 
Once they started to understand the implications of complexity and power law distributions, 
they set about with great industriousness looking at other subjects that showed power law 
effects, for example earthquakes, fossils, share markets, sexual partners, war etc. Initially it 
seems that subject experts in those other areas were not that excited with the invasion of 
physicists into their specialist areas. The fact that the ‘complexity’ thinkers said that details 
don’t count for the big picture, probably made it even worse for the subject specialists who 
were used to getting donkey deep into the details of their respective subjects. Complexity was 
really a dream come true for the cross subject theorist of ‘universality’.  
 
Stephen J. Gould (Palaeontologist) wrote in one of his books about his reaction to being told 
by the Danish Physicist Per Bak that he (Gould) was wrong thinking that the extinction shocks 
had to be external. Per Bak himself writes about how ‘flawed’ economists are since the 
traditional economic model believes in ‘rationality’. Bak pointed out that since he doesn’t claim 
to be completely ‘rational’ as defined by the economists’ assumptions, how can any ‘rational’ 
economic model account for him (or anyone else). Of course once the physicists realised that 
economics downplays empirical evidence and prides mathematical argumentation and logic, 
this only increased the cross subject discussion. Bak and others struggled with the idea that 
economics wasn’t as empirically based as other subjects like physics. The physicists 
seriously questioned the lack of empirical evidence to the assumptions being made in 
economics. Fortunately some of the great economists like Hayek and Schumpeter had 
already thought about these issues fifty years ago.  
 
The following chapters highlight these continuing differences in thinking. It is perhaps ironic 
that the various power law examples I use, all have solid empirical support and little 
developed theory, whereas classic economic theory is the reverse, elaborate theory that can 
not explain the various power law effects.  
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Chapter 5 - Pareto’s law  
 
Pareto’s law of wealth distribution 
Vilfredo Pareto was an avid gardener, where he noticed that 80% of his peas were produced 
by only 20 percent of the peapods. He also observed the economic inequality of where 80% 
of Italy’s land and wealth was owned by only 20% of the population.
1
  Pareto in effect found 
power laws (named later by others) when he studied wealth distributions. He observed that 
this income distribution held true for many countries, regardless of their political system or 
taxation regime.
2
 Pareto found in each country he tested that a small fraction of the 
population  always possesses a lion’s share of that country’s riches.
3
  
 
Whilst income distributions follow a power law distribution, each set of data will vary around  
the 80:20 ratio (so the 80:20 is more a rule of thumb) and the log-log graphs may not be a 
completely straight line and the slope will vary.  There seems good reason to believe that a 
power-law distribution does hold at least for the highest-earning bracket of any society as 
shown by the straight line in Figure 4. The steepness of such a power-law slope reflects the 
degree of disparity between incomes: the steeper the slope, the more unequal the distribution 
of wealth and the more poverty there is, i.e. Haiti or Zaire.
2
  
Figure 4 
 
Power law curve for economic wealth (Pareto’s law). – The wealth distribution for the population 
of the U.K. in 1996, according to figures collected by the Inland Revenue. This is a cumulative 
distribution; each data point shows the percentage of the population with net capital wealth 
greater than the corresponding amount on the horizontal axis. (Ball – 2004). 
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There is nothing special about the numbers 80/ 20, since the Pareto distribution applies to 
itself. For example; just as 80 percent of effects come from 20 percent of causes, it is also 
true that 80 percent of that top 80 percent of effects come from 20 percent of that top 20 
percent of causes, and so on (i.e. 80% of 80% is 64%; 20% of 20% is 4%, so this implies a 
64-4 law is just as valid).
4
 
 
Examples of this uneven wealth distribution (Pareto’s law) 
 The world’s richest 2 percent own more than 50 percent of the world’s wealth, whilst the 
poorest 50 percent of people own 1 percent.
2
 
 
 The income of the 225 richest people in the world is equal to that of the poorest 2.7 
billion, 40 percent of the world.
5
  
 
 In New Zealand the top 10% of the population holds 50% of the total wealth, and the 
bottom half owns around 5%. The top 1% owns about 16% of New Zealand’s wealth. 
This compares with other countries like the US, UK, Australia and Canada where the 
bottom 30% of the population have less than 1% of the wealth.
6
 
 
 In 1998, according to the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances, the 
richest 1 percent of U.S. households owned 38 percent of all wealth, and the top 5 
percent own more than half of all wealth. The imbalance is greater than in any other 
advanced industrial country.
7
   
 
 In the United States only 20 percent of the population of the country own 85 per cent of 
the wealth, and the numbers are similar in Chile, Bolivia, Japan, South Africa, or the 
nations of Western Europe. It might be 10 percent owning 90 per cent, 5 per cent 
owning 85 per cent, or 3 per cent owning 96 per cent, but in all cases, wealth seems to 
migrate into the hands of the few.
3
  
 
 Numerous studies show that wealth inequality all over the world has grown significantly 
since the early 1980s, in developing countries such as Argentina, China, Pakistan, and 
South Africa as well as in industrialised ones such as Australia, Finland, Britain, and the 
United States.
7
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Economists cannot explain Pareto’s law 
Pareto’s law of wealth distribution stirs strong emotions amongst economists. Of the central 
issues in economics, as John Kenneth Galbraith wrote, the first is ‘how equitable or 
inequitable is the income distribution. The explanation and rationalization of the resulting 
inequality has commanded some of the greatest, or in any case some of the most ingenious, 
talent in the economic profession’. From a mathematical point of view, however, Pareto’s law 
has stubbornly defied explanation. Explanations such as a few people are exceptionally more 
creative and talented than most, first require an explanation of the inherent spread in human 
talents and abilities – and that is a tall order. Details such as inheritance, education, desire, 
luck etc may be part of the factors, but they are the unnecessary detail.
8
 What is agreed, is 
that there is no generally accepted economic explanation for Pareto’s law.
3
 
 
 
The complexity explanation for Pareto’s law 
The skewed distribution is an emergent property of the system. It is a macro behaviour that 
emerges out of the collective micro behaviour of the population of agents.  The combination of 
the genetic endowments of the agents, where they were born, the rules they follow, the 
dynamics of their interactions with each other and with their environment, and above all, luck 
together conspire to give the emergent result of a skewed wealth distribution.
9
  
 
Pareto’s law is not about individuals. Rather, it captures a pattern that emerges at the level of 
many individuals and leaves individual histories aside. Pareto’s law reflects little about human 
cultural, behavioural, or intellectual features and arises instead as a consequence of some 
deeper principle of organisation.
8
   
 
The number of people having wealth, W, is inversely proportional to W
α
, where α is a number 
around two and one-half. In other words, the number of people falls off as the wealth rises to 
a power between two and three. Each time wealth goes up by a factor of ten, the number of 
people having that much falls by a factor of about six (about six times as many people have 
$1 million, for example, as have $10 million). The numbers dwindle in a natural and regular 
way.
3
 
 
Because of the scale-invariant nature of the power law relationship, the relationship applies 
also to subsets of the income range. Even if you take the ten wealthiest individuals in the 
world, we can see the top three (Warren Buffett, Carlos Slim Helu, and Bill Gates) own as 
much as the next seven put together.
4
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Pareto’s law of incomes holds for French towns in the nineteenth century, U.S. incomes in 
1916, and a number of other populations. The α value does vary between countries.  Using 
current U.S. figures of minimum and maximum incomes – say $5,000 and $10
9
 Anderson 
found that half of the wealth is with only 1/8
th
 the people. The rich have all the money. The 
policy implication is that it pays to tax the rich and not the poor. In a failed state such as Haiti 
or Zaire, α = 1 (for α to be less than 1 is impossible as everyone starves).10  
 
Power laws means the extreme is the norm, i.e. ‘the winner takes all’ 
The Pareto Principle is an illustration of a ‘power law’ relationship. Because it is self-similar 
over a range of magnitudes, it produces outcomes completely different from Gaussian 
distribution phenomena.
11
 Under a normal or Gaussian distribution, most observations hover 
around the mean, while the odds of a deviation decline faster and faster (exponentially) as 
you move away from the mean. 68.2 percent of the observations fall between minus one and 
plus one standard deviations away from the average. Outliers are increasingly unlikely and 
you can safely ignore them.
12
  
 
Since much of the real world is controlled as much by the ‘tails’ of distribution as by ‘means’ 
or ‘averages’; by the exceptional, not the mean; by the catastrophe, not the steady drip; by 
the very rich, not the ‘middle class’, we need to free ourselves from ‘average’ thinking.  Power 
laws by definition do not follow a normal or Gaussian distribution.
10
  
 
Taleb illustrates the difference between the Gaussian and power law distributions with an 
example of book sales. He says that if he told you that two authors sold a total of a million 
copies of their books, the most likely combination is 993,000 copies sold for one and 7,000 
copies for the other. This is far more likely than the books each sold 500,000 copies. For any 
large total, the breakdown will be more and more asymmetric.
12
  
 
The Pareto Principle has been used to attribute the widening economic inequality in the U.S.A 
to ‘skill-biased technical change’ of those taking advantage of new technology and 
globalisation. However, Paul Krugman in the New York Times (February 27, 2006) dismissed 
this ’80-20 fallacy’ as being cited ‘not because it’s true, but because it’s comforting’. He 
asserts that the benefits of economic growth over the last 30 years have largely been 
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concentrated in the top 1%, rather than the top 20%.
4
  This is a clear example of what is 
called the Matthew effect, where the ‘rich get richer’. 
 
Taleb like Krugman, also does not like the phrase ‘80/20 rule’ developed by Pareto, and he 
also believes that reality is more extreme than that. For example, he believes that the 80/20 
rule applies to itself so gets to 64/4 (as mentioned above) and after another iteration will yield 
approximately 50/1. Taleb says that instead of saying that 80% of the work comes from 20% 
of the workers, under the 50/1 rule, it is, 50% of the work comes from 1% of the work force. 
Whilst it may seem unfair and extreme, this seems closer to reality for many things.
12
  
 
Taleb uses the U.S. book business to show how unfair life actually is. The 80/20 rule is only 
metaphorical; it is not a rule, even less a rigid law. The proportions are more like 97/20 (i.e. 97 
percent of book sales are made by 20% of the authors) and it is worse for non fiction when 20 
books from approximately eight thousand represent half the sales.
12
 Of course for book sales 
no one knows before hand which books will be in that elite group of best sellers. For simple 
systems it is sometimes possible to determine before hand the top 20 per cent, but when 
power laws apply (Complex systems), the reality is that determining the top 20 per cent is 
only possible after the event.    
 
Hamel gives another example of this ‘winner takes all’ effect. At the end of 1999, just 32 
companies accounted for half the market capitalisation of the S&P 500. This is less than one 
percent of the companies having 50 percent of market capitalisation.
13
 
 
Pareto distribution – the 80/20 Rule 
Pareto’s Law or Principle, known also as the 80/20 rule, has been turned into the Murphy’s 
Law of management: 80% of profits are produced by only 20% of the employees, 80% of 
customer service problems are created by only 20% of consumers, 80% of decisions are 
made during 20% of meeting time, and so on. It has morphed into a wide range of other 
truisms as well. For example, 80% of crime is committed by 20% of criminals, 80% of links on 
the Web point to only 15% of Webpages, 80% of citations go to only 38% of scientists, 80% of 
links in Hollywood are connected to 30% of actors.
1
 
 
Though it is tempting to infer that the 80/20 rule applies to just about anything, that would be a 
gross overstatement. In reality all systems following Pareto’s Law are a bit special. What sets 
them apart is a property (power laws) that plays a key role in understanding complex 
networks as well.
1
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The Pareto distribution is a power law probability distribution that coincides with many social, 
scientific, geophysical, actuarial, and other types of observable phenomena.
14
 The following 
examples approximate to Pareto-distributed: 
 The sizes of human settlements (few cities, many hamlets/ villages) 
 File size distribution of internet traffic (many smaller files, few larger ones) 
 The values of oil reserves in oil fields (a few large fields, many small fields) 
 The length distribution in jobs assigned supercomputers ( a few large ones, many 
small ones) 
 The standardized price returns on individual stocks 
 Sizes of sand particles 
 Sizes of meteorites 
 Number of species per genus 
 Areas burnt in forest fires 
 Severity of large casualty losses for certain lines of business.
14
  
 
Simplification of thinking by the incorrect use of the 80/20 Rule 
Martin is clear about using the 80/20 Rule incorrectly. He believes that conventional or linear 
thinking tends to take a narrow and simplistic view of causality. We rationalize this 
simplification by referring to the 80-20 rule. The 80-20 rule implicitly acknowledges that 
simplification is not the perfect solution to the problems of ambiguity and casual 
inconsistency, but rather a coping mechanism. We settle for 80 percent to avoid being 
overwhelmed by complexity. As comforting as simplification can be, however, it impairs every 
step of the integrative thinking process. It encourages us to edit out salient features rather 
than consider the question of salience broadly. Simplification makes us favour linear, 
unidirectional casual relationships, even if reality is more complex and multidirectional. 
Simplification also encourages us to construct a limited model of the problem before us and to 
reduce alternatives, giving us the best bad choice available.
15
 
 
Criticisms of the 80/20 Rule 
Chris Anderson believes that the 80/20 Rule is chronically misunderstood, for three reasons. 
First, it’s almost never exactly 80/20. Most of the large-inventory markets are 80/10 or even 
less (no more than 10 percent of products account for 80 percent of sales). The second 
confusing fact is that the 80/10 doesn’t add up to 100. The 80 and the 10 are percentages of 
different things, and therefore they don’t need to equal 100. One is a percentage of products, 
the other a percentage of sales. Third, there is no standard convention on how to express the 
relationship between the two, or which variable to hold constant. Saying a market has an 
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80/10 shape (10 percent of products account for 80 percent of sales) can be the same as 
saying it is 95/20 (20 percent of the products account for 95 percent of sales).
16
  
 
The Long Tail – the alternative to the 80/20 Rule 
The traditional interpretation of the 80/20 Rule is to only carry 20 percent of goods that 
account for the most sales. Chris Anderson’s concept of the ‘Long Tail’ is a reinterpretation 
of the 80/20 Rule. (Refer Figure 5). What the Long Tail offers, is the encouragement not to be 
dominated by the 80/20 Rule. In Long Tail markets, where the carrying costs of inventory are 
low, the incentive is there to carry everything, regardless of the volume of its sales. With good 
search engines the bottom 80 percent product can turn into a 20 percent product. Historically 
the traditional bricks and mortar retailer needed to focus on the 20 percent of products that 
sold well. That paradigm changed with computerisation and the Internet, as we in the west 
now live in the age of abundance, not in the age of scarcity. Distribution is now cheap.
16
  
 
Some examples: 
 Some of the most successful Internet businesses have leveraged the Long Tail as 
part of their businesses. For example, physical goods (e.g. Amazon, eBay), digital 
goods (e.g. iTunes, iFilm), advertising (e.g. Google), information (e.g. Google, 
Wikipedia), communities/ user-created content (e.g. MySpace).
17
 
 Wikipedia is a Long Tail provider of information with 1 million articles in English 
compared with Britannica’s 80,000. This means that a lot more specialist knowledge 
for different niches is now available.
17
  
 Long Tails have proved a very popular concept, with micro-finance schemes (e.g. 
Bangladesh), user-driven innovation, economic modelling and marketing (viral 
marketing).
18
 
 Rhapsody offers online music for 1.5 million tracks. Most music shops sell only 
55,000 tracks at best.
17
 
 Amazon offers 3.7 million book titles. A typical bookshop like Borders holds only 
100,000 books.
17
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16
   Anderson, Chris (2006). The Long Tail – Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More. 
Hyperion. New York. U.S.A. Pp. 120-132. 
17
  Ibid., Pp. 23-89.   
18
  Ibid., Pp. 229. 
 47 
Figure 5 
 
The Long Tail - The radical new shape of Culture and Commerce. (Anderson – 2006). 
 
The Long Tail market (Refer Figure 6) provided by Amazon and Rhapsody provides them with 
20 to 40 percent of their total sales which are products not available in offline retail stores. 
This is the fastest growing part of their businesses. There are lots of niche markets that have 
a steady demand.
17
  
 
Figure 6 
 
The Long Tail – Three steps to infinite variety. (Anderson – 2006). 
 
Book sales show a typical long tail and power law distribution. For example, in 2004, 950,000 
books out of the 1.2 million tracked by Nielson BookScan sold fewer than ninety-nine copies. 
Another 200,000 sold fewer than 1,000 copies. Only 25,000 sold more than 5,000 copies. The 
average book in America sells about 500 copies. In other words, about 98 percent of books 
are uncommercial, whether they were intended that way or not. Or expressed in a different 
way, each year only 20,000 of the 200,000 books published in English will make it into the 
average book store.
18
 (Refer Table 3). 
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Table 3 - Book sales - Source: Book Industry Study Group
16
 
Book Sales, 2004 
Sales Range Titles Units (millions) 
1,000,000 or more 10 17.4 
500,000 to 999,999 22 13.8 
250,000 to 499,999 64 22.3 
100,000 to 249,999 324 46.9 
50,000 to 99,999 767 51.9 
5,000 to 49,999 23,047 280.0 
1,000 to 4,999 67,008 149.1 
100 to 999 202,938 69.5 
Sold 99 or less 948,005 14.3 
Total  1.2 Million 665 Million + 
 
The reality is that the vast majority of content (from music, books or movies) is not going to be 
hits, but there is still a demand for them, measured in hundreds of orders rather than millions. 
Sales follow a power law (they follow a 1/x log-log curve) – where a few products sell most 
and most sell a little. For example, only 10 titles (out of 1.2 million) in 2004 sold more than a 
million copies, whereas 1.15 million titles sold less than a 1,000 books each.
16
  
 
In reality the power law curve isn’t a straight line when people apply the 80/20 Rule. Box 
office revenues fall dramatically after rank 100 until they approach zero around 500. (Refer 
Figure 7). Movies don’t get worse at rank 100 and the movie makers don’t stop making 
movies at 500. An estimated 13,000 feature films are made each year in the U.S. alone. What 
happens is that the films past the first 100 or so simply failed to get much theatrical 
distribution. Or, to put it another way, the ‘carrying capacity’ of the U.S. theatrical industry is 
only about 100 films a year.
16
  
 
Figure 7 - The Long Tail – Hollywood box office, 2005. (Anderson – 2006). 
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Chapter 6 - Zipf’s law – Frequency of words used and size of cities 
 
Zipf’s law – Power Law of the frequency of Words 
Zipf’s law states that the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to its rank in the 
frequency table. Thus the most frequent word will occur approximately twice as often as the 
second most frequent word, which occurs twice as often as the fourth most frequent word. For 
example, in the ‘Brown Corpus’, which is a large database of over one million present day 
American English words, ‘the’ is the most frequently occurring word (7%), second is ‘of’ 
(3.5%) , followed by ‘and’ (2.9%). Only 135 words are needed to account for half the Brown 
Corpus. Zipf’s law applies to many types of data in the physical and social sciences. It is one 
of a family of related discrete power law probability distributions. (Refer Figures 8 and 9 for 
log-log power law graphs). The simplest case of Zipf’s law is a 1/f function, where frequencies 
are sorted by frequency from most common to least common. The second most common 
frequency will occur ½ as often as the first, the third will occur 1/3 as often as the first.
1
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Power law curve for language – Zipf’s law for the English language. (Casti – 1997). 
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Figure 9 
 
Power law curve for language – Zipf’s law and the ‘The Hound of the Baskervilles’. (Casti –1997). 
 
Explanations for Zipf’s law of words used 
George Zipf (who the law is named after) was a Harvard linguist and suggested in the 1940s 
that the more you use a word, the less effort you find to use that word again, so you borrow 
words from your private dictionary in proportion to their past use. This would explain why out 
of the sixty thousand main words in English, only a few hundred constitute the bulk of what is 
used in writing, and even fewer appear regularly in conversation.
2
 
 
Zipf’s law is an empirical relationship which shows an emergent pattern that is not obvious 
from looking at the individual words of a language itself.
3
 
 
Zipf’s law, also called the rank size rule, is a power law that is related to the distribution 
known as the Fibonacci sequence and to that of the equiangular spiral. In terms of the 
Fibonacci sequence, each term is approximately 1.618 (the Golden ratio) times the preceding 
term. A special case of the Fibonacci sequence is the Lucas sequence consisting of these 
sequentially additive numbers 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 18, 29, 47, 76, 123, 199 etc. When any log-linear 
factor is ranked, the ranks follow the Lucas sequence and each of the terms in the sequence 
can also be approximated by the successive values of powers of 1.618. For example, the 
third term in the sequence above, 4 is approximately 1.618
3 
or 4.236 (which is approximately 
4); the fourth term in the sequence, 7, is approximately 1.618
4
 or 6.854 (which is 
approximately 7); the eight term in the series, 47, is approximately 1.618
8
 or 46.979 (which is 
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approximately 47). With higher and higher values, the figures converge.
 
 The rank size rule 
‘works’ because it is a ‘shadow’ or coincidental measure of the true phenomena. The true 
value of rank size is thus not as an accurate mathematical measure but as a handy measure 
or ‘rule of thumb’ to spot power laws.
4
 
 
Wide application of Zipf’s law 
Zipf found that the Zipf’s law applies to a host of other phenomena, from population statistics 
to industrial processes. He analyzed Philadelphia marriage licences within one twenty-block 
area and showed that 70 percent of the marriages were between people who lived no more 
than 30 percent of the twenty-block distance away from each other. Other researchers have 
extended the rule to everything from atoms in a plasma, electricity bills, street addresses, 
stock prices, to the size of cities. At the heart of these observations is the ubiquity of power 
law distributions, the 1/f shape that Pareto first saw in his wealth curves.
5
   
 
An interesting application of Zipf’s law of words is its apparent use in determining if the ‘noise’ 
received from outer space is just ‘noise’ or if it is communication from another civilization. If 
the different sounds don’t follow a Zipf distribution then the information is not considered a 
language and therefore not a message.  
 
Zipf’s law – Power law of size of Cities 
If one ranks the population size of cities in a given country or in the entire world and 
calculates the natural logarithm of the rank and of the city population, the resulting graph will 
show a remarkable log-linear pattern. (Refer Figure 11). This is the rank-size distribution. For 
example a rank 3 city would have 1/3 the population of a country’s largest city, a rank four city 
would have ¼ the population of the largest city, and so on.
4
 The log (size) versus log (rank) 
will have a straight line slope of -1.
6
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Figure 11 
 
Power law curve of city size – Ranking of cities by size around the year 1920, from Zipf. The 
curve shows the number of cities in which the population exceeds a given size or equivalently, 
the relative ranking of cities versus their population.  (Bak – 1997). 
 
For example, there is a striking empirical regularity that governs city sizes in the United 
States. Cities are defined as metropolitan areas, rather than cities as political units. Figure 10 
plots the log of each metropolitan area’s population against the log of its rank (i.e. New York 
is 1, Los Angeles 2, and so on) for the 130 largest such areas in the United States in 1991. 
The relationship is impressively linear, and very close to a 45- degree line. If you multiply the 
rank of each city by its population, you get a very nearly constant number. For example, the 
10
th
 largest metropolitan area in the United States is Houston, population 3.85 million; the 
100
th
 is Spokane, population 370,000.
7
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Figure 10 
 
Power law curve for the size distribution of U.S. metropolitan areas from Krugman. (Arthur – 
1997). 
 
This statistical regularity has shown to be valid for most industrial countries today, as well as 
for individual countries over extended periods of time. There are well known exceptions to the 
law (as evidenced by the dotted line at the top left of Figure 11); often the largest city in a 
country is ‘too large’ to fit well into the overall size distribution and some countries have size 
distributions that deviate systematically from the Zipf distribution.
6
 For example, the rank-size 
rule works reasonably well for the 31 largest urban areas in New Zealand, though the 
Auckland region is slightly larger than it predicts.
8
  
 
Whilst noting the exceptions, it is clear that the Zipf law for city size and the Zipf law for firm 
size are two famously skewed size distributions and are among the single most regular 
statistical features of modern societies.
6
 
 
Explanations for Zipf’s law of city sizes 
Axtell and Florida believe that despite considerable research, there does not exist a traditional 
explanation for Zipf’s law based on behaviourally-credible micro-foundations. Whilst 
economists have recognized this uneven, hierarchal structure, they have been unable to 
generate empirically-salient explanations for it, based on the linear assumptions of rationality 
and equilibrium which are the standard economic assumptions.
6
   
 
The purely neoclassical theory tells us that high-tech firms will tend to distribute themselves 
evenly across the landscape. There’s no reason for any of them to prefer one location over 
another. But in real life, of course, they flock to places like California’s Silicon Valley and 
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Boston’s Route 128 to be near other high-tech firms. This is due to positive and negative 
feedback loops of non-linear systems.
9
  
 
Complexity explanation of Zipf’s law 
Like most agglomerations, Silicon Valley owes its existence to small historical accidents that, 
occurring at the right time, set in motion a cumulative process of self-reinforcing growth.  
Krugman believes the spatial economy is, self-evidently, a self-organizing system 
characterized by path dependence. It is a domain in which the interaction of individual 
decisions produces unexpected emergent behaviour at the aggregate level. Krugman 
believes the spatial economy is a dynamic landscape that is typically rugged with an evolution 
that involves ‘punctuated equilibria’, in which gradual changes in the driving variables leads to 
occasional discontinuous change in the resulting behaviour.
7
   
 
Cities grow, according to Waldrop, because they build up slowly as small chance events 
become magnified by positive feedbacks which are non-linear random processes.
9
  
 
Buchanan is clear as to the implication of Zipf’s law.  The implications of this power law 
pattern are as usual: there is no ‘typical’ size for a city in the USA or elsewhere, and no 
reason to see special historical or geographical situations behind the emergence of the very 
biggest. The growth of a city is a critical process, poised on the edge of great instability. There 
was probably nothing inevitable or special about the beginnings of New York, Mexico City or 
Tokyo. If you rewind history and play it again there would no doubt be great cities, but in 
different locations and with different other names. Even so, the power law pattern of cities 
would remain the same.
10
 
 
Likewise, the more people aggregate in a particular city, the more likely a stranger will pick 
that city as his destination. The big get bigger and the small stay small, or get relatively 
smaller.
2
  
 
The Axtell/ Florida complexity model that fits the Zipf data shows how cities and firms form 
and co-evolve from a simple micro-foundation: people form firms and these firms agglomerate 
to make cities. Agents have heterogeneous abilities; exhibit bounded rationality and interact 
directly with one another in out of equilibrium or non-linear environments.
6
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Chapter 7 - Zipf’s law – size of Companies 
 
Robert Axtell used as data the entire population of tax paying firms in the U.S., being 5 million 
firms and 105 million employees. (Refer Figure 12). He found that the Zipf distribution 
characterizes firm sizes, with the probability a firm is larger than size ‘s’, is inversely 
proportionate to ‘s’. Axtell found that the power law exponent ‘α’ was close to 1. These results 
hold for data from multiple years and for various definitions of firm size.
1 
 
Figure 12 
 
Power law curve for U.S. Company size distribution by employees (probability mass function). 
Data from 1997 U.S. Census. (Axtell – 2001). 
 
Fitting the Zipf distribution means that firm size is highly skewed. The upper tail of the firm 
size distribution has often been described by the Yule or Pareto (also known as power laws or 
scaling) distributions. Whilst the Figure 12 graph shows a slight imperfection with too few very 
small and very large firms with respect to the Zipf fit, presumably due to finite size effects, it is 
a strong power law distribution.
1
 When fitting data to scaling laws it is common that data at 
the extremes do not fit well due to so-called finite size cut-offs.
2
 
 
Company size means either sales turnover or employee numbers 
Axtell found that it does not matter whether one uses numbers of employees or the 
companies sales volume in constructing company size distribution functions, as the power law 
exponent of the distributions are approximately the same.
2
 (Refer Figures 12 and 13). 
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The relationship between firm output and size by number of employees once plotted on a log-
log graph show that the two measures are highly correlated. There is significant variability at 
large sizes since these data bins hold few observations.  The graph highlights the hypothesis 
of constant returns.
2
 
 
Figure 13  
 
Power law curve for U.S. Company size distribution by revenue (probability mass function). Data 
from 1997 U.S. Census. (Axtell – 2001). 
 
‘Equilibrium’ assumptions fail to explain Zipf’s law of firm size  
According to Axtell, there does not exist today a purely microeconomic explanation for the 
overall firm size distribution. The neoclassical theory of the firm distils the multi-agent 
character of real firms down to a single rational actor, who faces completely specified 
technological options, and who acts to maximize profit by choosing inputs that minimize cost. 
There are many problems with this firm-as-production-function picture, from its static 
technology to its hyper-rationality of requiring perfectly informed and rational managers. None 
of this explains Zipf law of company size.
3
  
 
Given the power law character of actual firm size distributions, it would seem that equilibrium 
theories of the firm, such as principal-agent models, will never be able to grasp this essential 
empirical regularity. Intrinsic to this theory is that the system is far from equilibrium, a 
necessary condition in order to observe non-Gaussian fluctuations. Power law distributions 
and Per Bak’s highly idealized sandpiles provide the general idea that power law size 
distributions result from ‘self organized critical’ processes, in which a system arranges itself 
such that large fluctuations are always possible, and these occur not infrequently.
2
  
 
Axtell studied the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of an agent-based computational model. 
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Axtell assumes agents glean data concerning their economic environment from members of 
their social networks, that is, through local interactions. This relatively new methodology 
facilitates modelling agent heterogeneity, non-equilibrium dynamics, local interactions 
(network/ spatial processes) and bounded rational behaviour.
3
  
 
It is Axtell’s claim that the preoccupation with equilibrium notions is largely responsible for the 
relative neglect of the overall size distribution of firms in industrial organization. While the 
existence and stability of this distribution have been well-known for decades, and while 
microeconomic conceptions now dominate industrial organizational theory, there apparently 
does not exist a microeconomic (equilibrium) explanation of the aggregate size distribution. 
Indeed, perhaps it is the case that no equilibrium theory could ever reproduce the empirical 
data. Power law effects come from non-equilibrium distributions.
4
  
 
Real firms have provided the important concept of bounded rationality, a notion still far from 
fully-integrated into economic theory.
4
  
 
The new non-equilibrium models assume that agents can be arbitrarily heterogeneous. They 
can interact with one another directly (local interactions) or indirectly through aggregate 
economic variables (global interactions). Agents possess only a limited amount of information 
and are of necessity boundedly rational, since to model full rationality is too computationally 
complex in all but extremely simple environments. Attainment of equilibrium is not required.
4
 
 
No traditional theory of economics comes close to explaining these effects, which should be 
of no surprise, since traditional economic theories hold onto the idea of economics existing in 
a world that they believe is static and in ‘equilibrium’.
5
  
 
Traditionally, economists are inclined to look for Nash equilibria in their models – these, they 
think, determine behaviour in the real world. But Robert Axtell’s model has no stable Nash 
equilibria. That is to say, it can never settle down into an unchanging state. There is a 
constant flux as firms boom and bust. This model is a non-equilibrium one, and this makes it 
quite different from most microeconomic models of firm growth. Nothing certain can be 
deduced about the system. Rather, it means that we are forced to draw statistical inferences. 
We can not say, for example, how long it will take for a firm encompassing 25 per cent of the 
total labour force to appear. But we can, at any point, determine the probability of such a firm 
existing. Axtell’s study was compiled from Census and Compustat data involving 20 million 
US firms in 1997, being the 5 million tax paying firms and 15 million firms with no payroll/ 
employees. Axtell’s model produces results which are striking, since no other microeconomic 
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5
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theory of the firm has correctly forecast the power-law nature of this distribution. The power 
law distribution is a consequence of purposive behaviour on the part of the individual agents 
in the market. For example, we can increase the size of each agent’s friendship circle, or we 
can boost the factors that promote increasing returns of scale etc, but these things only alter 
the slope of the straight-line, but the log-log line stays straight.
6
  
 
Companies getting bigger is unavoidable, since in a network economy the hubs (companies) 
must get bigger as the network grows.
7
  
 
Scaling 
Axtell found a power law pattern for sales of 1/S
2
. This means that firms with sales of $1 
million are four times as numerous as those with $2 million, which are in turn four times as 
numerous as those with $4 million.
5
  
 
Scaling means firms of size 1,000 are four times less common than firms of size 500, while 
firms of size 10,000 are 100 times less common than firms of size 1,000. While large firms are 
certainly important, as a practical matter approximately 80% of the U.S. workforce is 
employed in firms size 500 or smaller.
2
  An interesting property of firm size distributions is that 
the qualitative character of such distributions is independent of how size is defined.
1
 From 
what I know of the profile of New Zealand companies, I am sure these principles also apply to 
New Zealand.  
 
Perpetual company churn 
Any acceptable theory of firms should also account naturally for the way firms continually 
came and go. Most firms are ephemeral. Although General Motors, Microsoft and Exxon 
seem like permanent features of the economic landscape, they can not be comfortable.
5
   
Of the largest 5,000 US firms operating in 1982, for example, only 35 per cent still existed as 
independent entities in 1996. There is a high ‘turnover’ of companies, which many economic 
theories of the firm do not acknowledge.
6
  
 
Whether labour markets or other markets, there is actually no real equilibrium, as markets will 
have many unpredictable fluctuations and crashes. A theory of the firm must necessarily be a 
non-equilibrium theory in which the future is never certain.
6
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7
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For the emergent power law pattern, the details don’t matter 
Out of all the chaos of millions of people doing an infinite variety of different things, emerges a 
mathematical pattern.
5
 Axtell notes that this skewness has been robust over time, as it has 
lasted over six decades of firm size (from 10
0
 where there are no employees to 10
6
 
employees). The skewness appears to be insensitive to changes in political and regulatory 
environments, immune to waves of mergers and acquisitions, and unaffected by surges of 
new firm entry and bankruptcies. It even survived large-scale demographic transitions within 
the work forces (e.g. women entering the labour market) and widespread technological 
change. Individual firms migrate up and down the Zipf distribution, but economic forces seem 
to have rendered any systematic deviations from it short-lived. Whilst the overall emergent 
pattern remains constant over time, at the individual level of firms there is perpetual churn. 
The other key point to note is the fact that details don’t matter.
1
  
 
Prediction of specific events and details is impossible, but it is possible to make high level 
predictions from the statistics that emerge and hold true for many power law events, i.e. 
wealth inequality, size of firms etc.
5
 
 
Power law patterns offer an aid in getting to grips with systems that simply never seem to 
settle down, that are always churning and changing and evolving, where nothing seems 
constant, and nothing is ever repeated. Virtually all of past and current social science is based 
on the notion of equilibrium, which poses some difficulties if much of the world is not in 
equilibrium, perpetually evolving as feedback drives the growth of patterns that replace the 
old, only to be replaced again in the future.
5
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Chapter 8 - Complexity Economics 
 
Beinhocker suggests that rather than portraying the economy as a static equilibrium system, 
complexity models present the economy as a buzzing hive of dynamic activity, with no 
equilibrium in sight. Just as the pattern of a whirlpool arises from interacting water molecules, 
these models showed complex patterns of boom and bust and waves of innovation emerging 
from the interactions of simulated agents, just as they do in the real economy. Viewing the 
economy as a complex adaptive system provides us with a new set of tools, techniques, and 
theories for explaining economic phenomena.
1
  
 
According to Beinhocker
2
 ‘complexity economics’ has five ‘big ideas’. (Refer Table 4). These 
five ideas can not be analyzed using mathematical theorems alone. Complexity economics 
uses a broad toolkit of approaches, plus big doses of computer power. In addition, complexity 
researchers have imported new mathematical and statistical tools from physics, biology, and 
other fields to help them better understand the economy as an open, dynamic system.
2
  
 
Table 4: Beinhocker’s Five ‘Big Ideas’ that distinguish Complexity Economics from 
Traditional Economics 
 Complexity Economics Traditional Economics 
Dynamics Open, dynamic, non-linear systems, 
far from equilibrium 
Closed, static, linear systems in 
equilibrium 
Agents Modelled individually; use inductive 
rules of thumb to make decisions; have 
incomplete information; are subject to 
errors and biases; learn and adapt 
over time (or not, as the case may be) 
Modelled collectively; use complex 
deductive calculations to make 
decisions; have complete information; 
make no errors and have no biases; 
have no need for learning or 
adaptation (are already perfect) 
Networks Explicitly model interactions between 
individual agents; networks of 
relationships change over time 
Assumes agents interact only 
indirectly through market mechanisms 
e.g. auctions. 
Emergence No distinction between micro- and 
macroeconomics; macro patterns are 
emergent result of micro-level 
behaviours and interactions 
Micro- and macroeconomics remain 
separate disciplines. 
Evolution The evolutionary process of 
differentiation, selection, and 
amplification provides the system with 
novelty and is responsible for its 
growth in order and complexity 
No mechanism for endogenously 
creating novelty, or growth in order 
and complexity 
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The fact that we can get such widely varying behaviours simply from tweaking one variable 
demonstrates an important characteristic of nonlinear dynamic systems; sensitivity to initial 
conditions. A related characteristic is that nonlinear dynamic systems are path dependent. 
These two characteristics, sensitivity to initial conditions and path dependence, make 
nonlinear dynamic systems notoriously difficult to work with and in many cases impossible to 
predict.
2
  
 
Joseph Schumpeter’s ‘Gales of creative destruction’ 
Technological innovation has been found to be the major force in economic growth. Studies 
show that growth in inputs (i.e., in capital and labour), only accounts for about 15 per cent of 
the growth in the economy. The other 85 per cent was technological innovation, which has 
been the major force in growth of output in highly industrialised economies.
3
 
 
The Neoclassical economists tended to view innovation as an external or exogenous factor: a 
random variable that affected the economy – like the weather – but was outside the bounds of 
economic study. Schumpeter, however, believed that innovation had to be viewed as internal, 
or endogenous, to the economy and central to its understanding. He insisted that for growth 
to occur, there must be a source of energy within the economic system which would of itself 
disrupt any equilibrium that might be attained. For Schumpeter, that source of energy was the 
figure of the entrepreneur, whom he wrote about in almost heroic terms.
1
  
 
According to Schumpeter, technological progress occurred in a random stream of discoveries. 
The commercialisation of new technologies, however, faced numerous barriers, ranging from 
the need for financing to the intransigence of old habits and mind-sets. Thus, like water 
behind a dam, the random rain of discoveries built up over time. (These metaphors compare 
very closely with Thomas Kuhn’s later paradigm shifts in science). In Schumpeter’s theory, 
entrepreneurs played the role of dam breakers, unleashing a flood of innovation into the 
marketplace. In this way, growth comes to the economy not in a steady stream, but as 
Schumpeter famously put it, in ‘gales of creative destruction’. The origin of wealth, according 
to Schumpeter, lies in the heroic efforts of individual entrepreneurs. Schumpeterian wealth 
creation occurs when people like Richard Arkwright, Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, and Steve 
Jobs battle the odds to turn the technologies of their time into successful commercial 
enterprises.
1
  
 
The entrepreneur, Schumpeter wrote, is ‘the pivot on which everything turns’. Entrepreneurs – 
whether they operate in big firms or small ones, old companies or start-ups – are the agents 
of innovation and creative destruction. Their projects are the wellsprings of new jobs, higher 
incomes, and general economic progress. But in releasing their creative energies, rising 
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entrepreneurs shove older ones aside, destroying their dreams and often their fortunes. The 
majority of people, even in rich countries, will never become entrepreneurs. Some will not 
even find employment in successful enterprises. And sooner or later, most businesses will 
fail, sometimes damaging whole communities as well as individuals.
4
  
 
In the rise of one set of entrepreneurs and concurrent decline of others, Schumpeter sees 
profound social implications. ‘The upper strata of society are like hotels, which are indeed 
always full of people, but people who are forever changing.’ Just as businesses go up and 
down, so too do entrepreneurs and their families.
5
  
 
Schumpeter’s ideas could not be translated into the rigorous language of mathematics and 
therefore have been unable to be ‘modelled’, so it could never be reconciled with the 
mathematical Neoclassical framework, which limited its impact to most economists. His work 
has been slow to be absorbed into the economic mainstream, but highly valued by those 
interested in entrepreneurship.
1
  
 
Economic progress shows punctuated equilibrium in action 
Schumpeter did not like the prevailing view of economics as working in a state of equilibrium. 
He thought that capitalist reality is first and last a process of change and had nothing to do 
with any concept of perfect equilibrium.
6
  Schumpeter represents advances in economic 
reasoning as nonlinear. The world involved much more of discontinuity and seismic 
convulsions, rather than regularity and smooth progression.
7
 Whilst most individual 
technological innovations have only an incremental impact, overall, technological innovation 
proceeds in patterns of calm and storm.
8
 
 
Innovation continuously revolutionizes the economic structures from within, destroying the old 
order and creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about 
capitalism. Those revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occur in discrete rushes which 
are separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works 
incessantly however, in the sense that there always is either revolution or absorption of the 
results of revolution, both together forming what are known as business cycles.
6
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Schumpeter believed that all companies react ‘adaptively’ to change, but creative ‘responses’ 
come only from innovative acts by entrepreneurs. Their innovations can take many forms: for 
example, new commodities, new forms of organisation, or new markets.  Innovating firms do 
not arise evenly throughout the economy. Instead, groups of these firms emerge just after an 
organisational or technological breakthrough in a particular industry. Meanwhile, powerful 
elements in society resist major innovation, because they tend to wreak havoc on existing 
structures. As a result, ‘the history of capitalism is studded with violent burst and 
catastrophes’. It is no gentle process of adjustment but something ’more like a series of 
explosions’. The building of a railway where none had existed, for example, ‘upsets all 
conditions of location, all cost calculations, all production functions within its radius of 
influence’.
9
  
 
Economic networks 
All technologies depend on a web of relationships with other technologies. These 
interrelationships are not just technological, but economic. The economic web that has grown 
around the automobile, for example, includes industries ranging from steelmaking to oil, 
hotels, and fast food. Also, all technologies are inherently modular; a car, for example, is 
made up of an engine, a transmission, a body etc. Modules are then assembled into 
‘architectures’. Innovations in modules can enable new architectures (e.g. the microchip 
enabling the PC), but it is innovations in architectures (e.g. the PC itself) that tend to have the 
big catalyzing ripple effects on innovation. All these interlocking economic/ technology 
networks or webs are therefore subject to cascades of change leading to the emergent 
pattern of punctuated equilibrium.
8
  
 
Strategy is about surviving the ‘Red Queen Race’ 
Schumpeter said that, ‘Strategy must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative 
destruction; it can not be understood irrespective of it or, in fact on the hypothesis that there is 
a perennial lull’.  Schumpeter believed that a creative response as opposed to an adaptive 
response can never be predicted and is therefore indeterminate, shaping long-run outcomes 
in a country, industry, or firm. It often depends on the leadership of specific individuals and it 
changes social and economic situations forever. It creates new conditions that would never 
have been developed without it.
7
  
 
The longer the industry remains relatively stable, the more convinced the management team 
becomes that it really understands what is going on and is able to predict where the business 
is going. The more convinced of this management becomes, the more precisely and 
specifically it tunes its assets, skills, and people to succeeding in the environment it has been 
experiencing. Then one day a new technology is developed, a competitor has an idea, or 
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consumer tastes begin to shift – and no one in the senior management team even knows 
about it. The world starts to change. At first the pattern-recognizing minds of the company’s 
leaders can’t believe the changes are really occurring. They believe that the problems they 
are experiencing are just a temporary anomaly and demand more evidence- after all; they’ve 
had their industry figured out for a long time.
10
  
 
Management suddenly finds itself in a new game and stuck with the wrong mental models, 
the wrong assets, and the wrong skills. The punctuated nature of change tricks our pattern-
recognizing minds into thinking that the world is more stable than it really is.
10
  
 
Beinhocker quotes a study that found that true competitive advantage is both rare and 
relatively short lived. That study found that only 5 percent of the companies in the sample 
ever achieved a period of superior performance lasting ten years or more. For example, there 
are as many books about why great companies succeed as why great companies fail. The 
same companies show up in both sets of books. The companies that survived were often 
companies that underperformed the overall S&P 500 index by 20%, so not great ‘excellent’ 
companies. This highlights the ephemeral nature of competitive advantage, and the incredible 
dynamism of markets as companies rise and fall.
10
  
 
There is no such thing as a safe, stable industry in the long term. Schumpeter’s ghost is alive 
and well and the ‘gales of creative destruction’ are blowing harder than ever. Competitive 
advantage is rare and short-lived in the biological world as well. In biological systems, species 
are locked in a never-ending co-evolutionary arms race (prey v predator) with each other. 
Biologists refer to such co-evolutionary spirals as Red Queen races, named after the Red 
Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass. It was she who said, ‘In this place it 
takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place’. There is no such thing as 
winning a Red Queen race, the best you can ever do is run faster than the competition. In 
evolutionary systems, sustainable competitive advantage does not exist; there is only a 
never-ending race to create new sources of temporary advantage. Understanding this means 
we change our definition of an excellent company from one of continuous high performance 
for very long periods (an achievement that is almost non-existent) to one that can string 
together a series of temporary advantages over time – in other words, a strong runner in the 
Red Queen race.
10
 
 
Noting there are virtually no excellent companies that last multiple decades and the extreme 
rarity of repeated excellence, brings us to a brutal truth about most companies. Markets are 
highly dynamic, but the vast majority of companies are not. Studies have found that change in 
the economy is driven more by the entry and exit of firms than by the adaptation of individual 
companies.
10
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From the market’s point of view, each business is an experiment in Business Plan space, 
some succeed and are amplified, while others fail and disappear. Markets tend to create more 
surprise and innovation than do corporations. Companies are ‘Big Person’ hierarchies with all 
their human foibles and distortions, while markets are almost pure evolutionary machines.
10
  
 
Chance events are important 
Beinhocker believes that chance events coupled with positive feedback rather than just 
technological superiority will determine economic superiority – not some abstrusely defined 
edge in a given area of expertise (i.e. the best technology or best product always wins) as 
required in classical economic models. Economic models which previously excluded 
randomness, now need to factor in, unexpected orders, chance meetings, and such things as 
management whims, since they all help determine which products achieve early sales and, 
over time, which firms dominate.
11
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Chapter 9 - Share market fluctuations   
 
Truncated power laws show up in stock price fluctuations 
For the last fifty years, Finance theory (which I studied as an undergraduate) has stressed the 
importance of the ‘Efficient Markets Hypothesis’ and the random walk model. Nobel Prizes in 
Economics have been awarded to people who have contributed to this body of knowledge.  
Even in the last five years, we can see the continued importance of these Gaussian based 
theories in the global banking collapse which had relied on a sophisticated Gaussian based 
finance equation.  
 
This reliance on Gaussian based models has been increasingly criticised as it does not 
completely account for reality. The part of reality that it does not account for happens to be 
very small but very dramatic, i.e. share crashes. A random walk model effectively never 
predicts such a crash because it is simply outside of the results it produces.
1  
 
 
Perhaps the resistance to move away from Gaussian based models is that share price 
fluctuations don’t exactly follow a power law distribution either, but price movements fall 
between the two systems. (Refer Figure 14.)  Finance theory therefore needs to accept that a 
modified or truncated power law applies to share price movements to account for share 
fluctuations ranging from tiny fluctuations to drastic events (such as market crashes). If 
shares prices followed a pure power law distribution then events like ‘Black Monday’ of 19 
October 1987, when all firms lost from 20 to 50 percent of their market value, would be more 
frequent.  
Figure 14 
 
Shares – The probability distribution function for fluctuations in the S&P 500 markets index for a 
time interval of 10 minutes (same general shape as intervals of 1 minute and at least one day). 
For comparison, the probability distribution for Gaussian fluctuations (a random walk) is shown 
as a dotted line. The solid line shows the probability distribution for a power-law. (Ball – 2004).   
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Beinhocker cites Stanley et al. who used 40 million data points of every five minutes of stock 
transactions from 1994 to 1995 for one thousand of the largest U.S. companies. They found 
that the fluctuations in stock prices follow clear power laws in the tails of the distribution. 
Stanley varied his time periods over three orders of magnitude, from 5 minutes to 6,240 
minutes (16 days). The data did look somewhat more Gaussian than the shorter periods, but 
it still very clearly followed a power law.
1   
Just as the Gutenberg-Richter law (See Chapter 12) 
for the frequency of earthquakes shows that large earthquakes fall on the same power-law 
straight line as small earthquakes, so do share price fluctuations. You therefore do not need a 
separate theory for large earthquakes or large price fluctuations.
1
    (Refer Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15 
 
Power law curve for Shares – Probability density function of the normalized returns of the 1000 
largest companies in the TAQ database for the two year period 1994-1995. (Stanley et al. – 2000). 
 
Power laws show up in returns, volumes, numbers of trades and order flow 
Whilst changes in share price fluctuations follow either truncated power law distributions or 
power law ‘tails’, other share market attributes also have pure power law distributions. For 
example, there is growing empirical evidence of the power-law tailed nature of distributions 
that characterize large movements of distinct variables describing stock market activity such 
as returns, volumes, numbers of trades, and order flow. These findings were established with 
‘dozens of millions of data points’.
2
 Remarkably, the exponents that characterize these power 
laws are similar for different countries, for different types and sizes of markets, and for 
different market trends, suggesting that a generic theoretical basis may underlie these 
regularities. The Stanley team model links large movements in market activity to the power 
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law distribution of the size of large financial institutions. The trades made by large financial 
institutions create large fluctuations in volume and returns.
2
  
 
The power law distribution of trading volume (shares traded) is 3/2 or 1.5, which is referred 
to as the ‘half-cubic’ law of trading volume.
3
 The Stanley team did empirical analysis on the 
262 largest stocks listed in the London Stock Exchange (Refer Figure 16) and they confirmed 
that volume has a power law decay of 3/2 (the slope of Figure 16 being 2.4-1= 1.4) which is 
consistent with their results from the Paris Stock Exchange (Refer Figure 17).
3
  
 
Figure 16 
 
Power law curve for Shares – Probability density function of trade volumes for 265 stocks listed 
in the London Stock Exchange. (Plerou et al. – 2004). 
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Figure 17 
 
Power law curve for Shares - Probability density of the individual trade sizes q for 30 large 
stocks in the Paris Bourse from January 1995 to October 1999. This represents 35 million 
observations. (Gabaix et al. – 2004) 
 
Figure 18 
 
Power law curve for shares – Zipf plot for the daily fluctuations in the Nikkei (1984-97), the Hang-
Seng (1980-97), and the S&P 500 (1962-96). (Gabaix et al. – 2004) 
 
The power law distribution for returns and the number of trades is 3 (cubic law of returns). 
Refer Figure 18, which shows how the return distributions of three different countries are very 
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similar. The cubic law predicts the existence of a few very large returns over a century. The 
1929 and 1987 stock market crashes are not outliers to the cubic law. Hence the theory of the 
cubic law of returns might be a theory of crashes.
3
  
 
The standard Efficient Markets Hypothesis cannot explain these results 
All these wild fluctuations fly in the face of the efficient market hypothesis, and the notion that 
markets are in equilibrium. In equilibrium, fluctuations should be small.
4
 Gaussian, random 
walks almost never have fluctuations greater than five standard deviations, yet in real 
economic data, such as stock market crashes, five standard-deviation events, and even 
larger-deviation ones, do in fact occur.
2
 For example, the stock market crashed more than 
500 points on a single Monday in October 1987. A lot of blame went to computerized trading, 
but computers had been around for years. Is there any reason why the crash came on that 
particular Monday?
5
  
 
One popular idea is that most extreme movements might simply be due to ‘external shocks’, 
destabilizing events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or major corporate or government 
scandals. Unfortunately many large market movements seem to take place in the absence of 
any big event. In 1991, when a group of economists examined the fifty largest one-day price 
movements in the United States in the years since World War II, they found that many of 
them happened on days when there was no big news.
6
  
 
Complex adaptive system models help our understanding 
Economic systems are examples of complex interacting systems for which a huge amount of 
data exists.
1
 Markets are complex systems for which the variables characterizing the state of 
the system – e.g. the price of the goods, the number of trades, and the number of agents, are 
easily quantified. These variables serve as fundamental examples of scale invariant 
behaviour – the scaling laws are valid for time scales from seconds to decades.
7
  
 
The power law implies that there is no such thing as a typical fluctuation, and so there is no 
reason to think that every swing either up or down is in any sense unusual. Waldrop believes 
that the idea that sudden and terrifically large changes need explaining doesn’t always hold 
up. In a market organised to the critical point, even the great stock market crashes are simply 
ordinary, expected events – although it is true that we should expect them infrequently. 
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Historically the big swings have not been easy to explain, except perhaps in hindsight. Even 
though there are no indications whatsoever, the market may fall by 20 per cent tomorrow. 
Such events need not be triggered by anything exceptional.
5
 The cubic power law predicts the 
existence of large returns and stock market crashes such as the 1929 or 1987 crashes. They 
are not outliers.
3
  
 
The major ups and downs in the market cannot always be traced to any external shocks or to 
the actions of any one person. Rather, the tendency for large fluctuations, a universal feature 
of all markets, emerges out of the way the agents, the atoms of this world, organise 
themselves into a delicate pattern of interdependence. Understanding why one rally is really 
big while another is small means getting down into the complex ecology of theories or 
hypotheses in the minds of all the traders, seeing how the actions of one trader, by 
influencing the prices, changed the behaviour of others, or did not.
7
  
 
The real-world is a far more interesting place than the equilibrium world imagined by 
traditional economics. Oscillations that do not settle down, punctuated equilibrium, and power 
laws – these are all signature behaviours of a complex adaptive economy at work.
2
 The 
economy is too complex, too nonlinear, too dynamic, and too sensitive to the twists and turns 
of chance to be amenable to prediction over anything but the very shortest of terms.
8
 Since 
stock market fluctuations follow a power law, a small adjustment of interest rates or other 
change in background conditions could (if only rarely) be the trigger for a large swing in the 
market, or might have no effect at all.
9
  
 
Commodity markets are similar to stock markets 
Commodity markets have been found to have qualitative features similar to those of the stock 
market, despite having special features such as most commodities requiring storage and the 
need for transportation to markets etc.
8
  
 
Per Bak discusses studies from the 1960s where the monthly variation of the cotton price is 
considered. Histograms were prepared, recording to how many months the variation would be 
0.1%, how many months it would be 1%, how many months it would be 10%, etc. (Refer 
Figures 21 and 22). The result is a power law distribution (log-log chart) for the price 
fluctuations. The most important feature of this power law is that it copes with infrequent and 
very large events, just like the Gutenberg-Richter law for earthquakes (See Chapter 12). In 
Per Bak’s view, the economists largely ignored this result, probably because they didn’t have 
the faintest clue as to what was going on, since there is no possibility of having large 
                                               
8
    Beinhocker, Eric D. (2007), op. cit., Pp. 323. 
9
  Gribbin, John (2004). Deep Simplicity. Chaos, Complexity and the Emergence of Life. Allen Lane. An 
imprint of Penguin Books. London, England. Pp. 149-150. 
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fluctuations or catastrophes in an equilibrium economy with its inherent ‘normal distribution’ 
assumption.
10
 
 
Figure 21 
 
Monthly variations of cotton prices during a period of 30 months, from Mandelbrot. (Bak – 1997). 
 
Figure 22 
 
Power law curve for cotton price – The number of months where the relative variation exceeded 
a given fraction, from Mandelbrot. (Bak – 1997). 
 
 
                                               
10
    Bak, Per (1997). How Nature Works – The Science of Self-Organized Criticality. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford, U.K. Pp. 186-192. 
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Chapter 10 - Company size fluctuations (Growth/ decline rates) 
 
Quantifying business firm fluctuations 
In 1996 physicist Gene Stanley and economist Michael Salinger looked at the growth rates of 
publicly traded US manufacturing companies between 1975 and 1991. Encompassing around 
8,000 firms, this study found that growth rates followed a power-law relationship. This means 
that plotting the logarithm of the growth rate against the logarithm of the probability of that rate 
produces a straight line. Or in this case, two straight lines: one for positive growth rates and 
one for negative, both with the same slope. This generates a tent-shaped graph. They found 
that the power law holds true for two different measures of firm size – sales (revenue) and 
number of employees. Power laws are the universal signature of interdependence. A power 
law generally emerges from collective behaviour between entities through which local 
interactions can develop into a long-range influence of one entity on another.
1
 (Refer Figure 
23). 
 
Figure 23 
 
Tent shaped distribution of growth rates for all publicly traded U.S. companies between 1975 and 
1991. The growth rates are measured by increases (or decreases) in both sales (black dots) and 
number of employees (white circles). The probability of a certain growth rate decreases as the 
rate increases according to a power law. Decreases in size follow the same power law as 
increases, making the graph tent shaped. From Stanley et al. (Ball – 2004). 
 
Stanley and colleagues also analyzed the Computstat database comprising all publicly traded 
U.S. manufacturing companies within the years 1974-1993. They found the distribution of 
growth rates is different for different size firms, with a width that varies inversely with a power 
                                               
1
   Ball, Philip (2004). Critical Mass – How one thing leads to another. Arrow Books. London. United 
Kingdom.  Pp. 324-325.     
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of firm size. Similar variation is found for other complex organisations, including country size, 
university research budget size, and size of species of bird populations.
2
   
 
Stanley and collaborators disregarded classical theory of firms which divided each business 
sector and they analyzed all firms together based on the ‘complexity’ viewpoint that all firms 
are actually interconnected. To find out growth patterns they made histograms that show how 
many times a firm grows by a given amount – e.g. the sales this year divided by the sales last 
year, sorted by the size of the firm. Large firms cannot grow or shrink very much in a given 
year. For example, General Motors could not grow by a factor of 10 in a single year. Big firms 
have narrow histograms and small firms can have a very wide histogram. The width, or 
standard deviation, of a histogram is a decreasing function of the size of the firm.
2
  
 
Their analysis shows that the standard deviation is a function of the size of the firm, and once 
plotted against frequency, shows an approximately linear log-log graph result – suggesting 
that the deviation is a power law. The slope of the power law is on the order of 0.2. This 
number also seems to be quite universal, e.g. if you measure firm size by number of 
employees (rather than by annual sales) the slope is the same. It is therefore possible to 
collapse all these tent-shaped distributions onto the same scaling curve by using appropriate 
scaled variables.
2
 
 
For some time it has been known that the ‘economies’ of many large business firms are the 
size of small countries, but it has been suggested that business firms might also have similar 
organization structures to countries. Different studies looked at economies of countries and 
found the identical tent-shaped distribution for the growing and shrinking of the economies of 
countries as business firms. So in this narrow sense, countries and business firms are 
identical. Funded scientific research in universities also grow and shrink in a tent-shaped 
distribution and when size-dependence is scaled out, so does the dynamics of North 
American breeding bird populations.
2
  (Refer Figure 24). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2
   Stanley, H.E.; Amaral, L.A.N.; Gopikrishnan, P.; Plerou, V. (2000). Scale invariance and universality 
of economic fluctuations. Boston University.  Physica A 283 (2000) Pp. 31-41. Elsevier Science B.V. 
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Figure 24 
 
Tent shaped distribution of scaled annual growth for different organisations. (Stanley et al. – 
2000). 
 
The growth and shrinking of complex organisations appears to follow a universal power law 
that is immensely robust. This universal law demonstrates its validity for a wide range of 
organisation types – from business firms to bird populations. These results are great for 
modellers. Stanley believes that the empirically observed power law scaling does not require 
a critical state of the system, but may arise from an interplay between random multiplicative 
growth and the complex structure of the units composing the system.
2
  
 
Growth rates of firms also follow another power law – they fluctuate less among larger firms 
than among smaller ones.
3
  
 
 
                                               
3   Buchanan, Mark (2007). The Social Atom – Why the Rich get Richer, Cheaters Get Caught, and Your 
Neighbour Usually Looks Like You. Bloomsbury. New York. U.S.A. Pp. 180-186. 
 76 
Chapter 11 - Economic extinctions (Company failures) 
 
Failure is the norm and is beneficial to the system 
Failure is everywhere, across time, across place and across different aspects of life. 99.99%  
of all biological species that have ever existed are now extinct. Failure in this context is 
measured over hundreds of millions of years. On a dramatically shorter timescale, more than 
10 per cent of all the companies in America disappear each year. Large and small, from 
corporate giants to the tiniest one-person business, they fail. However, for those that 
disappear there is a strong numerical bias of being at the newly formed and small end of the 
size and newness spectrum. Failure can be highly beneficial. Failure at the level of the 
individual component part can, paradoxically, enhance the fitness of the system as a whole.
1
 
 
It is failure rather than success which is the distinguishing feature of corporate life. We see 
the survivors, and their triumphs are lionized. But the failures remain virtually forgotten. For 
example, Ormerod found that of the largest 100 US firms at the end of each decade from 
1919 to 1979, only thirty-three out of the top 100 in 1919 remained in the list in 1979. The 
total sample size was only 216 companies, being the total number of US top 100 companies 
over the sixty-year period. Operating on a massive scale and possessing enormous 
resources, almost one in every four were unable to remain in the top 100 for more than a 
decade. Huge assets and years of successful operation, proved no guarantee, not merely of 
continued success, but of their very survival.
1
  
 
The average lifespan of small firms is shorter than larger ones, but this is accounted for 
almost entirely by relatively high death rates in the very early years of existence. After the first 
few years of existence, the difference between large and small firms’ survival potential 
narrows dramatically. Eventually most firms fail and the relationship that describes the pattern 
of extinctions amongst firms appears to be virtually identical to that which describes biological 
extinctions.
1
  
 
Company failures show punctuated equilibrium and power law effects 
Figure 24a (Data from Ormerod) shows company failures of the world’s largest 100 
companies and it shows very occasional large spikes, but mostly it has a background of a 
typically low level of extinction. It effectively shows a punctuated equilibrium pattern – mostly 
low extinction levels, punctuated at irregular intervals by much larger ones.
2
 Spikes naturally 
seem to have occurred during prominent political or economic events such as World War 1, 
                                               
1
   Ormerod, Paul (2005). Why Most Things Fail – Evolution, Extinction and Economics. Pantheon 
Books, New York, U.S.A. Pp. vii- 33. 
2
    Ibid., Pp. 169-210.  
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recessions of the 1920’s, the depression, World War Two, and oil crises of the 1970’s and 
1980’s etc.  
 
Figure 24a - Number of extinctions of the world’s largest 100 companies in 1912, annual basis, 
1912-95. (Ormerod 2005). 
 
 
A standard way of presenting data organised by the frequency with which different values are 
observed is in a histogram. Figures 24b shows the histogram of the frequency of annual 
extinctions of the world’s largest firms and Figure 24c plots the log of the rank of the size, so 
that the largest number is given rank 1, the second largest rank 2, and so on. This is the 
standard technique when the data series contains values of zero, which negates the 
possibility of using the logs of the raw data itself. The top left hand corner of the chart is 
labelled ‘0’ which labels that point for the frequency of no extinctions for that year. ‘6’ is the 
greatest frequency of extinctions in this sample in one year.
2
 This reveals power law 
behaviour. 
 
Figure 24b - Frequency of annual extinction rates from 1912-95 of the world’s largest 100 
companies in 1912. Uses the data from Figure 24a. (Ormerod 2005). 
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Figure 24c - Power law of the frequency and size of the extinctions from 1912-95 of the world’s 
largest 100 companies in 1912. (Ormerod 2005). 
 
The precise mathematical relationship which describes the link between the frequency and 
size of the extinction of companies, for example, is virtually identical to that which describes 
the extinction of biological species in the fossil records. (Refer Figure 30a). Only the 
timescales differ. Ormerod questions how the patterns of failure, are so similar in biology and 
human organization when there is such a sharp contrast between the abilities to act with the 
conscious intent of improving one’s prospects for survival.
1
 
 
Traditional ‘equilibrium’ economic theory can not explain this non-linear effect 
Ormerod believes that economic theory has a lot to say about what firms should do in order to 
succeed, but there is little, if anything, about why firms fail.
1
   More than 10 per cent of all 
economically active companies in the US become extinct each year (600,000 out of 
6,000,000). It is a distinctive feature of companies, and any theory of the firm should attempt 
to explain it. Conventional economic theory can only do so by positing an endless supply of 
completely unexpected shocks, for otherwise the perfectly informed, rational decision-making 
firms could never die. They would live for ever. Mainstream economics likes ‘exogenous’ or 
external shocks, and uses phrases such as ‘rational’, ‘perfect knowledge’ and ‘equilibrium’. 
Unfortunately the business cycle, the rate of growth of output (GDP) is constantly changing 
from year to year. Fluctuations have not disappeared.
2
  
 
Both Schumpeter and Hayek were critical of conventional economics and both believed that it 
was precisely the complex interactions between the component parts that led to the pervasive 
existence of failure. And both realized that failure at the level of the individual component, the 
individual firm, could be beneficial to the system as a whole, since the firms that were 
dropping out were not as able to adapt to the changing conditions as the ones that survived.
3
  
 
Hayek stressed the importance of dynamic, evolutionary change in the workings of human 
social and economic systems. Traditional theory however stressed, ‘stability, order and 
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equilibrium’ rather than ‘constant change, evolution and disequilibrium’, which is the 
experience of the real world.
1
  
 
Complexity explanation for the power law effect 
Power law behaviour at the level of the system as a whole arises from the ways in which the 
component parts of the system are connected. For example, the economy is characterized by 
its network of connections; of how, for example, firms are linked to each other, and whether 
the flow across any particular connection is positive or negative. Sometimes, it is the 
distribution of the connections themselves which follows a power law. Sometimes, it is the 
connections which give rise to power law behaviour of another feature of the system, such as 
the relationship between the size and frequency of extinction events in the fossil record.
2
  
 
The developed economies of the west each have an extensive network of connections, 
especially the very large firms with each other. General Motors, for example, will almost 
certainly have dealings with software companies, computer manufacturers, banks and 
insurance companies, oil suppliers, producers of heavy industrial materials, and so on. Direct 
competitors are also connected to the company, since they have an impact on General 
Motors’ fitness for survival and all its connected companies.
2
  
 
Most of the time, small events, small shocks to the system, will only have small impacts, and 
large shocks will usually have big consequences. But the fact that we observe power-law 
behaviour in a system tells us that the system operates in a way that means that these 
relationships do not always hold. Sometimes, a very small event can have profound 
consequences, and occasionally a big shock can be contained and be of little import. It is not 
the power law itself which gives rise to these unexpected features of causality; rather it is the 
fact that we observe a power law in a system which tells us that causality within it behaves in 
this way. The conventional way of linear thinking, which postulates a link between the size of 
an event and its consequences, is broken.
2
  
 
The relationship that describes the connection between the frequency and size of extinctions 
of biological species is the same as that which describes extinctions of companies. The 
timescales differ dramatically, but frequency and size are connected identically in both. This 
confronts us with a paradox. No biological species, with the exception of humanity, is able to 
anticipate the future and to plan its strategy accordingly. In reality, extinction is a pervasive 
feature for biological species, as it is for firms. Yet people in companies are able to think 
about strategy, they are able to make decisions which will effect the ability of the firm to 
survive, and still extinction is a pervasive feature.
2
  
 
There are two interpretations of extinctions of firms. Traditional economics believes that 
extinctions are caused solely by shocks that are external to the system. Complexity says that 
extinctions of all sizes arise quite naturally from within the system itself, from the network of 
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connections between the individual agents and how they evolve over time. A variation to this, 
is where some complexity writers believe that shocks can be both internal and external rather 
than just external or just internal.
2
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Chapter 12 - Earthquakes   
 
Gutenberg-Richter law of Earthquakes (Non-linearity) 
The Gutenberg-Richter law for earthquakes is a power law and that means the distribution is 
scale invariant. Buchanan believes that there is nothing whatsoever about the large quakes to 
suggest they have an origin different from the small quakes. In the absence of any reason for 
suggesting that the really large quakes are special, the paradoxical implication is that what 
triggers small and large quakes is precisely the same. From this perspective, it does not make 
sense to look for special explanations for the largest earthquakes. They are no more special 
or unusual than the tiny shudders constantly rippling beneath our feet. It is absolutely crucial 
to realise that we cannot draw this conclusion from any mathematical form other than a power 
law. But a power law demands it. In view of the Gutenberg-Richter power law, it is extremely 
unlikely that the project of mega-quake prediction is possible. Indeed, the entire project of 
earthquake prediction may be fundamentally misguided, and practically impossible.
1
  
 
‘Equilibrium’ and ‘linear’ approaches have failed to predict earthquakes 
Per Bak is clear that scientists are poor at making earthquake predictions, and not for lack of 
effort. All kinds of approaches have been suggested, but none are consistent with the data. 
Any prediction theory of earthquakes must explain the Gutenberg-Richter law.
2
 
 
The statistics for all quakes reveal a strikingly simple pattern. (Refer Figure 25). Between 
1987 and 1996, for example, a large number of earthquakes hit southern California in the 
United States. In terms of energy, the data indicates that whenever you double the energy 
released by an earthquake, it is one quarter less frequent.
1
 The Gutenberg-Richter law is 
surprisingly robust and does not vary significantly from region to region over time.
3
 The 
Gutenberg-Richter law is a classic example of a simple law underlying what looks at first sight 
to be a complex system.
4
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Figure 25 
 
Power law curve for earthquakes in Southern California between 1987 and 1996 from Buchanan. 
(Beinhocker – 2007). 
 
Logarithmic scaling 
The Gutenberg/ Richter graph does not seem to offer much illumination regarding the 
question about what is typical when it comes to earthquakes. But in other ways it tells us a 
lot.
1
 The Richter scale is logarithmic, so that an increase of one unit on the scale corresponds 
to an increase in the amount of energy released by a factor of 30; a magnitude 2 earthquake 
is 30 times as powerful as a magnitude 1 earthquake, a magnitude 3 earthquake is 30 times 
more powerful than a magnitude 2 earthquake (and therefore 900 times more powerful than a 
magnitude 1 earthquake), and so on.
4
  
 
The number of earthquakes of each magnitude also obey a power law – for every 1,000 
earthquakes of magnitude 5 there are roughly 100 earthquakes of magnitude 6, 10 
earthquakes of magnitude 7, and so on. An earthquake of magnitude 8, a little smaller than 
the famous San Francisco earthquake of 1906, is 20 billion times more energetic than an 
earthquake of magnitude 1, which corresponds to the kind of tremor you feel indoors when a 
heavy lorry passes by in the street outside.
4
 
 
Since earthquakes follow power laws, there is no typical size. Earthquakes occur across all 
size scales, but the bigger the quake, the rarer it is. Power laws, along with oscillations and 
punctuated equilibrium, are signature characteristics of complex adaptive systems.
5
 Thus, it 
appears that one should not try to come up with specific explanations for large earthquakes, 
but rather with a general theory encompassing all earthquakes, large and small.
6
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Scale invariant  
A power law, with its scale-invariant form, implies that large events are just magnified copies 
of smaller ones, and arise from the same kinds of causes. Really big earthquakes are not 
triggered by special events, but are simply the natural if infrequent consequence of the overall 
critical organisation of the earth’s crust, and its susceptibility to long-range chain reactions.
7
  
 
Buchanan believes that when power laws apply, then words like ‘normal’, ‘typical’, ‘abnormal’ 
and ‘exceptional’ do not apply. Power laws always have this implication, whatever the subject 
being considered.
1
  Large earthquakes occur more rarely than small earthquakes, but they 
are produced by essentially the same physical process as small earthquakes –and the power 
law tells you this even if you have no idea what that single physical cause of earthquakes is.
4
  
 
This is quite different from the idea, still widely held, that large earthquakes require big 
triggers. If that were so, then it would be comforting, as you would wait a long time before the 
next big strike. The statistics and the power law in particular, say otherwise. Both large and 
small earthquakes occur at random, but importantly with different frequencies. Gribbin 
believes that an earthquake of any size could happen at any time in an earthquake zone, and 
just as the possibility of a tossed coin coming down heads is still 1 in 2 even if the last three 
tosses have all come down tails, so the chances of another earthquake like the event of 1906 
were no less (and no more) in 1907 than they were in 1905. Power laws always mean that the 
thing being described by the law is scale invariant, so that earthquakes of any size are 
governed by exactly the same rules.
4
  
 
Omori’s law of aftershocks 
Omori’s law states that the rate of aftershocks decreases quickly with time. The rate of 
aftershocks is proportional to the inverse of the time since the main shock. Thus whatever the 
odds of an aftershock are on the first day, the second day will be ½ the odds of the first day 
and the tenth day will be approximately 1/10
th
 the odds of the first day (when p is equal to 1). 
These patterns describe only the mass behaviour of aftershocks; the actual times, numbers 
and locations of the aftershocks are ‘random’, while tending to follow these patterns. 
Aftershocks follow the Richter law of scaling, so in summary there are more small aftershocks 
and fewer large aftershocks.
8
  
 
Said another way, large earthquakes tend to cluster together in time, and the longer you wait 
without seeing one, the longer you will probably have to wait. The mathematical signature of 
this clustering is the distribution of ‘waiting times’ for the next large earthquake, after one 
large quake has taken place, a distribution that also follows a power law (Omori law) and is 
2.6 – that means, waiting times of, say, two weeks turns out about 2.6 times less frequent 
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than times of just one week, and the same goes for times of two months relative to one 
month, two years relative to one year, and so on.
7
  
 
Clustering 
Power law phenomenon such as earthquakes are inherently not periodic (i.e. don’t follow 
regular cycles). The power law indicates that the longer you have waited since a large 
earthquake at a given location, the longer you can expect to wait. Earthquakes are clustered 
in time, not periodic. This applies to evolution, where the longer a species has been in 
existence (i.e. cockroaches), the longer we can expect it to survive. This is contrary to popular 
thinking. People assume that since an earthquake is due at a particular location, means that 
one will happen there soon.
9
 Regularity should not be confused with periodicity.
6
  
 
Careful statistical studies of earthquakes indicate that the longer some region goes without a 
quake, the less likely it is to suffer one in the near future. Earthquakes seem to strike in 
clusters. The best current method for predicting an earthquake according to Per Bak is 
probably to wait until one strikes, and then quickly predict another at that location.
1
  
 
 
                                               
9
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 85 
Chapter 13 - Scientific progress and scientific citations 
 
Scientific citations 
Alfred Lotka reported in 1926 in his ground breaking discovery of the so-called Law of 
Scientific Productivity, which states that the distribution of the numbers of papers written by 
individual scientists follows a power law. That is, the number of scientists who have written k 
papers falls off for some constant α. In fact, this result extends to the arts and humanities as 
well. Both the in- and out-degree (numbers of times a paper has been cited and number of 
other papers a paper cites) distributions of the network follow power laws, a far reaching 
discovery.
1
 
 
Lotka’s law is now defined as the frequency of publication by authors in any given field. As the 
number of articles published increases, authors producing that many publications become 
less frequent. The formula is 1/n
a
 where ‘n’ is authors and ‘a’ is usually 2.  For example, there 
are ¼ as many authors publishing two articles within a specified time period as there are 
single-published authors, 1/9 as many publishing three articles, 1/16 as many publishing four 
articles, etc. Though the law itself covers many disciplines, the actual ratios involved are 
discipline related. Lotka’s law is believed to have application in other fields for example in the 
military for fighter pilot kills.
2
 
 
In the 1950s Herbert Simon
1 
showed that power laws arise when the ‘rich get richer’, when 
the amount you get goes up with the amount you already have. In sociology this is referred to 
as the Matthew effect, after the biblical edict, ‘For unto every one that hath shall be given, and 
he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he 
hath.’ (Matthew 25:29 – King James Bible).  
 
Later studies showed that the network of citations between scientific papers followed a power 
law and that many citations receive further citations in proportion to the number they already 
have. This was called ‘cumulative advantage’ or as it is more commonly called ‘preferential 
attachment’. Newman believes that preferential attachment is the most widely accepted 
explanation for the occurrence of power-law degree distributions in networks as diverse as 
the World Wide Web, social networks, and biological networks.
3
  
 
Redner (1998) also independently discovered power law effects using two large databases of 
citations of physics papers. Redner investigated the citation frequency of 783,339 papers 
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published in 1981 and cited over 6 million times between 1981 and 1997. Redner found the 
power tail exponent roughly equal to -3. The data shows a ‘scale-free network’.
3
 Most papers 
were cited only a few times, but a few appeared in a large number of reference lists. In fact, 
about half the papers (368,110 papers) were never or hardly ever cited at all, a telling 
reminder of the modest nature of most research projects. Of course some research papers 
are highly influential.
4
  (Refer Figure 26).  
 
Figure 26 
 
Power law curve by Redner of the distribution of research papers according to the number of 
citations they receive. (Buchanan – 2000). 
 
For the papers that collected more than a hundred citations or so, Redner found that the 
distribution of citations follows a scale-invariant power law; precisely what we might expect if 
the network of ideas is organised, like the sand-pile, into a critical state. Redner discovered 
that the way highly cited papers become rare follows an extremely regular pattern: double the 
number of citations, and the number of papers receiving that many falls off by about eight. So 
there is no typical number of citations for a paper, and by extension, no typical magnitude for 
the reshaping in the network of ideas that any paper ultimately entails.
5
 
 
Mathematical models by Newman of the scientific citation process predict a strong ‘first-
mover’ effect under which the first papers in a field will, essentially regardless of content, 
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receive citations at a rate enormously higher than papers published later. This is confirmed by 
empirical evidence.
6
 
 
The collaboration networks of scientists in biology and medicine, various sub disciplines of 
physics and computer science were analyzed by Newman, by using author attributions from 
papers or reprints appearing in those areas over a 5-year period from 1995 to 1999. They all 
form ‘small world’ networks, in which the average distance between scientists via a line of 
intermediate collaborators varies logarithmically with the size of the relevant community. 
Newman found that the three databases had a power law result with an exponential cut-off. 
The power law exponent was constant at about 2.5.
7
 
 
Newman studied the distributions of both the number of collaborators of scientists and the 
number of papers they write, and found both follow power law distributions with an 
exponential cutoff. This cutoff may be caused by the finite time window used in the study.
7
  
 
‘Punctuated equilibrium’ describes how science progresses  
Thomas Kuhn described the development of science through periods of stable growth 
punctuated by revisionary revolutions. According to Kuhn the development of science is not 
uniform but has alternating ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ phases. The revolutionary phases are 
not merely periods of accelerated progress, but differ qualitatively from normal science. 
Normal science does resemble the standard cumulative picture of scientific progress, on the 
surface at least.
8
 Kuhn called the violent revolutionary periods of upheaval ‘paradigm shifts’.
9
 
Discovery of new paradigms in science is the sudden ‘punctuation’, whilst ‘normal’ science is 
the gradual ‘equilibrium’.
10
  
 
Scientists like Albert Einstein, Isaac Newton and Charles Darwin are names we would match 
against the great, earth-shattering scientific revolutions. In a 1969 postscript to a new edition 
of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn emphasised that such revolutions need not 
have widespread consequences or involve fundamental ideas. A small sub-field of physics, 
say, or even a handful of scientists in a single research group, can experience a revolutionary 
change in the structure of ideas that form the basis of its work. If the ideas on which it has 
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depended increasingly fail to deliver results, even a small group may experience the same 
basic pattern of change. A major revolution does not have to be exclusively associated with 
an Einstein, Newton or Darwin. So in Kuhn’s mind, what distinguishes a revolution from 
normal science is its tradition-shattering as opposed to tradition-preserving character. A 
revolution tears up part of the old network of ideas; normal science simply adds to it. Kuhn’s 
discussion hints at the possibility that there may be no typical revolution; that the dynamics of 
science could be scale-invariant, and that the network of good ideas might, like the earth’s 
crust, be poised in a critical state.
11
 
 
Throughout all these phenomena, we make a natural but false distinction between the few big 
events and the background of the more numerous run-of-the-mill events. For example, we like 
to separate the five mass extinctions from the numerous smaller extinctions caused by 
evolution; or we like to separate the few great earthquakes from the numerous smaller 
quakes. In each of these examples, there are no exceptional causes. It looks as if something 
very similar may be true of science itself. Kuhn hinted that there could be small revolutions as 
well as large, and that both shared the same essential character as ‘tradition-shattering’ 
events. Redner’s power law for citations is a kind of Gutenberg-Richter law for scientific 
upheavals, and implies that there is, in a deep sense, no true distinction between large and 
small scientific revolutions.
11
 
 
Buchanan believes that scientific knowledge is like many other things poised in a critical state. 
If so, then scientists should expect the unexpected. For the fabric of ideas is organised so that 
the tiniest chance discovery may at any moment and without warning activate a domino-like 
chain of effects leading to a terrific revolution. Foreseeing such revolutions is next to 
impossible, for the ultimate consequences of any new idea depends not so much on its own 
inherent profundity as on where it happens to fall within the network of all scientific ideas.  
As seen through the lens of the critical state, great revolutions are not necessarily unique in 
terms of their causes. They are simply the expected large fluctuations of a system poised in a 
critical state.
11
  
 
The scale-free power law for citations, means that the smallest revolutions are happening 
every day, may involve only a few scientists in specialised communities, and may be virtually 
invisible to almost everyone else. By contrast, the largest revolutions may wipe away much of 
science as we know it, and are liable to happen at any time, if the right idea pops up in the 
right place. So while chains of events in these systems may not be predictable, it is not the 
case that nothing is predictable. It is in the statistical pattern that emerges over many chains 
of events that we can hope to discover the laws for things historical.
11
 
 
 
                                               
11
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Chapter 14 - Species extinctions 
 
Power law distributions are key to understanding evolution 
Mark Newman believes that all mathematical extinction models need to take into account 
three key global properties of fossil records.
1
 These are: 
 
(1)  The fossil record appears to have a power-law (i.e., scale- free) distribution of the size 
of extinction events, with an exponent close to 2.   
(2)  The distribution of the lifetimes of species also appears to follow a power law, with an 
exponent of about 1.7.  
(3)  The number of species per genus also appears to follow a power law with an exponent 
of about 1.5.  
 
Extinction rates 
Figure 27a shows a plot of the number of families of marine organisms becoming extinct in 
each geological stage since the start of life. The graph shows more variation than the five 
mass extinctions.  To investigate the endogenous view of extinction, researchers have 
constructed plots of the distribution of the sizes of extinction events; non-uniformity in such a 
distribution might offer support for distinct mass and background extinction mechanisms.
2
 
 
Figure 27a 
 
The number of families of known marine organisms becoming extinct per stratigraphic stage as 
a function of time. The positions of the ‘big five’ mass extinctions are marked with letters. (My = 
millions of years.) Data from Sepkoski. (Newman 2003). 
 
Figure 27b is a histogram of the data in Figure 27a. Figure 27b is highly skewed and very far 
from a normal distribution. It shows no visible discontinuities, within the sampling errors, and 
                                               
1
   Newman, M.E.J and Palmer, R.G. (2003). Modelling Extinction. A Volume in the Santa Fe Institute 
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2
    Ibid., Pp. 1-22. 
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therefore gives no evidence for any distinction between mass and background extinction 
events.  
 
Figure 27b 
 
Histogram of the number of families of marine organisms becoming extinct. Data from Figure 
27a - Sepkoski. (Newman 2003). 
 
Figure 27c is the data from 27b replotted using logarithmic scales using the Zipf ranking 
method, which shows a straight line of a power law distribution, at least for large extinction 
events. Whilst the graph shows both a power law fit and an exponential one, Newman 
believes that the power law is a better fit with a power law exponent of approximately 2.
 2
 
Newman’s methodology is considered in greater detail in Chapter 17, ‘Not all power law 
distributions are power law’.  
 
Figure 27c 
 
Power law of the data from Figure 27b replotted on logarithmic scale, with Poissonian error bars. 
The solid line is the best power-law fit to the data. The dashed line is the best exponential fit. 
(Newman 2003) 
 
Species lifetimes 
Another quantity which has been compared with the predictions of a variety of extinction 
models is the distribution of the lifetimes of groups of organisations (taxa). Figure 27d shows 
a log-log graph of the lifetimes of marine species in the Sepkoski database. The figure’s axes 
are logarithmic and the solid and dotted lines represent respectively power law and 
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exponential fits to the data. At first glance it appears from this figure that the lifetime 
distribution is better fitted by the exponential form. However, the power-law fit in the figure is a 
fit only to the data between 10 and 100 million years. For this interval, the power law line 
matches the data quite well. Newman believes that both the very short and very long lifetimes 
are probably under-represented in the database because of systematic biases.
2
  
 
Figure 27d 
 
Power law of the frequency distribution of marine species lifetimes in the fossil record. The solid 
line is the best power-law fit to the data between 10 and 100 million years (My), while the dotted 
line is the best exponential fit to all the data. After Newman and Sibani. (Newman 2003).  
 
First, since the appearance and disappearance of species are recorded only to the nearest 
stage, lifetimes of less than the length of the corresponding stage are registered as being 
zero and do not appear on the histogram. This means that lifetimes shorter than the average 
stage length of about 7 million years are underrepresented.  The longest lifetime data is 
always slightly shorter (i.e. up to 7 million years) than it may have been, so this causes some 
underestimation in results. Overall, Newman believes the power law form is a reasonable 
conjecture. The exponent of the power law for the central region of the figure is measured to 
be approximately 1.7.
2
  
 
The number of species per genus 
As long ago as 1922, Willis noted that if one takes the taxonomy hierarchy of current 
organisms, counts the number of species in each genus, and makes a histogram of the 
number of genera for each value, then the resulting graph has a form which closely follows a 
power law. In Figure 27e Willis used species per genus of flowering plants. The measured 
exponent in this case is approximately 1.5. Others have subsequently extended these results 
to higher taxa, showing that the number of genera per family, families per order, and so forth, 
also follow power laws, suggesting that the taxonomic tree has a fractal structure, a result of 
some interest to those working on ‘critical’ models of extinction.
2
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Figure 27e 
 
Power law of the number of species per genus of flowering plants. The solid line is the best 
power-law fit to the data. After Willis. (Newman 2003) 
 
Extinctions triggered by both exogenous and endogenous reasons 
Of the estimated one to four billion species that have existed on the Earth since life first 
appeared here, less than 50 million are still alive today. All the others became extinct, 
typically within about ten million years of their first appearance.
2
  
 
There are two primary schools of thought about the causes of mass extinction. The traditional 
view is that extinction is the result of external stresses imposed on the ecosystem by the 
environment. There is good evidence for particular external/ exogenous causes for a number 
of major extinction events in the Earth’s history, such as marine regression (sea level drop) 
and meteorite impact for the end of the Cretaceous. Other traditional explanations are also 
exogenous in nature, such as climate change, volcanism, tidal waves, etc. However, mass 
extinctions only account for 35 percent of the total extinction evidence in the fossil record at 
the family level, and for the remaining 65 percent we have no firm evidence favouring one 
cause over another.
2
 The paleontological wisdom primarily leans in favour of the traditional 
abiotic approach.
1
  
 
The alternative view is held by biologists and ecologists who support the idea that background 
extinction has biotic and internal/ endogenous causes – that extinction is a natural part of the 
dynamics of ecosystems and would take place regardless of any stresses arising from the 
environment. Those who hold this view are keen to use models which make predictions about 
trends based on the power law observations of the overall fossil patterns.
2
  
 
For Per Bak, the ‘external’ force idea is essentially a ‘linear’ idea, since it assumes that a 
large effect must come from a large impact. In a non-linear world, there is no simple way to 
predict emergent behaviour. Self-organising criticality does not need a large change to make 
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a large impact, as it is not a linear effect. Bak is therefore strongly against searching for linear 
solutions (external forces) to non-linear systems.
3
  
 
Stephen Gould suggested that the best way to look at it is to say that both endogenous 
triggers (often of small initial extent) and exogenous triggers (both great and small) can be in 
operation at the same time. The two approaches to causing triggers are complementary and 
do not exclude each other.
4
 
 
Catastrophes – Punctuated equilibrium 
The Darwin –Lyell viewpoint that extinction is a gradualist one is not supported by the 
evidence, which shows the regular occurrence of mass extinctions in the fossil records.
2
  
 
Punctuated equilibrium was proposed in 1972 by Niles Eldredge and Stephen Gould, based 
on a study of fossil records suggesting that the evolution of individual species takes place in 
well-defined steps (the punctuation marks) separated by long periods of stability (equilibra or 
stasis). Extinctions occurred in bursts.
5
 
 
Some regard the mass extinctions simply as a set of unrelated events. Others have sought a 
single mechanism to explain them all: the bombardment of the earth by comets, the 
destruction of shallow seas when continents collide and merge, a shortage of oxygen, a 
dramatic climate change, or a huge meteorite (favoured for killing the dinosaurs sixty-five 
million years ago).
5
   
 
Mass extinctions occurred 65 million years ago and in a geological blink of the eye, the 
dinosaurs and 75 per cent of all other species suddenly went extinct. Other mass extinctions 
occurred 440, 365, 250, and 210 million years ago. These form the five big extinctions. Of 
course not every extinction is part of a mass extinction.
6
  
 
Just because a meteorite (i.e. a 10 kilometre diameter meteorite that hit the Yucatan 
Peninsula of Mexico
7
) is the favoured explanation for the mass extinction of 65 million years 
ago, doesn’t mean that meteorites are the main reason for mass extinctions. For example, if 
meteorites are an important trigger, then where are the meteorite craters that fit the other four 
of the five mass extinctions, being 210, 250, 365 and 440 million years ago?
6
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It seems that not all meteorites are equal in impact. For example, researchers in 1998 
uncovered evidence of a huge crater 100 kilometres across in northern Siberia which was 
created at precisely the same time as an 85-kilometre hole was created at the mouth of 
Chesapeake Bay in the USA. Both were made 35 million years ago when comets smashed 
into the earth during a comet shower in the solar system. The fossil record shows absolutely 
nothing unusual at the time.
6
    
 
Power laws come from systems that are in a self-organised critical state 
Gribbin believes that what the fossil record seems to be telling us is that extinctions happen 
on all scales, all the time, and that (like earthquakes) an extinction of any size can happen at 
any time. Some extinctions might be triggered by meteorite impacts; some might be triggered 
by Ice Ages.  But the other lesson from what we know about power laws and 1/f noise is that 
you do not need a large trigger in order to set off a large event. An extinction of any size might 
be set off by a trigger of any size. What matters is that we are dealing with a complex system 
– life on Earth – which is self-organising, feeding off a flow of energy, and exists at the edge 
of chaos.
7
 
 
Per Bak suggests self-organizing criticality. Bak argues that life is a dynamic system, that far 
from ever existing in a stable steady state (equilibrium), organizes spontaneously into a 
characteristic and much more precarious critical state.  Life does not evolve gradually but 
intermittently, with long periods of inactivity or stasis, interrupted by spurts of change 
characterised by mass extinctions and the emergence of new species. What is significant 
about this idea is that it does not require extinctions to originate through some ‘external 
cause’. If life organises into a critical state, catastrophes, no matter how large, can be an 
intrinsic, self-organizing feature of evolution requiring no external causes.
5
  
 
Using highly idealised computer simulations of evolution, Bak and colleagues found that 
during periods of frenzied evolutionary activity, the average fitness of species is low, as they 
relentlessly mutate in search of better fitness. The fitness of these various species is also low 
during mass extinctions, and high during periods of stasis associated with low evoluntary 
activity. Thus, in their work, ‘survival of the fittest’ did not mean evolution to a state where 
every species is well off: on the contrary, individual species are barely able to hang on – like 
the grains of sand in the critical sand pile or surviving a ‘Red Queen effect’.
5
  
 
According to their model, at the critical point all species influence each other. In this state they 
act collectively as a single ‘metaorganism’, many sharing the same fate. This is highlighted by 
the very existence of large scale extinctions. One corollary is that species with a high degree 
of complexity and many biological connections and dependencies, resulting from such factors 
as food chains, predator-prey and parasite-host relationships, are more sensitive to 
                                               
7
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fluctuations that perturb the dynamics and thus are more likely to be part of the next 
avalanche to extinction.
5
 
 
The same power-law results occur with different sampling approaches 
Jack Sepkoski’s data (Figure 28) when plotted as a histogram (Figure 29) in four million years 
long intervals, found that just over 90 per cent of the extinctions occur in just under 50 per 
cent of the intervals. This is not a uniform distribution. Plotting each four million year long 
interval has fluctuated over the past 600 million years. The overall fluctuations of the graph 
look fairly random, with long intervals of relatively little variation, just a few species going 
extinct from time to time, punctuated by dramatic events in which large numbers of extinctions 
occur – the mass extinctions.
7
  
 
Figure 28 
 
Biological extinctions over the last 600 million years, from Sepkoski. The curve shows the 
estimated percentage of families that went extinct within intervals of approximately 4 million 
years. (Bak – 1997).  
 
Figure 29 
 
Biological extinctions – Histogram showing the number of intervals, each of four million years 
long, during which the indicated amount of extinctions occurred. Just over 90 per cent of the 
extinctions occur in just under 50 percent of the intervals, from Sepkoski. (Gribbin – 2004). 
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Like Sepkoski, Raup showed that the frequency with which we see extinctions of any given 
scale falls away with the square of the size (power law), for example, an extinction period in 
which twice the percentage of species per million years became extinct as in another event is 
four times less likely to be observed (four being two squared). A period in which three times 
as many become extinct is nine times less likely to take place, and so on.
8
 
 
Figure 30b gives an illustration of the power law connection between frequency and size 
using the same Sepkoski data in Figure 28, which is plotted over time of the total of seventy-
seven observations, each corresponding to a particular geological era. Forty-two of the 
observations experience an extinction rate of less than 3 per cent per million years, so the 
frequency is forty-two. We see an extinction rate of between 0 and 3 per cent forty-two times 
in the fossil record. Figure 30a is the histogram form of this data, which fits in sequence 
between Figure 28 and Figure 30b.
 8
 
 
The power law is the inverse square of the size. The label ‘0-3’ refers to the percentage of 
total species becoming extinct every million years in the geological eras of the data set, and 
refers specifically to percentages between 0 and 3. Similarly, ‘3-6’ refers to values between 3  
and 6 per cent, and so.
8
  
 
Figure 30a 
 
 
Frequency of extinction rates of biological species in geological eras since 550 million years 
before present. (Ormerod 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8
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Figure 30b 
 
Power law of the frequency of extinction events in the fossil records against the (natural) log of 
the size of the extinction. Size is defined as the percentage of all species becoming extinct per 
million years, and this data is grouped into bands of three, i.e., all periods when the extinction 
rate was between 0-3 are in the ‘0-3’ observations, and so on. (Ormerod 2005). 
 
The striking feature of Figure 30b is that it follows a power-law distribution – the frequency of 
extinction falls much faster than the size of the extinction. Ormerod believes that this 
discovery of the empirical relationship between the size and frequency of extinctions is a 
major advance in how we need to think about evolution. He notes that it is strikingly similar to 
the annual extinction rate of the world’s top 100 companies over the last 100 years.
8
 (Refer to 
Figure 24c). These findings provide an important starting point for modellers to apply as the 
control data when modelling for the future or for different policy scenarios.  
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Chapter 15 - War 
 
Richardson power law of war 
In the 1920s, British physicist Lewis Richardson studied eighty-two wars that had flared up 
between 1820 and 1929. (Refer Figure 31). Richardson used deaths to judge the size of war.
1
 
Richardson analysed conflicts from individual murders (magnitude 0 conflict) to the two world 
wars (magnitude 7).
2
 He found a power law; every time you double the number of deaths, the 
wars of that size become four times less common. This is precisely the same as the 
Gutenberg-Richter law, and we can draw similar conclusions. There is no typical size for a 
war, and no sensible division of wars into small skirmishes and major conflagrations. All wars 
whether over territory, religion or nationalism fall on a smooth curve that implies that the initial 
causes of all wars are probably the same. Later war historians like Jack Levy have used the 
number of casualties divided by the world population at the time. The power law still holds. 
The precise pattern becomes 2.62 times less frequent every time you double the number of 
deaths.
1
  
 
Figure 31 
 
Power law curve for War - The distribution of deadly conflicts according to the number of people 
killed according to Richardson. (Buchanan – 2000). 
 
Cederman believes Richardson’s finding that the severity of interstate wars is power-law 
distributed belongs to the most striking, most accurate and most robust empirical regularities 
in world politics. Yet, in his view this is a regularity in search of a theory, as conventional 
theories on war can not account for the power law effect.
2
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Predicting war is impossible 
Levy notes that in spite of the importance of war and the enormous human and economic 
resources devoted to its many aspects, our understanding of war remains at an elementary 
level. There is no widely accepted theory of the causes of war and little agreement has 
emerged on the methodology through which these causes might be discovered. Instead, the 
literature is characterised by a proliferation of competing and often contradictory theories.
3
  
 
Levy found that once a war (or a series of wars) is over, neither its incidence nor its 
seriousness has any impact on the likelihood of war in the period immediately following, 
regardless of its characteristics or frequency of occurrence and regardless of the total amount 
of war in a given period. These findings are valid for Great Power wars as well as for 
interstate wars involving the Powers over the last five centuries of the modern Great Power 
system.
4
  
 
Particularly interesting are the implications of Levy’s findings for the popular war-weariness 
hypothesis. Not only are most of the relevant test statistics relatively weak and statistically 
insignificant, but they tend to run in a direction contrary to that implied by the hypothesis. Levy 
found that neither war nor a series of wars retards subsequent war (or Great Power war). The 
severity of war has the smallest (rather than the largest) impact, and periods of the most 
destructive war (as measured by severity) tend to be followed by more (not fewer) Great 
Power wars.
4
 Equally, there have been several empirical studies of the war contagion 
hypothesis. These consistently found that the outbreak of war is random rather than 
contagious, regardless of whether we look at short term contagion or long-term periodicity.
5
   
 
Levy found that the only statistically valid trend that came out of all his analysis was that the 
frequency of war is inversely related to its seriousness. Wars have generally been either 
frequent but limited or infrequent but more serious; only rarely have they been both frequent 
and serious or infrequent and limited.
6
 
 
Civilisation operates in a self-organised critical state 
Ball suggests that civilisation operates in a self-organised critical state. His idea is that 
conflicts and wars are the result of tensions that hold international relations poised at the brink 
of catastrophe. As a consequence, wars of all magnitudes, from minor skirmishes to global 
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conflagrations, are inevitable.
7
 Coveney believes that conflicts and social unrest tend to 
spread like avalanches.
8
 
 
Like every other power law, the evidence is ‘emergent’ from the empirical evidence of the 
Richardson power law graph, i.e. the graph displays the relationship between the number of 
conflicts and their size, measured according to the number of fatalities that resulted. Wars 
which left only a few hundred dead and world wars which have killed millions, all follow a 
single power law.
7
  
 
The power law implies that a war, when it starts out, does not ‘know how big it will become’ – 
nor does anyone else. The power-law, suggests that the world’s political and social fabric 
tends to be organised on the very edge of instability, and in such a way that wars spread in a 
special way, so that their ultimate extent is nearly impossible to foresee. The scale free 
character of the power law suggests that at the outset of a war there are no obvious clues 
about how large it will become.
1
  
 
Once a complex system is at the critical point and there is tension, small events can have 
disproportionate consequences. For example, the First World War started from the 
assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
7
 It was hardly the first time 
a member of a ruling family was killed by an assassination and when they do occur they do 
not usually signal a reason for war. This is an example of the ‘Butterfly’ effect. In this case the 
flapping of the butterfly did cause a great storm, at other times the butterfly’s flapping just 
caused it’s wing to flap – no more and no less.  
 
Modern severity/ frequency data 
Cederman uses updated data from the Correlates of War Project (1998). In this project the 
focus is restricted to interstate rather than intrastate wars. Using double logarithmic scales, 
Figure 32 plots the severity of interstate war between 1820 and 1997. It is a power law since 
the fit is linear. While the data points in the lower right-hand corner correspond to the world 
wars, the vast majority of all other wars reach considerably lower levels of severity, though 
without straying very far from the estimate line. The slope estimate of -0.41 implies that a ten-
fold increase of war severity decreases the probability of war by a factor of 2.6. These 
findings compare with those of Jack Levy’s compilation of European great power wars from 
1945 to 1965 which also had a straight line in a log-log diagram but with a steeper slope of  -
0.57.
2
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Figure 32 
 
Power law curve for War - The cumulative frequency of severity of interstate wars, 1820-1997 
according to COW data. (Cederman – 2002). 
 
Given these strong results it may seem surprising that so few scholars have attempted to 
account for what seems to be an important empirical law. In fact, the situation is not very 
different from the economists’ failure to explain the power law governing the distribution of city 
sizes, also known as Zipf’s law. Using urban population data from many countries, 
researchers have established that the rank of city size typically correlates astonishingly well 
with city size. Cederman cites the economist Paul Krugman (1995) who noted that at this 
point we have to say that the rank-size rule is a major embarrassment for economic theory as 
it is one of the strongest statistical relationships we know, but lacks any clear basis in theory.
2
 
 
Whilst International relations theory can not explain this power law effect, natural scientists 
have been studying self-organised criticality (SOC), which follows the ideas of Per Bak and 
others. What is unique about SOC systems is that they do not have to be carefully tuned to 
stay in the critical point where they generate the scale-free output responsible for the power 
laws. They do it automatically, i.e. they are ‘self’ organised. The non-equilibrium master 
metaphor is the sandpile.  Whereas macro-level distributions emerge as stable features of 
scale-free systems, at the micro-level, such systems exhibit a strong degree of path 
dependence. To use the sandpile as an illustration, it matters exactly where and when the 
grains land. This means that point prediction often turns out to be futile, as exemplified by 
earthquakes. This does not mean, however, that no regularities exist. In particular, it is 
important to distinguish complex self-organized systems of the SOC kind from mere chaos, 
which also generates unpredictable behaviour.
2
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The stress on SOC encourages us to search for scale-invariant explanations. This means 
rather than treating large wars, such as world wars, as qualitatively distinct events that require 
separate explanations, that to get to a unified theory you need to explain all wars regardless 
of their size.
2
  
 
Cederman found that technological change and contextual activated decision-making go a 
long way towards explaining why power laws emerge in geopolitical systems. Without these 
mechanisms, it becomes very hard to generate scale-free war-size distributions. Cederman’s 
computational modelling of this regularity strengthens his confidence in the conjecture that 
interstate warfare actually follows the principles of self-organised criticality. If the SOC 
conjecture holds, then the logic of SOC casts doubt on international relation’s static 
equilibrium theories as blue-prints for systematic theorising. If wars emanate from 
disequilibrium processes, then the narrow focus on equilibrium based theories is misguided.
2
  
 
After all, scholars do make seismic analogies when reviewing history. For example, it is often 
stated that the end of the Cold War was caused by a series of geopolitical earthquakes.
2
 This 
could equally be called the ‘punctuated’ part of the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ effect of history. 
 
Cederman warns that care needs to be taken not to make simplistic analogies. For example, 
in the seismic analogy, he hopes that war is avoidable due to democratic security 
communities that can emerge, unlike the actions of the continental plates.  Whereas some 
areas of the world are prone to frequent outbreaks of interstate violence, in others, 
catastrophic events are virtually unthinkable. Cederman suggests that the only safe way of 
managing security affairs is to transform the balance of power into a situation of trust, which is 
what happened between France and Germany in the last half century. While nuclear 
calamities would further vindicate Richardson’s law, there would be few people around 
appreciating the advances of social science should the ostensibly ‘impossible’ turn out to be 
just another huge low-probability event.
2  
Whilst I hope Cederman is right, I note that there is 
strong empirical support for the power law effect for war. This can only bode badly for the 
future, afterall there are always potential rogue states like Iran or Pakistan which are nuclear 
armed and ambitious. Arguably, the history of humanity has been as much the history of war 
and struggle as it has been the search for peace.   
  
Insurgency attacks follow a power law pattern of timing and casualties 
The power law roughly predicts the number of people that will be killed during a certain time 
period. Johnson and his team found that it’s easier for enemy combatants to kill 10 people 
than 100. In fact, it’s 316 (316 is 10 to the power of 2.5) times easier; therefore, smaller 
attacks are more likely than larger ones because they are less difficult to execute. Like 
earthquakes and stock volatility, violent attacks typically occur in ‘bursts’, such as multiple 
bombings in one city on a single day, and even at a certain time. Johnson believes you can’t 
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predict what will happen tomorrow, but you can say what, statistically, will happen over a 
month. To many strategists and commanders, the timing of bursts of attack could suggest a 
coordinated effort. To Johnson and his colleagues, however, this suggests that enemy 
combatants saw a good opportunity and seized on it at the same time with little or no 
communication among rival groups. For insurgency groups do not operate in the traditional 
command and control style.
9 
 
Applying this to actual ongoing wars 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been compared with the longer term guerrilla war in 
Colombia which is taking place against a back-drop of drug trafficking and Mafia activity. The 
origins, motivations, locations and durations of these conflicts are very different. However, the 
Johnson study found identical patterns of violence. (Refer Figure 33). Not only have the wars 
in Iraq and Colombia evolved to yield a power-law behaviour, but this behaviour is currently of 
the same quantitative form as the war in Afghanistan and global terrorism in non-G7 
countries. The Johnson study findings suggest that the dynamic evolution of these various 
examples of modern conflict has less to do with geography, ideology, ethnicity or religion and 
more to do with the day-to-day mechanics of human insurgency. The respective insurgency 
forces are effectively becoming identical in terms of how they operate.
10
  
 
Figure 33 
 
Power law for War - The distribution of deadly conflicts according to the number of people killed 
in Iraq (5/01/03 to 10/23/05) and Colombia (1988 to 2004). (Johnson et al. – 2005). 
 
                                               
9
   Gilbert, Natasha (2009). Modellers claim wars are predictable – Insurgent attacks follow a universal 
pattern of timing and casualties. December 16, 2009.  
www.scientificamerica.com/article.cfm?id=modellers-claim-wars-are-predi&print=true 
10
    Johnson, Neil F.; Spagat, Mike; Restrepo, Jorge A.; Becerra, Oscar; Bohorquez, Juan Camilo; 
Suarez, Nicolas; Restrepo, Elvira Maria; and Zarama, Roberto. (2005) Universal patterns 
underlying ongoing wars and terrorism.  http://xxx.Ianl.gov/abs/physics/0506213 Oxford, London 
and Bogota, Colombia. Pp. 2-8. 
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Casualty numbers in global terrorist events, from 1968 to the present, obey power laws of  α 
= 2.5 for non-G7 countries and 1.71 for G7 countries. For the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
as well as the conflict in Colombia, each has a power law coefficients close to 2.5.
10
 (Refer 
Figure 34).  
 
Figure 34 
 
Power law for War - The variation through time of the power law coefficient for Iraq and 
Colombia. The graph includes a 95% confidence band around the two sets of data. (Johnson et 
al. – 2005). 
 
As well as observing power-law behaviour for the time-aggregated data, it can also be seen 
over smaller time windows, i.e. α values as a function of time. At face value other wars such 
as Casamance (Senegal) (1982-2005), Indonesia (1996-2001), Israel (2000-2002) and 
Northern Ireland (1969-2001) have an average α between 2.4 and 2.5. The data covered 
nearly 55,000 separate acts of violence.
10
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Chapter 16 - Various networks 
There are numerous types of network
1
. These include the following: 
 
Type of network Examples 
Social networks Film actors, company directors, science co-authorships, telephone call 
graph, email messages, email address books, human sexual contacts. 
Information networks WWW nd.edu, citation networks, word co-occurrence. 
Technological networks Internet, power grid, train routes, software packages, electronic circuits. 
Biological networks Metabolic networks, protein interaction, marine food web, neural network. 
 
Many of the most important world networks – economic, political systems, ecosystems, and 
so on – are poised perpetually on the very edge of instability and tumultuous upheaval. As a 
consequence, it is something akin to a universal law of nature that the course of history must 
necessarily be punctuated – and quite frequently – by seemingly inexplicable upheavals. The 
character of history will therefore be long periods of relative calm and gradual change to be 
punctuated by staggeringly overwhelming events that totally reshape the social and political 
landscape.
2
  
 
This chapter looks at a few of these power law affected systems. For example, movie-actor 
networks, social networks, the Internet, the World Wide Web, traffic jams, river networks and 
sexual partners.  
 
Movie-actor network follows a power law 
Gene Stanley and his colleagues looked closely at the power law in the movie-actor network, 
which seems inexorably to reward a few privileged individuals with ever better connections, 
and they found that this effect begins to falter at the high extreme. (Refer Figure 35). The best 
connected actors have rather fewer links than the power law would predict. The upper limit is 
set because actors have limited time and finite careers. There are also limits on most things, 
for example, on old scientific papers, volumes airports can handle etc.
3
 Networks of movie 
actors therefore follow a power law distribution (i.e. a straight line in a log-log graph) with an 
exponential cut-off at the top end.
1
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
      Newman, M.E.J. (2003). The structure and function of complex networks.  
arXiv:cond-mat/0303516v1 (cond-mat.stat-mech)   25 March 2003. Pp. 7-13. 
2
      Buchanan, Mark (2002). Nexus – Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks. 
W.W. Norton and Company. New York. U.S.A. Pp. 20 and 83-85. 
3
      Ball, Philip (2004). Critical Mass – How one thing leads to another. Arrow Books. London. United  
Kingdom. Pp. 479-501.      
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Figure 35 
 
Power law curve for connections between actors – The most highly connected movie actors do 
not quite follow the power law that characterizes the rest of the network as there appears to be 
an upper limit to the number of collaborations an actor can attain. (Ball – 2004). 
 
Social networks spread new ideas 
Innovation was thought to follow a bell curve with a few early adopters, followed by the 
majority and then the laggards. Barabasi cites a 1954 study that showed that new medicines 
spread along social networks. It turned out that the early adopters and early majority were 
predominantly doctors with numerous social links. These highly connected doctors were more 
likely to be in touch with innovators, thus learning about the new drug more quickly. Once 
adopted by these doctors, the drug spread from these hubs to their less connected 
colleagues, who formed the late majority. Finally came the laggards, doctors who resisted 
adopting the new drug until the very end.
4
 This highlights the importance of being linked into 
networks that spread innovation. These professional networks follow power law distributions.  
 
The Internet links have a power law 
Buchanan cites a study that reviewed 4,389 nodes in the network, linked together by 8,256 
connections and found a power law pattern. (Refer Figure 36). Each time the number of 
Internet links doubles, the number of nodes with that many links becomes less by about five 
times. This simple power law relationship holds right across the board from nodes with only a 
few links to those with several hundred. The simplicity within the ‘emergent’ pattern suggests 
that however random and haphazard the Internet picture may look, it actually harbours a 
hidden order.  The Internet is more or less pure hardware (i.e. hardware is the physical 
components of a computer system).
2
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4
   Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo (2002). Linked – The New Science of Networks. Perseus Publishing. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. Pp. 113-129. 
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Figure 36 
 
Power law curve for the Internet - The distribution of Internet ‘nodes’ according to how many 
links they possess. From Faloutsos et al. (Buchanan – 2002). 
 
The World Wide Web links follow a power law 
In contrast to the Internet, the World Wide Web is rather ethereal. This is the vast network of 
Web pages connected together by hypertext links. Barabasi and colleagues studied the Notre 
Dame Web site of 325,729 documents connected by 1,469,680 links and they also found a 
power law graph – identical to that for the Internet - the number of nodes having a certain 
number of links decreased by about five each time the number of links was doubled. (Refer 
Figure 37). In these networks, just a few nodes have so many links that 80 to 90 percent of 
the network’s total number of links feed into just a small fraction of the nodes. So like all 
things that have a power-law pattern, there is a clear mathematical architecture of the log-log 
graph, an architecture that is dominated by especially well connected hubs.
2
  
 
Figure 37 
 
Power law curve for the World Wide Web (WWW) – The probability distribution of incoming 
hyperlinks to HTML documents on the WWW. The outgoing links have a similar distribution. (Ball 
- 2004). 
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In 1999 Albert Barabasi and colleagues found that the probability distributions of both 
incoming and outgoing links in this graph were power laws. That is the probability of a random 
page on the university (Notre Dame in Indiana) web site having a certain number of links to or 
from it depended on the number of links according to a power-law relationship. Most pages 
had few links; a few had many; and each time the number of links was doubled, the number 
of pages with that many links decreased by a constant factor. A power law is an emergent 
result as it is by no means the only relationship consistent with this expectation, i.e. it could 
have been a bell curve. But the power-law relationship says that there is no scale to the 
connectivity of the network. The system is scale-free. There is nothing pre-ordained in this 
power law. Everyone is completely at liberty to decide how many hyperlinks to make 
elsewhere. Yet out of this multiplicity of individual choices comes a mathematical law that 
holds true. The network seems to organise itself into this power law state, just as the sand-
pile model of self-organised criticality generates a critical state with a power law distribution of 
avalanches.
3
 The scale-free nature of the WWW link distribution indicates that collective 
phenomena play a previously unsuspected role in the development of the web, forcing us to 
look beyond the traditional random (normal distribution) graph models.
5 
Because the World 
Wide Web is a ‘small world’, characterized by a power law and by scale free connectivity, 
anything can be found within a few clicks. It has been estimated that the best search engines 
reach only about 30 per cent of the entire indexable Web, and that some of them trawl 
through only 3 per cent.
3
  
 
Resistance to attack 
A cyber-terrorist who wants to trash the Internet need only identify a relatively small number 
of the most highly connected nodes and make those the targets of sabotage. In other words, 
when an attack is guided by intelligence it can do a disproportionate amount of harm to a 
scale-free network like the Internet. It is around the linchpin nodes that the most secure safety 
walls should be raised. Knocking out nodes at random will probably be futile, because the 
network can withstand a considerable amount of such punishment without losing much of its 
connectivity. Overall, the weakness of scale-free networks is their sensitivity to planned 
attack. If the hub nodes are removed, the network rapidly falls apart.
3
  
 
Traffic jams follow a power law 
Traffic jams also obey a power law. (Refer Figure 38). The kind of traffic jams referred to here 
are the ones on motorways where there is unobstructed dual carriageway, seemingly for no 
reason at all. Traffic flows smoothly when traffic is light, but once the amount of traffic on the 
road gets too great, traffic jams occur even though there seems to be no reason why 
everybody cannot move along smoothly. The problem is that if one vehicle brakes for any 
                                               
5
   Newman, Mark; Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo; Watts, Duncan J. (2006). The Structure and Dynamics of 
Networks. Princeton University Press. Princeton. New Jersey. U.S.A. Pp. 182.  
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reason (perhaps because the driver has simply got too close to the vehicle in front), there is a 
knock-on effect as everybody behind slows, and it is easier to slow down than it is to speed 
up.
6
 
 
Both in computer modelling and in studies of real traffic flows we find a power law – the 
number of jams of different sizes (measured in terms of the number of vehicles involved) 
obeys the same kind of law as the number of earthquakes of different sizes. Just like real 
traffic jams, the jams in the model move backwards through the traffic, as more cars break 
behind the obstruction while those in front speed away, and just like real traffic jams they 
dissolve as the average speed of the traffic is slowed by the jam. As well as there being big 
jams and small jams, there are jams within jams, in a fractal pattern.
6
  
 
Figure 38 
 
Power law curve for traffic jams, from Nagel et al.  (Bak – 1997). 
 
There are two practical lessons to be drawn. First, you don’t need an unusually large ‘trigger’ 
(such as a crash) to cause a large jam; any size jam can be triggered by even the smallest 
disturbance; such as one car getting too close to the car in front and braking sharply. Nobody 
ever hits anybody, there is no obvious cause visible to most of the people involved (and the 
car that did cause the jam has probably sped off into the distance, its driver unaware of what 
is happening behind), but hundreds of people may be inconvenienced. Secondly, if the 
density of traffic increases, it can be kept flowing more freely by limiting its top speed, 
because this reduces the impact of the difference between the time taken to accelerate and 
the time taken to brake.
6
  
 
The power-law graph (Figure 38) summarises in a mathematical form the irritating, 
unpredictable stop-start behaviour in traffic jams.  Per Bak believes that the critical state, with 
                                               
6
   Gribbin, John (2004). Deep Simplicity. Chaos, Complexity and the Emergence of Life. Allen Lane. An 
imprint of Penguin Books. London, England. Pp. 148-149. 
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jams of all sizes, is the most efficient state. The system has self organised to the critical state 
with the highest throughput of cars. If the density were slightly less, the road would be 
underutilised and if the density were slightly higher, there would be one big permanent, huge 
jam, absorbing a fraction of the cars. In both cases, the throughput would be less. The critical 
state is the most efficient state that can actually be reached dynamically.
7
  
 
River networks follow a power law 
One of the key discoveries of complexity is that finding lawlike patterns in complex 
nonequilibrium systems generally means taking a step back from the details, and focusing on 
the larger picture. We cannot predict accurately which person will be rich and which poor, or 
how large the next earthquake will be. The lawlike and predictable patterns emerge instead at 
the level of many events, in the statistics. Taking this step back from the prediction of events 
to prediction of general patterns is important if we wish to be able to answer different 
questions.
8
 
 
At the detail level, the irregularity of rivers like the Mississippi is of little surprise because the 
specific layout of any river network reflects the geophysical history of the region, including 
earthquakes that shifted the river’s course, patterns of rainfall, and so on. The overall 
structure of the river and its branches is like a fingerprint of that place and its history.
8
  
 
When looking at river networks at a higher level, we can see that a power law applies. (Refer 
Figure 39). For example, the amount of water that any particular branch of a river network 
carries reflects the size of its ‘catchment area’, the total area that drains into it. The larger 
rivers, those carrying lots of water, are like the ‘richer’ rivers and the smaller rivers being the 
‘poorer’. Studies have found that the number of rivers with an amount W of water flowing 
through them (say per day) is proportional to 1/ W
α
, where α is about 1.43. Water flows 
through river segments in pretty much the same way that wealth accumulates in the hands of 
a few. A power law exists and they exist for trees and clouds also. This means that each time 
you double the amount of water drained, you find that the number of such streams falls by a 
factor of about 2.7. If there are one hundred streams draining a thousand square kilometres, 
then there will be only about thirty-seven draining two thousand square kilometres, and so 
on.
8
  
 
This finding represents an impressive and rather unexpected simplicity for a network that 
seems to have little if any order (emergent property). This pattern applies to all river networks 
– the Nile, the Amazon, the Mississippi and the Volga etc. It points to a deep organizing 
                                               
7
   Bak, Per (1997). How Nature Works – The Science of Self-Organized Criticality. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford, U.K. Pp. 196-198.  
8
    Buchanan, Mark (2007). The Social Atom – Why the Rich get Richer, Cheaters Get Caught, and 
Your Neighbour Usually Looks Like You. Bloomsbury. New York. U.S.A. Pp. 174-177 and 228. 
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tendency behind the apparent disorder of all these networks. If river networks really were ‘just’ 
the product of a long string of historical accidents, with waters eroding channels here and 
there without regard for any overall plan, then this power law pattern would not exist. But the 
power law pattern suggests that there is a deeper reality and something else to discover 
behind these details. If the same pattern turns up in the Mississippi, the Nile, and the 
Amazon, details of geology and weather must have little to do with it.
9
 (Refer Figure 39).  
 
Because you don’t need to take account of most physical factors (rocks, soil, rainfall, erosion 
etc), modelling river networks is far simpler than anyone would have guessed. All they 
needed to know was that each time the size of the basin doubled, the number of rivers fell by 
a factor of about 2.7. The modelled networks were never quite the same in terms of the 
detailed layout. Accidents and historical contingency play an important role here. History and 
chance are fully compatible with the existence of lawlike order and pattern.
9
  
 
Scientists have found that the network of dry interlocking valleys on Mars looks like an archaic 
river network that dried out. It followed precisely the same power law as rivers on Earth.
8
  
 
Figure 39 
 
The structure of the Fella River network in northern Italy from Rodriguez et al. (Buchanan – 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9
   Buchanan, Mark (2002), op. cit., Pp. 98-103. 
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The number of sexual partners follows a power law 
A Swedish study (Liljeros) showed that the number of sexual partners also follows a power 
law, with most people having a few (up to 10 over a life time), some having dozens or more, 
and a few having hundreds. Our sexual relations network has a scale-free topology.
10
    
 
Liljeros et al. (2001), carried out a sociometric study of sexual partnerships in Sweden. In the 
study 4781 individuals of ages 18 to 74 were polled, and, with a response rate of 59%, the 
experimenters obtained detailed information for 2810 nodes in the sexual contact network. 
The results indicated that the majority of respondents had between one and ten sexual 
partners during their lifetime, but a few had several hundred. It followed a power law – sexual 
contacts form a scale-free network – with exponent 3.5 for women and 3.3 for men (i.e. 
statistically the same). The outliers were the hubs in the network.
11
 
 
Mark Newman and colleagues did their own study and confirmed the power law feature. They 
carried out a random digit dialling survey conducted among 1194 Seattle residents aged 18-
39 years of age during 2003-2004. As Figure 40 shows, 38% of the survey reported five 
partners or fewer during their lifetime. However, the distribution also has a ‘fat tail’ 
representing a small fraction of the population who have a large number of partners.  
15 percent of the population reported having 20 or more partners during their lifetime. Figure 
40 is plotted on logarithmic scales and when viewed in this way the tail has an approximately 
straight-line form (dashed line), implying that the data follows a Pareto distribution or power 
law, at least approximately. Other studies have also made this observation. The spikes in the 
distribution are the result of digit preference, as respondents had a tendency to round off 
large numbers of partners to multiples of ten.
12
  It is reasonable to assume that there is an 
exponential cut-off at the upper limits for the same reasons as networking of movie actors has 
an upper exponent cutoff. .  
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Figure 40 
 
Power law curve for number of sexual partners. Cumulative distribution function of self-reported 
history of lifetime number of sex partners on logarithmic scales. The straight line in the tail of 
the distribution indicates a power law. The slope of the line is measured to be -1.4 (dashed line), 
which corresponds to a value of -2.4 for the exponent of the power law.
12
(Foxman et al. – 2004?). 
 
Power laws offer a way forward in dealing with venereal disease 
One of the original, and still primary, reasons for studying networks is to understand the 
mechanisms by which diseases and other things (information, computer viruses, rumours) 
spread over them. For instance, the main reason for the study of networks of sexual contact is 
to help us understand and perhaps control the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.
13
 
 
Public health programs ordinarily aim to vaccinate a certain fraction of the population more or 
less at random, hoping to drive the disease below the tipping point. If there is no such point, 
this will not work.
14
 In traditional epidemiology, diseases display an epidemic threshold, as a 
function of their probability of transmission, between a regime in which only small local 
outbreaks of the disease occur and a regime in which the disease shows epidemic behaviour, 
reaching a significant fraction of the entire population in question.
11
  
 
Epidemiologists conclude that the great majority of venereal disease cases could be 
accounted for by a small subset of the population – prostitutes, for one, but also servicemen 
stationed at a nearby military base and a small cadre of other men and women whose sexual 
activity was exceptionally high. Treating this core group is essential as this group is roughly 
                                               
13
    Newman, M.E.J. (2003), op. cit., Pp. 15 and 40. 
14
    Buchanan, Mark (2002), op. cit., P182-183. 
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identical to the connectors. On one hand, the connectors in a small-world network (i.e. a 
network that follows a power law) of the aristocrat kind (a name for the extreme power law 
outliers), are so well connected that their activity dominates all else, and no unfocussed 
treatment scheme has any chance of success. Well over 90 percent of all people could be 
immunized and the disease would keep right on going. On the other hand, treatment of only a 
fraction of the most highly connected offers a chance to bring the disease under control and 
possibly wipe it out. Actually applying this in the real world is not easy but it offers a basic 
game plan and a strategy that could help deal with Aids and for new diseases that might arise 
in the future.
14
  
 
Network resilience is of particular importance in epidemiology, where ‘removal’ of vertices in a 
contact network might correspond for example to vaccination of individuals against a disease. 
Vaccination not only prevents the vaccinated individuals from catching the disease but also 
destroys paths between other individuals by which the disease might have spread.
13
  
 
Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2001) demonstrated that networks with power law 
distributions may not have an epidemic threshold at all; in such networks it is possible for 
diseases always to be spread, regardless of the probability of transmission. They found that 
the cumulative distribution of the number of different sexual partners in one year decays as a 
scale-free power law that has a similar exponent for males and females. The scale-free 
nature of the web of human sexual contacts indicates that safe-sex campaigns are likely to be 
the most efficient way to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. These results 
are consistent with the preferential-attachment mechanism of scale-free networks: evidently, 
in sexual contact networks, as in other scale-free networks, ‘the rich get richer’.
11
  
 
The Liljeros team’s most important finding is the scale free nature of the connectivity of an 
objectively defined, non-professional social network. This result indicates that the concept of 
the ‘core group’ considered in epidemiology studies must be arbitrary, because there is no 
well defined threshold or boundary that separates the core group from other individuals (as 
they would be for a bimodal distribution).  Their results may have epidemiological 
implications, as epidemics arise and propagate much faster in scale-free power law networks 
than in single-scale normal distribution networks. Also, the measures adopted to contain or 
stop the propagation of disease in a network need to be radically different for scale-free 
networks. Single –scale networks are not susceptible to attack at even the most connected 
nodes, whereas scale-free networks are resilient to random failure but are highly susceptible 
to destruction of the best connected nodes. The possibility that the web of sexual contacts 
has a scale-free structure indicates that targeting of safe-sex education campaigns to those 
individuals with a large number of partners may significantly reduce the propagation of 
sexually transmitted diseases.
11
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Chapter 17 - Not all apparent power law distributions are 
really power law 
 
Throughout my thesis I have accepted at face value all the claims by the numerous authors I 
have used as to which phenomena follow power law distributions and which don’t. Since I am 
a student of strategic studies and not mathematics, I have only used examples that are 
described as power law distributions as these will clearly have the scale free properties that 
are so important in defining the difference between linear and non-linear phenomena. This 
distinction is what my thesis is about, since I believe power laws and the consequential 
punctuated equilibrium effects are important to many strategic questions (i.e. to all the non-
linear ones).  
 
This chapter considers a study by Mark Newman and his colleagues where they test twenty 
four data sets to confirm that they actually follow a power law distribution or whether they 
follow one of power laws’ close statistical cousins such as log-normal or exponential 
distributions. They all apparently fit log-log graphs. For me, this is an interesting chapter as I 
am not sure that the mathematicians have worked out what the exceptions mean and so I 
assume that Newman and others are close to a knowledge frontier and those who rely on 
power law phenomena will need to continually monitor developments at this knowledge 
frontier. The importance for me of this chapter is to recognise that some apparent power law 
phenomena are not completely power laws. Since I had read Newman’s articles before I 
started this thesis, I was therefore keen to include every graph of every subject covered, that I 
could, so that I could clearly see how different all these graphs actually looked in real life as 
opposed to reading about the effects in a narrative. This chapter effectively summarises 
Newman’s conclusions and leaves out all the detailed mathematical reasoning.  
 
Power-law distributions 
Power laws are important for our understanding of non-linear phenomena and they appear in 
a diverse range of natural and man-made phenomena. For example, the populations of cities, 
the intensities of earthquakes, and the sizes of power outages are all considered power-law 
distributions. Quantities such as these are not well characterized by their typical or average 
values. For instance, according to the 2000 US Census, the average population of a city, 
town, or village in the United States is 8226. But this statement is not a useful one for most 
purposes because a significant fraction of the population lives in cities (New York, Los 
Angeles, etc) whose population is larger by several orders of magnitude.
1
 
 
                                               
1
      Clauset, Aaron, Shalizi, Cosma Rohilla, and Newman M.E.J. Power-Law Distributions in Empirical 
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The tool most often used for proving a power law distribution is to construct a histogram. The 
histogram is then plotted on double logarithmic axes. If in so doing one discovers a 
distribution that approximately falls on a straight line, then one can say that it may be a power 
law distribution, with a scaling parameter ‘α’ given by the absolute slope of the straight line. 
Typically this slope is extracted by performing a least-squares linear regression analysis on 
the histogram. This procedure dates back to Pareto’s work on the distribution of wealth at the 
close of the 19
th
 century. Newman believes that by itself this method has been found to be 
unsatisfactory, as systematic errors occur. Additional techniques are needed to determine 
whether distributions are or are not power law distributions.
1
  
 
Problems with defining what a power law is 
Newman believes that the detection and characterization of power laws is complicated by the 
large fluctuations that occur in the tail of the distribution, the part of the distribution 
representing large but rare events and by the difficulty of identifying the range over which 
power-law behaviour holds. Newman found that commonly used methods for analyzing 
power-law data, such as least-squares fitting, can produce substantially inaccurate estimates 
of parameters for power-law distributions. Newman’s approach combines maximum-likelihood 
fitting methods with goodness-of-fit tests based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and 
likelihood ratios.
1 
 
 
Most empirical studies of ostensibly power-law distributed data have not attempted to test the 
power-law hypothesis quantitatively. Instead, they typically rely on qualitative appraisals of the 
data, based for instance on visualization. But these can be deceptive and can lead to claims 
of power-law behaviour that do not hold up under closer scrutiny. Two other patterns are also 
possible, being a log-normal distribution and an exponential distribution. Because each of 
these distributions looks roughly straight line on the log-log plot, one might, upon a cursory 
inspection, judge all three to follow power laws, albeit with different scaling parameters. This 
judgement would, however, be wrong – being roughly straight on a log-log plot is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for power-law behaviour. Newman does not provide any simple 
guidance on what would be a better definition of power law distributions.  
 
Because in all observed distributions there are small deviations because of the random nature 
of the sampling process, there will always be a challenge determining which power-law 
distributions are and which are not.
 
There are practical difficulties with test data. For example, 
very small data sets should always be treated with caution, since it is difficult to rule out 
alternative fits to such data, even when they are truly power-law distributed, and conversely 
the power-law form may appear to be a good fit even when the data are drawn from a non-
power-law distribution.
1
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The Clauset/ Newman power law quantitative study 
Newman tested twenty-four data sets drawn from a broad variety of different branches of 
human endeavour, including physics, earth sciences, biology, ecology, paleontology, 
computer and information sciences, engineering, and the social sciences.
2
 
 
They are as follows: 
 
A. The frequency of occurrence of words in the novel Moby Dick by Herman Melville. 
 
B. The degrees (i.e., numbers of distinct interaction partners) of proteins in the partially known 
protein-interaction network of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. 
 
C. The degrees of metabolites in the metabolic network of the bacterium Escherichia coli. 
 
D. The degrees of nodes in the partially known network representation of the Internet at the level of 
autonomous systems for May 2006. An autonomous system is a group of IP addresses on the 
Internet among which routing is handled internally or ‘autonomously’, rather than using the 
Internet’s large scale border gateway protocol routing mechanism.  
 
E. The number of calls received by customers of AT&T’s long distance telephone service in the 
United States during a single day. 
 
F. The intensity of wars from 1816-1980 measured as the number of battle deaths per 10,000 of the 
combined populations of the warring nations. 
 
G. The severity of terrorist attacks worldwide from February 1968 to June 2006, measured as the 
number of deaths directly resulting.  
 
H. The number of bytes of data received as the result of individual web (HTTP) requests from 
computer users at a large research laboratory during a 24-hour period in June 1996. Roughly 
speaking this distribution represents the size distribution of web files transmitted over the Internet. 
 
I. The number of species per genus of mammals. This data set, compiled by Smith et al., is 
composed primarily of species alive today but also includes some recently extinct species, where 
‘recent’ in this context means the last few tens of thousands of years.  
 
J. The number of sightings of birds of different species in the North American Breeding Bird Survey 
for 2003. 
 
K. The number of customers affected in electrical blackouts in the United States between 1984 and 
2002. 
 
                                               
2
    Ibid., Pp. 22-30. 
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L. The number of copies of bestselling books sold in the United States during the period 1895 to 
1965. 
 
M. The human populations of US cities in the 2000 US census. 
 
N. The size of email address books of computer users at a large university. 
 
O. The sizes in acres of wildfires occurring on Federal land between 1986 and 1996. 
 
P. Peak gamma ray intensity of solar flares between 1980 and 1989. 
 
Q. The intensities of earthquakes occurring in California between 1910 and 1992, measured as the 
maximum amplitude of motion during the quake. 
 
R. The number of adherents of religious denominations, bodies, and sects, as compiled and 
published on the web site ‘adherents.com’. 
 
S. The frequencies of occurrence of US family names in the 1990 US Census. 
 
T. The aggregate net worth in US dollars of the richest individuals in the United States in October 
2003. 
 
U. The number of citations received between publication and June 1997 by scientific papers 
published in 1981 and listed in the science Citation Index. 
 
V. The number of academic papers authored or co-authored by mathematicians listed in the 
American Mathematical Society’s MathSciNet database. Data compiled by J. Grossman. 
 
W. The number of ‘hits’ received by web sites from customers of the America Online Internet service 
in a single day. 
 
X. The number of links to web sites found in a 1997 web crawl of about 200 million web pages. 
 
These data sets are shown in Figures 41 and 42. Note the range of subjects covered – from 
religions to surnames.  
 
Many of these data sets are only subsets of much larger entities (such as web sites, which 
are only a small fraction of the entire web). In some cases it is known that the sampling 
procedure used to obtain these subsets may be biased, as, for example, in the protein 
interactions, citations and authorship, and the Internet. Newman did not attempted to correct 
any biases in their analysis.
2
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Newman found that the testing tools, such as likelihood ratio tests do not give conclusive 
answers. Many of the twenty four phenomena are plausible power laws, but they are also 
plausible log-normal’s and stretched exponentials. In general, it is extremely difficult to tell the 
difference between log-normal, exponential and power-law behaviour.
2
  
 
Figure 41 
 
Testing for power-law fit – Samples (a) to (l). (Clauset, Shalizi, Newman 2009). 
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Figure 42 
 
Testing for power-law fit – Samples (m) to (x). (Clauset, Shalizi, Newman 2009). 
 
Summary of ‘Support’ for a power law distribution 
Power-law distributions come in two basic types: continuous distributions concerning 
continuous real numbers and discrete distributions where the quantity of interest can take 
only a discrete set of values, typically positive integers. Both sets of data need to be treated 
differently.
1
 Following, are two tables (Tables 5 and 6) with the different data sets sorted into 
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continuous and discrete. The tables are a summary of the Newman results with the final 
column of each table showing the Newman team’s judgement of the statistical support for the 
power law hypothesis for that data set.  They have used the words ‘None’, ‘Moderate’, ‘Good’ 
and ‘With cut-off’ to describe their judgements. These terms are defined below. 
 
Table 5 
Data set - Continuous  
(non-discrete) data 
Sample size 
n 
Power law 
exponential 
α  
Support for power law 
Birds species sightings 591 2.1(2) moderate 
Blackouts (x10
3
)  211 2.3(3) moderate 
Book sales (x10
3
) 633 3.7(3) moderate 
Cities (x10
3
) 19 447 2.37(8) moderate 
Forest Fire size (acres) 203 785 2.2(3) With cut-off 
Flares, solar intensity 12 773 1.79(2) With cut-off 
HTTP size (Kilobytes) 226 386 2.48(5) none 
Earthquakes, intensity (x10
3
) 19 302 1.64(4) With cut-off 
Religions, followers (x10
6
) 103 1.8(1) moderate 
Surnames, frequency (x10
3
) 2753 2.5(2) With cut-off 
Wars, intensity 115 1.7(2) moderate 
Wealth. Net worth (mil. USD) 400 2.3(1) none 
Web hits 119 724 1.81(8) With cut-off 
Web links 241 428 853 2.336(9) With cut-off 
 
Table 6 
Data set – Discrete (integer)  Sample size 
n 
Power law 
exponential 
α 
Support for power law 
Internet degree 22 688 2.12(9) With cut-off 
Calls, telephone received 51 360 423 2.09(1) With cut-off 
Citations to papers 415 229 3.16(6) moderate 
Email address books size 4581 3.5(6) With cut-off 
Metabolic degree 1641 2.8(1) none 
Papers authored 401 445 4.3(1) moderate 
Protein interaction degree 1846 3.1(3) moderate 
Species per genius 509 2.4(2) With cut-off 
Terrorist attack severity 9101 2.4(2) moderate 
Words, use 18 855 1.95(2) good 
 
The final column of the table lists their judgement of the statistical support for the power law 
hypothesis for each data set.  These are: 
 
‘None’ indicates data sets that are probably not power-law distributed. 
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‘Moderate’ indicates that the power-law is a good fit but that there are other plausible alternatives as 
well. 
‘Good’ indicates that the power-law is a good fit and that none of the alternatives considered is 
plausible. 
‘With cut-off’ means that the power law with exponential cut-off is clearly favoured over the pure power 
law. In each of these cases, however, some of the alternative distributions are also good fits, such 
as the log-normal or the stretched exponential distribution.
2
  
  
No standard and easy method of analysis to determine power laws 
The study of power laws is relatively new and the methodology for this important subject is 
still being developed. At this stage there are no easy or standard methods for analyzing 
power-law data. As Newman points out, this naturally leaves open the possibility that 
apparent power-law behaviour is, in some cases at least, the result of wishful thinking.
2
  
 
The common practice of identifying and quantifying power-law distributions by the 
approximately straight-line behaviour of a histogram on a doubly logarithmic plot should not 
be trusted completely. Such straight-line behaviour is a necessary but by no means sufficient 
condition for true power-law behaviour.
2
  
 
Newman cautions that for many of these data sets the power-law hypothesis turns out to be, 
statistically speaking, a reasonable description of the data. That is, the data are compatible 
with the hypothesis that they are drawn from a power-law distribution, although they are often 
compatible with other distributions as well, such as the log-normal or stretched exponential 
distributions. In the remaining cases the power-law hypothesis is found to be incompatible 
with the observed data. In some instances, such as the distribution of earthquakes, the power 
law is plausible only if one assumes an exponential cut off that modifies the extreme tail of the 
distribution.
2
 Newman believes that the data sets that are considered problematic, indicate 
complex underlying processes that merit further study.
1
  
 
Table 5 shows that wealth (Refer Pareto’s law – Chapter 5) is deemed by Newman not to be 
a pure power law. It is unclear what that inherently means as I don’t understand enough 
mathematics to know what it means for non-linear log-log graphs not to be a power law. They 
will still be non-linear, so we need to wait until the body of knowledge on this subject 
addresses this issue and explains what it means. For the purposes of my study, Pareto’s law 
of wealth is still a very useful explanation of a non-linear distribution and is widely quoted 
(perhaps mis-quoted) in complexity literature. Newman’s 2009 study highlights that in any 
developing area, initial classifications may have to be modified. 
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Chapter 18 – Strategic implications of non-linearity  
 
For me, this thesis has been an important stepping stone in my study of strategic thinking, as 
it built on my STRA 519 Research Essay which also considered forecasting. The STRA 519 
essay considered linear approaches which by the time I had finished that essay, I considered 
that I had mastered (i.e. had a good understanding of), whereas from my learning point of 
view, this thesis covers non-linearity (complexity) and especially the study of power laws that 
is almost completely new territory for me and it has opened up completely new possibilities. 
These possibilities are outlined below.     
 
Implications of complexity when considering strategic forecasting 
One way I know that I have advanced my understanding of strategic forecasting from doing 
this thesis, is from the following example. Recently, after I had scripted most of this thesis, I 
sat down and read the following future focused books: 
 
 A Brief History of the Future (2009) by Jacques Attali, 
 The Next 100 Years – A Forecast for the 21
st
 Century (2009) by George Friedman, 
 The World is Flat – A Brief history of the twenty-first century (2005) by Thomas L. 
Friedman,  
 Hot, Flat, and Crowded – Why we need a green revolution and how it can renew 
America (2008) by Thomas L. Friedman,  
 The Decline of American Power – The U.S. in a chaotic World (2003) by Immanuel 
Wallerstein, and  
 The Post American World (2008) by Fareed Zakaria. 
 
I realised that all of these books gave me good safe ‘linear’ advice if I was advising the Mayor 
of the Auckland Council or Prime Minister or some other decision maker.  For example, they 
all talk about the relative decline of American power and the relative and absolute rise of 
many emerging powers (China, Russia, India etc). Most developed countries are aging and 
will be short of workers etc. These books are authoritive and full of important and valid trends, 
but I suggest the phrase repeated by Thomas Friedman, ‘Trend is not destiny’, is a critical 
point. All of the books above use standard extrapolation scenario techniques based on trends 
or ‘mega trends’ which are mostly fairly linear. They don’t factor in non-linear turbulence and 
sudden, dramatic, transformational and unexpected changes to the established order.  It was 
only when I read the following strategy book that I saw for the first time someone linking the 
‘sandpile’ criticality of Per Bak to political and strategic events in the world. 
 
 The Age of the unthinkable – Why the new world disorder constantly surprises us and 
what we can do about it (2009) by Joshua Cooper Ramo. 
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The following paragraphs give a flavour of a non-linear approach to strategic forecasting from 
Joshua Ramo (Kissinger Associates)
1
. All the examples are far removed from linear-
equilibrium thinking.  
 
a) Increasing the connectedness, increases the future uncertainty 
Ramo believes our future is more dangerous than we think. There exists a dangerous 
paradox – the more closely we’re bound, the less resilient we all become. Studies of food 
webs or trade networks, electrical systems and stock markets, find that as they become more 
densely linked they also become less resilient; networks, afterall, propagate and even amplify 
disturbances.  Worse, the more efficient these networks are, the faster they spread those 
dangers. Drop a shock into a network and you get a chain reaction and the end state can not 
be predicted.
2
  
 
b)  Politics and foreign affairs tend to move towards the ‘critical’ state 
When Per Bak described the ‘tendency of large systems to evolve into a poised ‘critical’ state, 
way out of balance, where minor disturbances may lead to events, called avalanches, of any 
size’, he could have been speaking about the Middle East, relations between the United 
States and China, the oil market, disease, nuclear proliferation, cyber warfare or a dozen 
other problems of global affairs and security. We are organised for instability. Bak believed 
that sandpile energy, the energy of systems constantly poised on the edge of unpredictable 
change, was one of the fundamental forces of nature. Bak’s sandpile universe was violent – 
and history making. It wasn’t that he didn’t see stability in the world, but he saw stability as a 
passing phase, as a pause in a system of incredible and unmappable non-linear dynamism. 
This dynamic sandpile energy demands that we accept the basic unpredictability of the global 
order.
2 
 
 
c) Top down ‘Grand Strategies’ don’t work in a dynamic complex world 
Ramo believes that the sandpile effect takes notions at the heart of contemporary foreign 
policy; ideas like soft power or that democracies won’t fight one another, and shreds them. 
Traditional Grand Strategy took strength from its static nature. It began with a vision of the 
world as we wanted it to be – all democratic or all French or all British etc. Old grand 
strategies looked like the Cold War détente balance between East and West or the Monroe 
Doctrine. They relied on the idea of rational powers, threats that could be named and 
monitored, violence that came in the form of armies, and usually clear lines between 
economic, environmental, political, and military policy. In the sandpile world no such division 
is possible. In a world that is changing fast, we need a grand strategy that’s capable of the 
sorts of rapid change the world itself produces, because much of what we have to confront 
                                               
1
   Ramo, Joshua Cooper (2009).  The Age of the unthinkable – Why the new world disorder constantly 
surprises us and what we can do about it. Little, Brown. London U.K. Pp. 198. 
2
   Ibid., Pp. 49-60. 
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will be things that have never occurred to us before. Ramo believes we don’t need a grand-
strategy, but we do need ‘deep security’, that assumes that we don’t know all the answers or 
have anticipated all possible events. We need to be as adaptive and flexible as the world is.
3
  
 
d) The unexpected fall of the Soviet Union 
The end of the Soviet Union was one of those sandpile avalanches that, like the 1929 stock 
market collapse, demanded a complete remapping of the world. The end of the U.S.S.R. 
stunned the same minds that were later stunned by 9/11 and the financial collapse of 2008. 
The U.S.S.R. imploded and was seen as a sign of the triumph of U.S. ideals – for example, 
the inherent supremacy of democracy and capitalism over other systems. This was the ‘linear’ 
– ‘input Western ideas, output implosion’ explanation.
4
 
 
The Russians including Gorbachev (who Ramo interviewed) were baffled by the collapse of 
the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union had been exposed to periods of far greater economic and 
social pressure without imploding. The U.S. military threat had been part of Soviet life for 
decades.  If the political system was so deeply fragile and rotten, then why had the collective 
predictive superstructure of Soviet and foreign experts missed the signs? 
5
 
 
The Soviet Union was actually one of those critically poised systems.   As Per Bak said, 
‘Small things can trigger a big change, so you don’t need a big cause for a big event’.  The 
U.S.S.R. collapsed quickly. Kotz and Weir’s research concluded that the U.S.S.R. didn’t 
inherently collapse because of popular pressure upwards from the grass roots of Soviet life – 
pressure that could have been suppressed at any time – but largely because of the 
‘nomenklatura’. Politburo members like Gorbachev certainly held sway on the macro level, but 
the nomenklatura (e.g. army officers, professors and officials etc) who actually managed the 
day to day workings of the U.S.S.R., decided once Gorbachev began reforming a system that 
had protected their rights and privileges, they had more to gain by letting the U.S.S.R. fracture 
than by holding it together. The nomenklatura logic was that when the empire fell, they would 
be in the best position to pick up the pieces. This was perhaps a cold, selfish decision. Weir 
and Kotz concluded that the surprisingly peaceful and sudden demise of the U.S.S.R. 
happened because it was abandoned by most of its elite. It was not a real revolution like 1917 
with a new set of masters, but one where the new leaders like Putin, were also previously 
elite members. It was not a clear cut and inevitable Western ‘triumph’ in the Cold War. 
Gorbachev told Ramo it is wrong to assume that the West won the Cold War. Change 
produces unpredictability and surprise. Gorbachev made his system more complex and 
unstable rather than less.
5
    
 
 
                                               
3
    Ibid., Pp. 107-8. 
4
    Ibid., Pp. 65-72. 
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e) A small action can lead to big effects (non-linear effect) 
In 1982 the British were desperate to stop the flow of Argentine soldiers arriving at the lone 
airport at Stanley, in the Falklands. There was only one plane that could get there, which was 
the Vulcan bomber and it needed multiple mid-flight refueling to get to the Falklands and 
back. It was very high risk. The question was raised as to how many bombs were needed to 
take out the airfield. A Defence scientist (James Moffat) worked this out, prepared a map, and 
sent it to his seniors. They passed it within hours to Prime Minister Thatcher who immediately 
approved the Vulcan planes to carry out the difficult mission. As Moffat had predicted, one 
bomb had hit the runway hard enough to knock it out. Suddenly and quite unexpectedly the 
Argentine Airforce began shifting their planes back to Buenos Aires in a defensive move. The 
bombings had shown the Argentines that the RAF had the potential to hit Argentina and to the 
Argentines that was deeply disturbing, especially to the generals who now felt personally 
threatened. It wasn’t that Moffat had managed to take out the Stanley airport; he had 
indirectly taken out a large chunk of the entire Argentine air force. A small action had a big 
unexpected impact. On reflection it was as if one bomb, exactly placed, is as powerful as an 
entire Airforce.
5
 
 
f) Creating what you fear most - your own complex adaptive enemy 
Ramo believes that Hizb’allah (Pro-Palestinian resistance/ terrorist movement) has a capacity 
for creativity and innovation, due to the need to survive under the full pressure of Israeli 
attack. Ramo believes it is an example of a complex adaptive system in operation. The 
Israelis over time have forced their enemies to be more innovative and to evolve into effective 
networks. Those that didn’t were put out of action. Those that evolved grew stronger. As a 
condition of its survival during the years of its fight against Israel, Hizb’allah has become a 
machine for innovation, as much terror lab as terror group.
7
  
 
In 2006 the Israelis used powerful air strikes to pound the visible Hizb’allah to kill the invisible. 
To Ramo, this is classic old-school thinking. However, unfortunately for the Israelis, fewer 
than 500 Hizb’allah fighters managed to frustrate a 30,000-man Israeli attack, including one of 
the most extensive air campaigns in Middle East history. Hizb’allah, to prove their point, had 
made a show of firing the same number of missiles on the last day of the war as they had on 
the first.
6
  
 
This created a dangerous problem for Israel; direct attacks on Hizb’allah made the militants 
more resilient, not less. Over time Israel’s small engagements meant Hizb’allah’s resilience 
improved as they were able to shift and learn and change – and they did all of those things 
even better when they were under attack. The Israelis have not only failed to eliminate the 
Hizb’allah, they have made them stronger.
7
 To be fair to the Israelis, they can also learn and 
                                               
5
    Ibid., Pp. 200-203. 
6
    Ibid., Pp. 4-9, 141-2, 183-190. 
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adapt to new situations. Recent computer attacks on Iran’s centrifuge facilities at their power 
plants shows that everything is fluid in conflicts/ warfare and learning is essential.  
 
g) Success of networked and decentralized military leadership 
Military historians have studied the bewildering efficiency of armies that swarm like bees or 
ants, highly decentralized groups that bend, adjust, and attack based on a far better sense of 
local conditions than any central commander could ever have. This form of warfare flew in the 
face of centuries of command-and-control warfare theory, but that is what made the German 
U-boats so effective, the Mongol horsemen, Mao Zedong, the Hizb’allah and others so 
successful. Swarming is the classic immune-system response. This kind of self-organisation 
exists in many of the most efficient and resilient systems in the world.
7
   
The important point from a strategy perspective is to acknowledge the success of bottom up, 
decentralized, non linear approaches and to equally acknowledge the success of top down, 
centralized, and linear approaches. Each approach suits different circumstances and both can 
apply to different aspects at the same time. For example in most of the examples above, such 
as the German U-boats or Mao Zedong, there was clearly a strong central direction and 
leadership even if there was some flexibility of methods and timing at a local level. The linear/ 
non-linear debate is not saying that complexity is the answer for all situations, only that non-
linear solutions are the most appropriate for non-linear situations, and linear solutions are 
best for linear situations. Historically all situations whether linear or non-linear, were treated in 
a linear top down approach. The reality for all networked organisations is to apply the newly 
developing non-linear complexity approaches, which may turn out to be for most situations.   
Whilst all the examples that I have just quoted from Ramo are quite dramatic, they need to be 
put into a coherent strategic framework. The next section gives one such framework.  
 
The changing face of strategic planning due to non-linearity 
Markku Sotarauta
8
, who teaches strategic thinking for regional economic development in 
Finland, provides the following table (Table 7) which effectively summarises the linear/ non-
linear divide. Sotarauta provides a good high level summary of my summary of key words 
used to compare linear and non-linear effects of Table 2 in Chapter 2; as well as covering 
many of the issues described by Ramo above. What Sotarauta calls Governance of Ambiguity 
is the approach that acknowledges the world has non-linear aspects with power-law networks 
that have tipping points, cascades or avalanches. It also acknowledges that combinations of 
approaches are needed so that a strategy may have aspects that are top down as well as 
bottom up and that like most New Zealand public sector strategies they are developed and 
                                               
7
   Ibid., Pp. 236-7. 
8
  Dator, James A. (2002). Advancing futures - Futures Studies in Higher Education. Chapter 16, 
Teaching Futures-Seeking Policy process by Markku Sotarauta. Praeger Studies on the 21
st
 Century. 
Westport, Connecticut. United States of America. Pp. 217 to 231.  
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implemented by multiple parties, with multiple viewpoints and the whole process has a 
‘herding feel’ to it. This contrasts with the historical view of strategy which is perhaps more 
like the Biblical ‘Moses’ approach, where the leader develops the plan and then orders the 
hierarchy they control to implement it. Sotarauta uses the tiles of each approach to reflect 
their underlying thinking. ‘Government’ is the state, such as the Crown or Ministries or other 
public sector organisations. ‘Governance’ includes the ‘Government’ but also includes other 
key stakeholders such as the education sector, Non-Governmental Organisations (N.G.O.s) 
and the business sector.  Governance is therefore a much more inclusive approach to 
strategy development. ‘Uncertainty’ has a focus on risk reduction, whereas governance of 
‘ambiguity’ is accepting a greatly increased sense of uncertainty for most aspects of the 
strategy development.  
 
Table 7   Characteristics of Government of Uncertainty and Governance of Ambiguity   
 Government of Uncertainty  
(Historical approach) 
Governance of Ambiguity  
(Model from the 1990s onwards)   
Development 
view 
 Linearity, predictability, and 
continuity 
 Shared worldviews and conceptions 
of future 
 Cause-effect relations 
 Evolutionary view of development; 
complexity, discontinuity, unpredictability 
 Different worldviews and diverging 
conceptions of future 
 Cause-effect relations blurred over time 
 
Structure  One dimensional 
 Centralized integration 
 Hierarchies 
 Division into units 
 Multidimensional 
 Decentralized integration 
 Networks 
 Entities and parts 
Governance 
processes 
 Top-down 
 Unilateral dependence 
 Strong, do-it-alone dependence 
principle 
 State dependent 
 Top-down and bottom-up 
 Multidimensional 
 Do-it-together principle emphasized 
 Dependent internationally, nationally, 
regionally, and locally 
Planning  Formal and hierarchical 
 Separation of planning and 
implementation 
 Approaches and analyses based on 
averages, from rules to exceptions 
 Network management, communicative 
planning 
 Planning, decision making, and 
implementation differences blurred 
 Approaches and analyses for each 
situation, from exceptions to rules.  
 
So far in this chapter I have described various examples where the strategic reality is non-
linear and I have outlined one framework that essentially shows the historical approach which 
had a linear/ top down focus and the modern approach of acknowledging non-linear aspects. 
This change over time may seem very straight forward, but I believe there is a definite ‘edge’ 
to why acknowledging and understanding that non-linear thinking in strategy is essential for 
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our very survival and that is not a trivial point. For example, all the major problems facing 
humanity, such as climate change or obesity, are called ‘wicked complex problems’ and they 
can only be solved by using non-linear approaches that understand such things as power-law 
cascades and feedback systems etc. The next section considers wicked problems and why 
the solutions to them have everything to do with non-linear approaches.  
 
Tackling wicked problem 
The term ‘wicked’ was first used in 1973 by two Americans - Rittell and Webber
9
 who noted 
that there was a whole realm of social planning problems that cannot be successfully treated 
with traditional linear, analytical approaches. They called these issues wicked problems and 
contrasted them with ‘tame’ problems. Tame problems are problems that can be tightly 
defined and a solution fairly readily identified or worked through. Linear approaches could not 
handle the social complexity, conflicting policy objectives and approaches, multiple 
organisations and stakeholders, unintended consequences and imperfect knowledge of what 
are now called wicked problems. The handling of wicked problems requires holistic rather 
than linear thinking.  
 
Wicked problems have the following attributes: The problems are difficult to clearly define, 
they have many interdependencies and are often multi-causal, actions lead to unforeseen 
consequences, the problems are not stable, there is usually no clear solution, they are 
socially complex, they can not be solved by one agency, they involve changing behaviour and 
they are characterised by chronic policy failure.
9 
 
The Australian Public Service Commission
9 
suggests that tackling wicked problems requires 
at least the following: 
 Holistic and big picture and not partial or linear thinking  
 Innovative, adaptable and flexible approaches 
 The ability to work across agency boundaries 
 Increasing understanding and stimulating a debate on the application of the 
accountability framework 
 Effectively engaging stakeholders and citizens in understand the problem and in 
identifying possible solutions 
 Additional core skills to just high-level analytical, conceptual, writing and project 
management; to include communications, influencing skills and the ability to work co-
operatively. 
 A better understanding of behavioural change by policy makers 
 A comprehensive focus and/or strategy 
                                               
9
   Australian Government/ Australian Public Service Commission (2007). Tackling Wicked Problems – A 
Policy Perspective.  Contemporary Government Challenges.  
http://apsc.gov.au/publications07/wickedproblems.pdf 
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 Tolerating uncertainty and accepting the need for a long-term focus.  
 
These solutions clearly tie back to the Table 7 analysis. We live in a world of very complex 
‘wicked problem’ of which any number of them could threaten our survival. It is paramount to 
understand and apply the best strategic tools we have for solving these problems and 
understanding non-linearity and systems based thinking are important aspects of this.  
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Chapter 19 – Conclusions  
 
Forecasting, when power law distributions apply 
Power law statistical distributions can be seen in a wide variety of natural and man-made 
phenomena, from earthquakes and solar flares to populations of cities and sales of books. 
This sheer diversity of effects that have power law distributions is an important fact that has 
only become evident over the last decade or so. However, it is important to remember that 
few of these real world distributions follow a power law over their entire range, and in 
particular not for smaller values of the variable being measured. That is why my thesis 
includes when ever possible the actual power law graphs, so that the imperfect reality can be 
seen. A second important fact is that the power law effects are usually emergent properties 
and would never have been detected by linear approaches and explanations. Overall, 
complexity has its own set of terms and methods and some of the empirical sample sizes for 
the graphs are impressive. 
 
The answer to my research question, ‘Forecasting, when power law distributions apply’, is to 
understand the ‘sandpile’ metaphor of Per Bak, where the next event could be very small or 
occasionally very large, and that the overall pattern of the events will follow an emergent 
power law ‘log-log’ chart. Under these conditions forecasting what the next event will be 
becomes very problematic, if not downright impossible. Patterns can be predicted but not 
point events. Big events do not require big causes. Trends are not destiny.  
 
Throughout the thesis the main ideas and concepts that strategic forecasting needs to apply 
to non-linear power-law distributions are:  
 
 Understanding the importance of complex adaptive systems, 
 ‘Scale-free’ or ‘scale invariant’ features,  
 Punctuated equilibrium (periods of stability and periods of rapid change),  
 Self-organised criticality (poised at a tipping point), 
 The ‘Butterfly’ effect (small changes can have big effects), 
 Emergent properties or patterns,  
 The ‘Matthew’ effect (winner takes all),  
 Change is caused by both internal/ external triggers, 
 Pattern prediction rather than point prediction, 
 Straight line log-log graphs are the signature of power law-distributions,  
 With emergent power-law patterns, details do not matter, 
 Increased networks/ interdependence, means increased turbulence, and  
 Strategy is about surviving the ‘Red Queen’ Race. 
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These concepts only apply to non-linear power-law distributions and they need to be 
understood in that uniquely non-linear way, where the whole is greater than the sum of the 
parts. Each of these concepts is considered in greater detail below.  
  
Power law distributions only apply to ‘complex adaptive systems’  
Nonlinear systems are systems in which changes in initial conditions do not produce 
proportional changes in the final state.
1
 Non-linear systems are common, of which complex 
adaptive systems are an important subset. Complex adaptive systems involve a medium-
sized number of agents (drivers, traders, molecules etc) who are generally both intelligent and 
adaptive. These agents make decisions in accordance with various rules, and are ready to 
modify their rules of action on the basis of new information that comes their way. There are no 
dictators or centralised controllers in these systems. There is generally no single driver, 
trader, or molecule that has access to what other actors in the system are doing, so the 
agents in a complex adaptive system make their decisions and update their rules for action on 
the basis of local rather than global, information.
2
   
 
Power law distributions are ‘scale-free’ or ‘scale invariant’  
Power law distributions decay far more slowly than the normal, Bell or Gaussian curve, 
allowing for large ‘rare events’ that can never happen in a normal curve. These large ‘rare’ 
events are an important characteristic of power law distributions.  Power laws formulate in 
mathematical terms the notion that a few large events carry most of the action.
3
 
 
The power-law distribution is the only distribution that is scale-free.
 
This contrasts with what 
happens under most normal Gaussian linear distributions which are inherently stable and do 
have a ‘scale’ or mean. In Gaussian systems there are no dramatic tipping points or wild 
fluctuations. In a Gaussian/ normal distribution, there is an average/ mean and practically all 
the values are tightly clustered (within three standard deviations) around that figure. In a 
power law distribution there is no valid average figure that represents the majority of values. 
The power law average combines the numerous low figures with a few extreme figures and 
the answer is much greater than the median because of the high outliers. This forces us to 
abandon the idea of an average. There is no intrinsic scale.  This is the reason power-law 
distributions are called ‘scale-free’.
4
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4
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For example, there is no ‘typical’ size for a city in the USA or elsewhere, and no reason to see 
special historical or geographical situations behind the emergence of the very biggest. 
Likewise there is no typical size computer company. Do you include Microsoft in the sample 
or not? Power law behaviour predicts the existence of large returns and stock market crashes 
such as the 1929 or 1987 crashes, since they are not outliers.
5
 
 
A power law, with its scale-invariant form, implies that large events are just magnified copies 
of smaller ones, and arise from the same kinds of causes. 
6
 For example, this is quite different 
from the idea, still widely held, that large earthquakes require big triggers. If that were so, then 
it would be comforting, as you would wait a long time before the next big strike. The statistics 
and the power law in particular, say otherwise. Both large and small earthquakes occur at 
random, but importantly with different frequencies.
7
 What triggers small and large quakes is 
precisely the same. From this perspective, it does not make sense to look for special 
explanations for the largest earthquakes. They are no more special or unusual than the tiny 
shudders constantly rippling beneath our feet.
8
  
 
Punctuated equilibrium – a ‘signature’ of complex adaptive systems 
The term ‘punctuated equilibrium’ describes the pattern of alternating calm and storm, or 
periods of quiescence or stasis interspersed with periods of change.
10
 Punctuated equilibrium 
is contrasted with gradualism, which states that evolution generally occurs by smooth steady 
and continuous progress.
9
 Fossil evidence shows long periods of relatively little change, 
interspersed with periods of explosive innovation and periods of massive extinction.
10
 There 
are long periods of evolution and incremental adaptation in traditional directions (more of the 
same); that are interrupted or punctuated occasionally by short bursts of ‘quantum’ 
revolutionary realignment, that are sudden, dramatic, and pervasive shifts in direction.
11
 
 
Patterns of punctuated equilibrium show up not just in biological evolution, but in other 
complex systems ranging from physical avalanches, the crashes of stock markets
10
, to 
changes of political regimes, such as in Egypt with the abrupt and unexpected fall from power 
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of President Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of rule. Large intermittent bursts have no place in 
equilibrium systems, but are ubiquitous in history, biology and economics’.
12  
 
Economic progress shows punctuated equilibrium in action. Schumpeter represents advances 
in economic reasoning as nonlinear. The world involved much more of discontinuity and 
seismic convulsions, rather than regularity and smooth progression.
13
 Whilst most individual 
technological innovations have only an incremental impact, overall, technological innovation 
proceeds in patterns of calm and storm.
14
 
 
‘Punctuated equilibrium’ describes how science progresses. Thomas Kuhn described the 
development of science through periods of stable growth punctuated by revisionary 
revolutions. According to Kuhn the development of science is not uniform but has alternating 
‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ phases. The revolutionary phases are not merely periods of 
accelerated progress, but differ qualitatively from normal science.
15
 Kuhn called the violent 
revolutionary periods of upheaval ‘paradigm shifts’.
16
 Discovery of new paradigms in science 
is the sudden ‘punctuation’, whilst ‘normal’ science is the gradual ‘equilibrium’.
17
 As seen 
through the lens of the critical state, great revolutions are not necessarily unique in terms of 
their causes. They are simply the expected large fluctuations of a system poised in a critical 
state.
18
 
 
Power-law distributions are the fingerprint of self-organized criticality19  
Self-organized criticality is a property of most non-equilibrium systems, especially where 
power laws apply.
19
  Self-organising criticality automatically drives itself to a critical point by 
some dynamic process, no matter what state it starts off in. These systems are perpetually 
out of balance, but organized in a poised state - the critical state – where anything can 
happen within well-defined statistical laws.
20
 Self-organised criticality is the way nature is able 
to make enormous transformations over short time scales.
21 
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The non-equilibrium master metaphor is the sandpile.  Whereas macro-level distributions 
emerge as stable features of scale-free systems, at the micro-level, such systems exhibit a 
strong degree of path dependence. To use the sandpile as an illustration, it matters exactly 
where and when the grains land. This means that point prediction often turns out to be futile, 
as exemplified by earthquakes. This does not mean, however, that no regularities exist. In 
particular, it is important to distinguish complex adaptive systems of the self-organised 
criticality (SOC) kind from mere chaos, which also generates unpredictable behaviour.
22
 
 
What is unique about SOC systems is that they do not have to be carefully tuned to stay at 
the critical point where they generate the scale-free output responsible for the power laws. 
They do it automatically, i.e. they are ‘self’ organised.  
 
The characteristics of non-equilibrium self-organized critical-point phenomena, such as 
extreme sensitivity to fluctuations, ‘scale-free’ events and, in particular, power law probability 
distributions are found widely both in nature and in the world of human affairs. Power-law 
distributions are the fingerprint of self-organized criticality.
23
 
 
The idea that large systems tend to evolve into a poised ‘critical’ state, way out of balance, 
where minor disturbances may lead to events, called avalanches, of any size, can easily be 
applied to politics, such as looking at events in the Middle East, relations between the United 
States and China, the oil market, disease, nuclear proliferation, cyber warfare or a dozen 
other problems of global affairs and security.
24
 
 
Small changes in complex adaptive systems can have a disproportionate effect 
– the Butterfly effect 
Linear thinking assumes that large events need large causes, for example, the large mass 
extinction that killed the dinosaurs was caused by a very large meteorite. However, non-linear 
thinking points out those large catastrophic events occur as a consequence of the same 
dynamics that produces small ordinary events. This observation runs counter to the usual way 
of thinking about large events, in which we look for equally large causes.
25
  
 
Nonlinearity causes small changes on one level of organisation to produce large effects at the 
same or different level. This is called positive feedback.
26
 The phenomenon where a small 
change in the initial state of a dynamic system can dramatically alter its subsequent evolution 
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is called the ‘Butterfly effect’.
1
 Characterised as the so-called butterfly effect: a butterfly flaps 
its wings over the Amazon rain forest and sets in motion events that lead to a storm over 
Chicago. The next time the butterfly flaps its wings, however, nothing of meteorological 
consequence happens.
27
 In non-linear systems small inputs can (but not always) lead to 
dramatically large consequences. Also, a very slight difference in the initial conditions 
produces very different outcomes, which is the reason for the unpredictability in weather and 
other non-linear systems.
27
   
 
Most of the time, small events, small shocks to the system, will only have small impacts, and 
large shocks will usually have big consequences. But the fact that we observe power-law 
behaviour in a system tells us that the system operates in a way that means that these 
relationships do not always hold. Sometimes, a very small event can have profound 
consequences, and occasionally a big shock can be contained and be of little import. It is not 
the power law itself which gives rise to these unexpected features of causality; rather it is the 
fact that we observe a power law in a system which tells us that causality within it behaves in 
this way.
28
  
 
Once a complex adaptive system is at the critical point and there is tension, small events can 
have disproportionate consequences. For example, the First World War started from the 
assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
29
 It was hardly the first 
time a member of a ruling family was killed by an assassination and when it does occur this 
does not usually signal a reason for war.  Another example of non-linear change is the 
unexpected fall of the Soviet Union which demanded a complete remapping of the world. The 
end of the U.S.S.R. stunned the same minds that were later stunned by 9/11 and the financial 
collapse of 2008. The U.S.S.R. collapsed quickly.  
 
Scientific knowledge seems to be a SOC system as it tends to be poised in a critical state. If 
so, then scientists should expect the unexpected. For the fabric of ideas is organised so that 
the tiniest chance discovery may at any moment and without warning activate a domino-like 
chain of effects leading to a terrific revolution. Foreseeing such revolutions is next to 
impossible, for the ultimate consequences of any new idea depends not so much on its own 
inherent profundity as on where it happens to fall within the network of all scientific ideas. So 
while chains of events in these systems may not be predictable, it is not the case that nothing 
is predictable. It is in the statistical pattern that emerges over many chains of events that we 
can hope to discover the laws for things historical.
30
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Fossil records tell us that extinctions happen on all scales, all the time, and that (like 
earthquakes) an extinction of any size can happen at any time. Some extinctions might be 
triggered by meteorite impacts; some might be triggered by Ice Ages.  Since power law 
systems do not need a large trigger in order to set off a large event, an extinction of any size 
might be set off by a trigger of any size. What matters is that we are dealing with a complex 
system – life on Earth – which is self-organising, feeding off a flow of energy, and exists at the 
edge of chaos.
31
 
 
The power law implies that a war, when it starts out, does not ‘know how big it will become’ – 
nor does anyone else. The power-law, suggests that the world’s political and social fabric 
tends to be organised on the very edge of instability, and in such a way that wars spread in a 
special way, so that their ultimate extent is nearly impossible to foresee. The scale free 
character of the power law suggests that at the outset of a war there are no obvious clues 
about how large it will become.
32
 The stress on SOC encourages us to search for scale-
invariant explanations. This means that rather than treating large wars, such as world wars, 
as qualitatively distinct events that require separate explanations, to get to a unified theory 
you need to explain all wars regardless of their size.
22
 
 
Systems that have power law distributions have ‘emergent’ properties or 
patterns 
Emergent properties show that the whole can be more than the sum of the parts
33
 and the so-
called emergent properties can only be described at higher levels than those of the individual 
units.
34
 The central idea of emergence is the idea that meaningful order can emerge 
spontaneously, all on its own in complex systems made of numerous interacting parts.
35  
An 
emergent property cannot be deduced or explained in terms of the properties of its 
constituents. In other words, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
1
 Feedback loops 
are a key factor behind this effect.   
 
Examples of emergent properties include: 
 
 The pattern of the whirlpool is the result of the dynamic interactions between the 
individual water molecules. The whirlpool is a collective or ‘emergent’ property of the 
system itself.  It is not an expected result, if you just study the properties of a single 
water molecule sitting in isolation. You need to have a few billion water molecules 
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together, add some energy in the right way, and then you get the complex macro 
pattern of a whirlpool.
36
 
 
  ‘Society’ and ‘market forces’ are emergent phenomena since they are formed from the 
interactions of millions of people making independent decisions which have different 
features than those of the studies of individuals that make it up.
37
  
 
 Pareto’s law of wealth distribution (power law) is an emergent property.
35
   Producing a 
power law is an emergent result as it is by no means the only relationship that can 
happen, e.g. it could have been a bell curve. There is nothing pre-ordained in producing 
a power law. Everyone is completely free to decide their own actions, yet out of this 
multiplicity of individual choices comes a mathematical law that holds true.
38
 
 
 Life is an emergent property, as are human beings.
39
 Zipf’s law of cities or words is an 
emergent property in the sense that it is not an obvious consequence of the underlying 
dynamical rules.
40
 
 
Power law distributions means the ‘the winner takes all’ Matthew effect applies 
The Pareto process is a rich-get-richer mechanism in which the most populous cities or best-
selling books get more inhabitants or sales in proportion to the numbers they already have. 
These distributions have a power law in their tail. These ‘rich-get-richer’ processes are also 
known as the Matthew effect, cumulative advantage or preferential attachment. The ‘Matthew’ 
effect comes from the biblical edict, ‘For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall 
have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.’ 
(Matthew 25:29 – King James Bible). This edict is harsh, but is very apt for reality. The 
Matthew effect helps explain why only a very few have most of the citations, only a few have 
most of the wealth, why a few cities have most of the population, why a few sites on the World 
Wide Web are so dominant, why only a few entertainers and film stars earn so much more 
that others, why only a few are so sexually active by number of partners, as well as why only 
a few are so well connected in social networks. When studying power law distributions, 
studying the key few is important, since the extreme power law outliers, sometimes called 
‘aristocrats’, are so well connected (or wealthy etc) that their activity dominates all else and no 
unfocussed attention has any chance of success.
41
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Book sales are an example of the Matthew effect, since book sales have the typical long tail 
power law distribution.  For example, only 10 titles (out of 1.2 million) in 2004 sold more than 
a million copies, whereas 1.15 million titles sold less than a 1,000 books each. In other words, 
about 98 percent of books are uncommercial whether they were intended that way or not.  
 
Pareto’s Law of Wealth provides the following examples of this uneven wealth distribution: 
 The world’s richest 2 percent own more than 50 percent of the world’s wealth, whilst the 
poorest 50 percent of people own 1 percent.
42
 
 
 In the United States only 20 percent of the population of the country own 85 per cent of 
the wealth.
3
 In the U.S.A. the benefits of economic growth over the last 30 years have 
largely been concentrated in the top 1%.
43
   
 
 In New Zealand the top 10% of the population holds 50% of the total wealth, and the 
bottom half owns around 5%. This compares with other countries like the US, UK, 
Australia and Canada where the bottom 30% of the population have less than 1% of the 
wealth.
44
 
 
This contrasts with what would happen if a normal Gaussian distribution applied to cities, 
book sales or wealth, where there would be a tight clustering around a mean. This makes an 
‘unreal’ world of essentially one size of city, one size of book sales and a very even wealth 
distribution. This is ‘unreal’ as it has never occurred at any time or location in history. For 
these non-linear phenomena (wealth, book sales etc) it is inherently an unfair non-linear 
world.  
 
Change is triggered by both internal/ external reasons 
Traditional economics and evolution believed that different extinctions are caused solely by 
shocks that are external to the system. However, for complex adaptive systems such as 
species extinctions and for the major ups and downs in the sharemarket, there are not always 
obvious external shocks than match dramatic changes in those systems.
45
  
 
Complexity theory believes that extinctions of all sizes (for species or companies) and 
sharemarket movements arise quite naturally from within the system itself, from the network 
of connections between the individual agents and how they evolve over time.
45
 The idea of 
needing an ‘external’ force is essentially a ‘linear’ idea, since it assumes that a large effect 
must come from a large impact. In a non-linear world, there is no simple way to predict 
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emergent behaviour. Self-organising criticality does not need a large change to make a large 
impact, as it is not a linear effect.
46
  This is a difficult idea to accept, since society still 
searches for big causes of share crashes etc.    
 
In areas where complex adaptive systems apply (that is any system where a power law 
distribution applies) it is now generally believed that both internal/ endogenous triggers and 
external/ exogenous triggers can be in operation at the same time. The two approaches to 
causing triggers are complementary and do not exclude each other.
47
 
 
Power law distributions give pattern prediction not point prediction  
We tend to make predictions by looking for patterns in the past and then extrapolating those 
patterns out into the future. Often this works quite well, especially if the world is fairly stable. 
But the frequent occurrence of ‘stable’ periods between punctuations points only gives us a 
false sense of predictability since the existence of power laws means that big changes are far 
more likely to occur than the expectations our mental models give us on the basis of past 
experience.
48
   
 
Friedrich Hayek’s main contribution to early complexity theory was to point out that you could 
only explain complex phenomena from pattern prediction, compared with the precise 
predictions in simple linear systems like classical physics.
49
  
 
Self-organizing criticality only tells you about the overall statistics of avalanches; it tells you 
nothing about any particular avalanche. This is another case where understanding is not the 
same thing as prediction.
50
 For example, knowing the history of events in non-linear systems 
often provides little or no prediction value as to the next event, despite the fact that each step 
follows logically from the previous step (historical explanations looking backwards).
51
  
 
For example, you will never be able to predict the size of the next earthquake or war, but the 
power law graph for that subject gives a clear forecasting framework at the highest level 
looking at all the available data, which we can learn from and help us get over the idea of 
needing to predict the next event. 
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Another example is Pareto’s law of wealth which is not about individuals. Rather, it captures a 
pattern that emerges at the level of many individuals and leaves individual histories aside. 
Pareto’s law reflects little about human cultural, behavioural, or intellectual features and 
arises instead as a consequence of some deeper principle of organisation.
52
 
 
The signature of a power law distribution is the straight line ‘log-log’ graph   
All power laws tend to look alike when plotted on a graph with a logarithmic scale. (Where 
each division is a factor of 10 larger than the one that came before it, for example, 1, 10, 100, 
1,000 and so on.) Common examples of logarithmic scales are the Richter scale of 
earthquakes and the decibel scale of sound volume.  When a power law is plotted on a log 
scale on both axes (called a ‘log-log graph’), a straight line sloping down should result. The 
exact angle of that slope varies, but whether it’s the size and frequency of earthquakes or the 
distribution of publicly listed companies by stock-market capitalization, the slope is always a 
straight line.
53
  
 
The exponent of the slope is called the ‘power’ which is why we use the term power law. Each 
power law is characterized by a unique exponent. The power law describes the degree 
distribution and the exponent is often called the degree exponent. For example, the 
distribution of incoming links on web pages follows a power law with a degree exponent close 
to two. The collective action of millions of webpage creators work together in a way that 
produces this emergent result, that is not a ‘random’ (i.e. not a normal distribution) network.
54
 
The exponent is therefore an important and powerful forecasting tool.
55
 
 
The straight line log-log graph is often called the signature of a power law. However, whilst 
this is a necessity, there are non-power data sets (such as ‘log-normal’ or exponential) that 
mimic this signature behaviour, so care needs to be taken.
56
  
 
High level power-law patterns (from straight line log-log power law charts) 
 
Examples include: 
 
 Authors (Lotka’s law) - As the number of articles published increases, authors 
producing that many publications become less frequent. For example, there are ¼ as 
many authors publishing two articles within a specified time period as there are 
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single-published authors, 1/9 as many publishing three articles, 1/16 as many 
publishing four articles, etc.
57
 
 
 Company sales - This means that firms with sales of $1 million are four times as 
numerous as those with $2 million, which are in turn four times as numerous as those 
with $4 million.
58
 Scaling means firms of size 1,000 are four times less common than 
firms of size 500, while firms of size 10,000 are 100 times less common than firms of 
size 1,000.  
 
 Earthquake energy (The Gutenberg/ Richter scale) - An increase of one unit on the 
scale corresponds to an increase in the amount of energy released by a factor of 30; 
a magnitude 2 earthquake is 30 times as powerful as a magnitude 1 earthquake, a 
magnitude 3 earthquake is 30 times more powerful than a magnitude 2 earthquake 
(and therefore 900 times more powerful than a magnitude 1 earthquake), and so on.
59
 
In terms of energy, the data indicates that whenever you double the energy released 
by an earthquake, it is one quarter less frequent.
60
 
 
 Earthquake magnitude (The Gutenberg/ Richter scale) - For every 1,000 earthquakes 
of magnitude 5 there are roughly 100 earthquakes of magnitude 6, 10 earthquakes of 
magnitude 7, and so on.
59
 
 
 Evolution - The fossil records show the size of extinction events, with a power law 
exponent close to 2. The distribution of the lifetimes of species also appears to follow 
a power law, with an exponent of about 1.7. The number of species per genus also 
appears to follow a power law with an exponent of about 1.5.  
 
 River networks - Every time you double the amount of water drained, you find that the 
number of such streams falls by a factor of about 2.7. If there are one hundred 
streams draining a thousand square kilometres, then there will be only about thirty-
seven draining two thousand square kilometres, and so on.
61
 
 
 Scientific citations (Redner’s law) - Double the number of citations and the number of 
papers receiving that many falls off by about eight.
62
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60
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 Share market returns and numbers of trades - The power law exponent is 3 (cubic 
law of returns). The cubic law predicts the existence of a few very large returns over a 
century.
5
 
 
 Size of cities (Zipf’s law) – For example a rank 3 city would have 1/3 the population of 
a country’s largest city, a rank four city would have ¼ the population of the largest 
city, and so on.
63
 
 
 The World Wide Web - the number of nodes having a certain number of links 
decreased by about five each time the number of links was doubled. In these 
networks, just a few nodes have so many links that 80 to 90 percent of the network’s 
total number of links feed into just a small fraction of the nodes - an architecture that 
is dominated by especially well connected hubs.
64
 
 
 War (Richardson’s law) - Every time you double the number of deaths, the wars of 
that size become four times less common. If you use the number of casualties divided 
by the world population at the time, the precise pattern becomes 2.62 times less 
frequent every time you double the number of deaths.
65
 
 
 Wealth (Pareto’s law) - Each time wealth goes up by a factor of ten, the number of 
people having that much falls by a factor of about six (about six times as many people 
have $1 million, for example, as have $10 million).
66 
Said another way, if wealth 
doubles from $1 million to $2 million, the incidence of people with at least that much 
money is cut in four, which is an exponent of two.
67 
 
For the emergent power law pattern, the details don’t matter 
Zipf’s power law distribution of company sizes comes out of all the chaos of millions of people 
doing an infinite variety of different things, from which emerges a mathematical pattern.
68
 The 
skewness appears to be insensitive to changes in political and regulatory environments, 
immune to waves of mergers and acquisitions, and unaffected by surges of new firm entry 
and bankruptcies. Whilst the overall emergent pattern remains constant over time, at the 
individual level of firms there is perpetual churn. The other key point to note is the fact that 
details don’t matter.
69
 Prediction of specific events and details is impossible.
68
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Power law patterns offer an aid in getting to grips with systems that simply never seem to 
settle down, that are always churning and changing and evolving, where nothing seems 
constant, and nothing is ever repeated.
68
 
 
Increased networks/ interdependence, means increased turbulence  
Networks are an essential ingredient in any complex adaptive system.
 70
  Unfortunately this 
means that many of the most important world networks – economic, political systems, 
ecosystems, and so on – are poised perpetually on the very edge of instability and tumultuous 
upheaval. As a consequence, it is something akin to a universal law of nature that the course 
of history must necessarily be punctuated – and quite frequently – by seemingly inexplicable 
upheavals. The character of history will therefore be long periods of relative calm and gradual 
change to be punctuated by staggeringly overwhelming events that totally reshape the social 
and political landscape.
71
  
 
There exists a dangerous paradox – the more closely we’re bound, the less resilient we all 
become. Studies of food webs or trade networks, electrical systems and stock markets, find 
that as they become more densely linked they also become less resilient; networks, afterall, 
propagate and even amplify disturbances.  Worse, the more efficient these networks are, the 
faster they spread those dangers. Drop a shock into a network and you get a chain reaction 
and the end state can not be predicted.
72
 The turbulence in all these systems dramatically 
increases due to power law effects within network flows. Extremes will get more extreme due 
to the ‘Matthew’ effect, where the winners take all. All these interlocking economic/ technology 
networks or webs are subject to cascades of change leading to the emergent pattern of 
punctuated equilibrium.
73
 
 
Strategy is about surviving the ‘Red Queen Race’ 
Schumpeter said that, ‘Strategy must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative 
destruction; it can-not be understood irrespective of it or, in fact on the hypothesis that there is 
a perennial lull’.  Schumpeter believed that a creative response as opposed to an adaptive 
response can never be predicted and is therefore indeterminate, shaping long-run outcomes 
in a country, industry, or firm.
74
 The punctuated nature of change tricks our pattern-
recognizing minds into thinking that the world is more stable than it really is.
75
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There is no such thing as a safe, stable industry in the long term. Schumpeter’s ghost is alive 
and well and the ‘gales of creative destruction’ are blowing harder than ever. Competitive 
advantage is rare and short-lived in the biological world as well. In biological systems, species 
are locked in a never-ending co-evolutionary arms race (prey v predator) with each other. 
Biologists refer to such co-evolutionary spirals as Red Queen races, named after the Red 
Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass. It was she who said, ‘In this place it 
takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place’. There is no such thing as 
winning a Red Queen race, the best you can ever do is run faster than the competition. In 
evolutionary systems, sustainable competitive advantage does not exist; there is only a 
never-ending race to create new sources of temporary advantage. Understanding this means 
we change our definition of an excellent company from one of continuous high performance 
for very long periods (an achievement that is almost non-existent) to one that can string 
together a series of temporary advantages over time – in other words, a strong runner in the 
Red Queen race.
75  
Learning faster than your competitors is the only sustainable advantage in 
an environment of rapid innovation and change. Resilience is key to survival. 
 
Importance of modelling 
One very important tool which I have hardly mentioned in this thesis is ‘modelling’. Probably 
every power-law example in this thesis comes from sources that not only record the power-
law log-log chart but also record attempts at modelling that subject using that chart’s power-
law co-efficient. I acknowledge the extreme importance of power-law charts to modellers 
since this has provided new methods and a greatly enlarged range of subjects (i.e. non-linear) 
to model.  As stated in the introduction, my interest is only in the high level principles of non-
linearity as it affects strategy. I am not a modeller, so I have not emphasized that aspect but 
that should not be taken as a lack of appreciation of how important power-laws are to 
modelling over a whole range of subjects. Whilst ‘modelling’ is an important technique it is not 
the one word answer to my thesis question. It is not my interest or my journey for this thesis. 
However, I believe this thesis would be a good background explanation of the subject of 
power-law non-linearity for modellers and non-modellers (like me).   It doesn’t help you 
‘predict’ the next event, but it should provide a good description of what is happening or could 
happen.  
 
For every power-law subject contained in this thesis, modellers are working on ‘bottom-up’ 
modelling where they focus on the lower-level individual entities or agents that make up the 
system. From my literature review, I can conclude that power–laws with their straight line 
graphs (and therefore power-law coefficients) have provided a wonderful tool to modellers to 
increase their understanding of the world (and therefore ours) and to understand the 
dynamics of agents as never before. Non-linear systems were previously considered too 
difficult to understand and predict. Now, with the techniques described in this thesis, the study 
of non-linear systems is becoming more productive.   
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Now that I have completed this study of power laws and non-linearity, I believe I have found a 
useful framework (Complexity) to understand strategy. For example, when dealing with linear 
matters, linear based strategic planning approaches are appropriate, but when dealing with 
non-linear matters, then non-linear strategic planning approaches are essential. 
Understanding non-linearity is important in understanding such things as ‘Black Swans’ and 
‘punctuated equilibrium. Luck, serendipity and ‘bounded rationality’ are always involved in 
complex adaptive systems, whereas linear systems tend to comply with the so called ‘rational’ 
traditions in science and economics. The strategist needs a strategy toolkit that can handle 
both linear and non-linear situations.  
 
Final thoughts – No difference between natural and human power law activities 
For this thesis I have found no effective difference between natural effects (e.g. earthquakes 
or animal extinction rates) that follow power law distributions and human activities (e.g. 
wealth, war, citations etc) that follow power law distributions. I have therefore not separated 
the two different types in this thesis. In fact the later section on networks is in purely 
alphabetical order of headings. The implication of this lack of clear difference between natural 
and human effects is both a surprise and is troubling. For example, empirically, the power law 
for war is a very good fit and that is not a comforting finding. It poses the profound question, 
as to whether we can actually change this underlying pattern or are we predestined to fit the 
various power law patterns such as in war or wealth. Are human agents inherently just grains 
of sand in the ‘sandpile’ of life or can the grains ‘think’ and determine their own future? My 
thesis therefore suggests that ‘overall’, humans are living in a completely deterministic world, 
hence power law effects happen at the macro level. Yet as individuals at a micro level, we like 
to think that human agency does count. Life and strategy is therefore all about striving to do 
better in a world that is often very unfair and non-linear. Understanding the rules of life is 
therefore essential.  
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